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PLACING BLAME WHERE BLAME IS DUE: THE
CULPABILITY OF ILLEGAL ARMED GROUPS AND
NARCOTRAFFICKERS IN COLOMBIA'S ENVIRONMENTAL
AND HUMAN RIGHTS CATASTROPHES
Luz E. NAGLE*
"Society is defined not just by what it creates but
more importantly by what it chooses not to destroy.
In the end, it will be an ethical decision whether or
not to preserve the integrity of this beautiful planet."'
I. Introduction and Background
II. Colombia's Legacy of Internal Armed Conflict
A. The Actors in the Conflict
1. The FARC
2. The ELN
3. The Paramilitaries and the Emergence of the AUC
III. International Environmental Law and Internal Armed
Conflict
A. International Armed Conflict and the Environment
B. International Humanitarian Law and the Colombian
Conflict
C. Law of Internal Armed Conflict and Environmental
Damage
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IV. Colombia's Implementation of Environmental Protections
A. Colombia's International Environmental Commitments
B. Colombia's Constitution
C. Internal Laws
1. The Code of Natural Resources
2. Law 99 of 1993
3. Enforcement
a. Law 599 of 2000 of the Colombian Penal Code
b. Government Monitoringof Environmental Crimes
V. Armed Conflict Degrades Colombia's Environment: Ineffective
Government
A. Unique Biodiversity and Fragile Environment
B. Environmental Effects of Armed Conflict
1. Deforestation from Coca and Poppy Cultivation
2. Precursors and Their Contamination of the Environ-
ment
3. Environmental Terrorism by Armed Groups
C. Government Interdiction and the Environment
VI. Humanitarian Consequences of the Armed Conflict
VII. Conclusion
Existing research and debate focuses mostly on the social and
economic consequences of the Colombian conflict, while largely
overlooking the convergence of environmental degradation and
human suffering due to the illicit activities and insurgent violence
perpetrated on the national territory and its rural and indigenous
inhabitants by illegal armed groups and narcotraffickers. The
purpose of this Article is to articulate and report on the massive
environmental destruction and human rights abuses caused by
Colombia's illegal armed groups. It will emphasize that the vic-
tims are often indigenous groups and the rural poor, incapable of
protecting their livelihoods and property rights, unable to resist
the pressures brought on them by armed groups and narco-
traffickers, and less likely to have access to government resources
and constitutional protections.
The Article also presents recent findings on the environmental
impact of the internal armed conflict to show that environmental
degradation and inequitable sharing of the biological and natural
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resources can be both a cause and a result of internal armed
conflict. Disputes occur over land, water, forestry biodiversity,
food-growing potential, mineral and water resources, and forest
cover to mask illegal activities and shield the encampments of
armed combatants. Colombia's situation highlights that a critical
contribution to peace demands committed implementation of
serious and effective policies regarding the conservation and
management of forests, water resources, land, and areas of critical
biodiversity, as well as the equitable sharing of the benefits of
biological resources-all of which are intrinsically linked to
essential issues of national security.2
Part I introduces the topic. Part II provides an overview of
Colombia's internal armed conflict and its humanitarian crisis that
has existed for more than fifty years. This Section explains that for
many years Colombia confronted only sporadic and isolated
hostilities, and until recently, the dissident groups failed to
exercise control over the national territory. Part II also shows that
such low-level hostility was the source of massive migration and
bloodshed, and the presence of illegal drugs exacerbated the
conflict, transforming Colombia into a nation at war. This Section
presents some of the primary actors in the conflict, including their
origins and evolution, their role in the struggle and in the illegal
drug industry, and their responsibility in Colombia's human
tragedy and in the nation's environmental devastation. Massive
migration from rural areas also demonstrates the need to recognize
the nexus between human and environmental rights through
Colombia's situation.
Part III discusses how environmental protection laws in an
international armed conflict may be applied to an internal armed
conflict. The examination revolves around the environmental pro-
tection in an armed conflict designed to prevent harm to the health
or survival of the population. This Section also addresses other
bodies of law that protect the environment in times of armed con-
flict such as peacetime environmental treaties and international
2 Jeffrey A. McNeely, Biodiversity, War, and Tropical Forests, in WAR AND
TROPICAL FORESTS: CONSERVATION IN AREAS OF ARMED CONFLICT 3 (Steven V.
Price ed., 2003).
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human rights law. In addition, Part III describes the Colombian
government's position regarding the Geneva Convention and the
application of international humanitarian law to the nation's
conflict. Finally, this Section addresses the laws applicable to
environmental protection during internal armed conflict.
Part IV describes several laws and regulations the Colombian
government has implemented to protect the environment. This
Section argues that the failure of the Colombian government to
apply the already enacted legislation during peacetime makes it
harder to do so during times of conflict. Part IV also addresses
Colombia's international environmental commitments, specifically
the Convention on Biological Diversity through which Colombia
developed programs and national strategies for conservation and
sustainable use of biological diversity. This Section also examines
relevant sections of the Colombian Constitution and domestic
legislation.
Part V presents the natural resources and biodiversity
impacted by the armed conflict. This Section explores the wide-
spread environmental damage caused by combat in fragile and
highly biologically diverse ecosystems, and the forced displacement
of thousands of civilians deeper into unspoiled areas of tropical
rainforest or overpopulated urban areas.' In addition, Part V
explains the environmental devastation caused by actions of illegal
groups as a result of either manufacturing drugs in order to fuel
the armed conflict and sustain the illegal combatants, or as
deliberate acts of environmental terrorism against the nation's oil,
gas, and power infrastructure.
Finally, Part VI describes the humanitarian devastation
resulting from the conflict, and shows how the rural and indige-
nous populations are caught up in the power struggle between
illegal armed groups for control over national resources and the
profits of the illegal drug business.
'According to the Colombian non-governmental organization Consultoria para
los Derechos Humanos y el Desplazamiento ("CODHES"), during 2002,412,553
individuals were displaced, and in 2003, there were 207,607 displaced.
Desplazamiento en Colombia - La dimensi6n de una crisis no resuelta (Feb. 18,
2004), at http://www.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf/0/b133e813bced481a85256e4000
795eca?OpenDocument.
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I. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND
History demonstrates how war assaults the planet's environ-
ment and how nature is destroyed as an act of war. Nature is used
as a weapon of war and its destruction affects innocent individuals
who depend on their environment, forcing them to leave the areas
that formed and nourished their communities. Environmental
damage is expensive, traumatic and sometimes irreversible. Eco-
logical assaults in combat zones are often kept secret or widely
ignored, resulting in more devastating humanitarian and environ-
mental harm.
Today, many tropical forest countries like Colombia are
experiencing some type of internal armed conflict.4 Colombia is
a nation whose precious, unique environment and priceless
biodiversity are under assault. The nation's tropical jungles, lush
river valleys, temperate agricultural zones, and mountainous
forest expanses languish amid the chaos of guerrilla warfare,
anarchy, banditry, drug cartels, and armed conflict. Of all
tragedies in Colombia, the nation's long-running internal armed
conflict is the most overwhelming, consuming, intricate, and
bewildering.' The conflict concerns several actors: left-wing
guerrilla groups, right-wing paramilitary combatants, and narco-
traffickers, pitted against the Colombian government and foreign
military and civilian advisers charged with various tasks and
goals.6 Compounding and prolonging the internal conflict are
" There are struggles in Colombia, Indonesia, Sri Lanka, and several countries
in Africa and Central America. McNeely, supra note 2, at 1.
' Internal armed conflicts have risen. Of the 110 armed conflicts between 1989
and 1999, 7 were international, 94 were internal, and another 9 were internal
with some form of foreign force intervention. Moreover, of the 192 sovereign
nations, 163.consider it necessary to assign a considerable portion of their re-
sources for keeping and maintaining regular armed forces in order to confront
internal or external threats to their national security. ARTHUR H. WESTING ET
AL., ENVIRONMENTAL DEGRADATION AS BOTH CONSEQUENCE AND CAUSE OF
ARMED CONFLICT 3, 5 (Working Paper No. 010531, 2001), available athttp:/!
www.institute-for-nonviolence.com.au/downloads/pdf/EnvirDegrad.pdf.
6 See Maria Christina Cardenas, Note, Colombia's Peace Process: The Con-
tinuing Search For Peace, 15 FLA. J. INT'L L. 273, 276-80 (2002). For several
years, the United States has supported the Colombian government's counter-
drug policies and programs, and September 11, 2001, marked United States
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complex problems involving property rights, social inequity,
economic disparity, institutional corruption, narcotrafficking,
terrorism, significant capital flight, and a debilitating brain drain.'
To keep the nation afloat, policymakers juggle the dissimilar
and urgent tasks of fighting terrorism while attempting to protect
the environment and human rights,jumpstart a stagnant economy
and reduce excessive unemployment,' address high levels of
corruption,9 prosecute the war on drugs on Colombian soil, and
cooperation in Colombia's efforts to defend the nation from insurgent and right-
wing groups classified as terrorists. The United States supplies helicopters,
intelligence, and different types of training in Colombia, all of which is used in
both counter-narcotic and anti-terrorist operations. Luz E. Nagle, U.S. Mutual
Assistance to Colombia: Vague Promises and Diminishing Returns, 23 FoRDHAM
INT'L L.J. 1235, 1270-71 (2000) [hereinafter Nagle, U.S. Mutual Assistance].
' In 2001, the Foreign Ministry of Colombia estimated that four million
Colombians had left the country. The reasons for leaving included economic
recession, guerrilla abductions, threats, and kidnappings. Jeremy McDermott,
Colombia's Mass Exodus, BBC NEWS ONLINE, May 5, 2001, at http://news.bbc.
co.uk/2/hi/programmes/from-ourown-correspondent/1314619.stm. In 1999, the
National Department for Planning stated that Colombia lost more than 4.4
billion pesos ($2 million) due to the overseas flight of human capital. Exodo de
Colombianos, at http://www.terra.com/especiales/informecolombia/exodo-de
colombia_2.html (last visited Oct. 4, 2004).
"In 2003, Colombia's inflation rate was 6.49%. Informe Sobre Inflaci6n, (Dec.
2003) at http:I/www.banrep.gov.co/inflaci/2003/inflacion dic_2003.pdf. According
to the Colombian Human Rights Network,
[a] mong Colombia's 40 million people, more than half (56%) live
in "absolute poverty," earning less than $500 US per year. The
Colombian government's adoption of neo-liberal economic
policies has only made matters worse, increasing absolute
poverty from 45% a decade ago, to 56% today. In rural areas
where 80% of people live in absolute poverty, the effect of neo-
liberal policies has been even more disastrous. Colombia has an
open unemployment rate of 20.7% (one of the highest in Latin
America) and an under employment rate of 57%.
Thus, only one in four Colombians are fully employed. Witness for Peace,
Colombia Report (Mar. 2001), at http://colhrnet.igc.org/newitems/wforp.301
report.htm.
' Colombia ranks 57th in the 2002 Transparency International Corruption
Perception Index, with a 3.6% CPI score. A score of 10 means that the country
is clean and a score of zero signifies that the country is highly corrupt. A country
with a score less than 5.0 has a serious corruption problem. According to
Transparency International, Colombia has improved its rating since the 2002
index. Johann Graf Lambsdorff, 2002 Global Corruptions Index, Global
Corruption, 265 (Nov. 27, 2002), at http://www.globalcorruptionreport.org/
download/gcr2003/24_Dataandresearch.pdf. According to a 2002 World
Bank survey, "bribes are paid in 50 per cent [sic] of all state contracts in
Colombia. Another World Bank report estimates the cost of corruption in
[Vol. 29:1
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relieve the suffering of citizens displaced by the internal conflict.'°
Were this not enough, the Colombian state is under immense pres-
sure by outside governments and non-governmental organizations
Colombia at US $2.6 billion annually, the equivalent of 60 per cent [sic] of the
country's debt." Transparency International, Global Corruption Report 2003
Press Release, 4 (Jan. 22, 2003), at http://www.globalcorruptionreport.org/
download/gcr2003/ ENGLISH _regional summaries.pdf. For more information
on developments, news, and legislation regarding corruption, see the
Transparencia por Colombia website at http://www.transparenciacolombia.
org.co. (last visited Oct. 4, 2004).
'o The annual statistics of displaced people show that the number of registered
displaced individuals is less than the estimation of actual displaced people. The
registration takes place through the Red Solidaridad Social-Sistema Unico de
Registro ("SUR") and the estimation is performed by the Consultoria para los
Derechos Humanos y el Desplazamiento ("CODHES"). According to CODHES,
the following numbers of people in Colombia have been displaced per year,
beginning with the year 1996:
Year Number of Displaced People
1996 181,000
1997 257,000
1998 308,000
1999 288,127
2000 317,375
2001 341,925
2002 412,533
2003 207,607
Pan American Health Organization, Cifras y Estadisticas, at http://www.
disaster-info.net/desplazados/investigacion.htm (last visited Oct. 8, 2004).
According to SUR in 2003, there were 1,205,514 registered displaced people due
to the violence. Presidencia de la Repfblica, Registro Nacional de Poblaci6n
desplazadapor la Violencia, at http://www.red.gov.co/Download/Files/Registro-
SUR/registroSUR nov_13/RegistroSURNov_13_webGeneral.htm (last visi-
ted Oct. 9, 2004). The Red de Solidaridad Social ("RSS") was created in 1997
through Law 368 of 1997. See Law 368 of 1977 (Colom.), available at http:l/
www.red.gov.co/eng/LaInstitucion/Normatividad/Ley368-1997/ (last visited Oct.
9, 2004). The RSS is an administrative entity ascribed to the Presidency,
charged with executing the social policies of the State. See Presidencia de la
Repdblica, Hacio un Estado Comunitario, at http://www. red.gov.co (last visited
Oct. 9, 2004).
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that monitor, scrutinize, and often criticize every policy decision
and governmental action. 1
Colombia's conflict hurts both individuals and nature. Con-
servationists and environmentalists from around the world are
concerned with the harm being done to Colombia's rich natural
habitats, its vast tropical forests, and its unique fauna. Colombia's
lush ecosystem supports millions of people who depend on its
water, forests, food sources, and medicinal plants and has been a
grave concern at least since the 1980s. 12 Colombian territory is
vital to sustaining life on the planet. The southern department' 3 of
Amazonas, which forms an important part of the Amazon basin, 4
is particularly vital, yet is under immense and increasing pressure
from logging, accidental fires, and deforestation.'5
Colombia's internal conflict has forced many rural poor away
from their sources of livelihood, placing tremendous pressure on
the fragile biodiversity and ecosystem. The amount of displaced
Some foreign governments, non-government organizations, and international
celebrities have taken extraordinary steps to show sympathy and support for
Colombian revolutionaries, including having hosted, toasted, and feted FARC
leaders during a February 2000 whirlwind tour of Europe as guests of the
governments of Sweden, Norway, France, Italy (including a meeting with the
Pope at the Vatican), Spain, and Switzerland. Tim Johnson, Colombian Rebels
Hit Road For a Lesson in Democracy, MIAMI HERALD, Feb. 8, 2000, at 1A.
12 Carlos Alberto Chica, Colombia: Environmentalists Declare "All-Out" War,
Inter Press Service, June 4, 1984.
' A department in the Republic of Colombia is loosely analogous to a state in the
United States. Colombia has 32 departments and one capital district. These are:
Amazonas, Antioquia, Arauca, Atlantico, Distrito Capital de Bogota, Bolivar,
Boyaca, Caldas, Caqueta, Casanare, Cauca, Cesar, Choco, Cordoba, Cund-
inamarca, Guainia, Guaviare, Huila, La Guajira, Magdalena, Meta, Narino,
Norte de Santander, Putumayo, Quindio, Risaralda, San Andres y Providencia,
Santander, Sucre, Tolima, Valle del Cauca, Vaupes, and Vichada. CIA, WORLD
FACTBOOK, at http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/ co.html (last
visited Oct. 9, 2004).
14 "The Amazon often is referred to as the 'Earth's Lungs' because of the massive
quantities of carbon dioxide the rainforests absorb from the atmosphere.
Unfortunately, researchers say those vital organs are beginning to resemble the
lungs of a lifelong smoker." Stephanie Kriner, Amazon Rainforest Is Fading
Faster Than Originally Thought (May 26, 1999), at http://www.disasterrelief.
org/Disasters/990414Amazon/ (last visited Oct. 9, 2004).
5 Id. A researcher has estimated that more than sixteen percent of the
Amazon's original rainforest cover is gone and the percentage increases at an
alarming rate during times of drought. Id.
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people and their present conditions are quite alarming. According
to a report by Colombia Human Rights Network,
[olf Colombia's 40 million people, 2.1-2.5 million are
estimated to have been displaced, forced to leave
their homes and communities because of continuing
armed conflict. Displacement is an experience large-
ly restricted to Colombia's poor. Forty percent are
Afro-Colombians displaced from Colombia's oil-rich
pacific coast region. As is true in much of the world,
Colombia's poor are disproportionately women and
children: more than 58 percent of the displaced are
female and 39 percent of displaced households are
headed by women, a group largely abandoned by the
government. 16
The root of humanitarian and environmental damage in
Colombia stems from conflicting economic, social, and cultural
realities and policies, and the significant inequity regarding access
to the population's resources and rural land. Consider the follow-
ing: The World Bank reports the poverty rate in Colombia at 19
percent, with 75 percent of the poor living in the rural country-
side.17 Yet, in these rural areas, a mere "3 percent of the landed
elite own 71.3 percent of arable land while 57 percent of the
poorest farmers must subsist off of a mere 2.8 percent of the
land."'" Viewed from another perspective, "less than eight per cent
[sic] of rural households own 40 per cent [sic] of the cultivated
lands, pushing land-poor farmers toward marginal and forested
areas."' 9 These farmers then contribute to deforestation by clear-
ing virgin tracts of land for sustenance farming or for the cultiva-
tion of illicit crops.2 °
16 Colombia Report, supra note 8, at 13.
17 Colleen Tighe, Deforestation in Colombia, 4 TED Case Studies No. 1 (Jan.
1995), at http://www.american.edu/TED/coldefor.htm (last visited Oct. 9, 2004).
18 Id.
19 Gabriela Grau, Colombia, World Wildlife Federation Research Centre, at
http://www.wwf.org.uk/researcher/places/0000000071.asp (last visited Oct. 9,
2004).
20 See Judy Mann, Waging Chemical Warfare in Colombia, WASH. POST, Mar.
16, 2001, at Cll.
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In response to these threats against the environment and
biodiversity, Colombia has enacted a corpus of domestic environ-
mental laws and regulations and signed several multilateral
environmental conventions, including the 1992 Convention on
Biological Diversity.21 The question is whether, in an armed
conflict setting, a government is obligated to protect the nation's
biodiversity, promote the use of sustainable biological resources,
and implement initiatives for improving and preserving the
environment and the livelihood of those living in the rural
territories. Can such obligations be honored and supported if they
are considered a vital component of the protection of human
rights?
During an internal armed conflict, the protection of the
environment and environmental policies, notwithstanding their
urgency, becomes a question of priorities. An armed conflict brings
numerous casualties to the nation confronting it, and, when
internal conflict escalates to become a matter of national and social
survival, environmental issues and, too often, humanitarian issues
are relegated to a lower priority.22 Regardless of the severity of an
internal armed struggle, the society's infrastructure deteriorates
and the government is forced to compromise or cancel crucial
services, terminate important projects, or close bureaucratic offices
in order to divert resources to military assets.23
21 The most important of domestic legislation was Law 99 of 1993, which among
other things created the Environmental Ministry, and established controls and
regulations for protection of the environment. Ley 99 de 1993 [Law 99 of 19931
(1993) (Colom.), at http://www.secretariasenado.gov.co/leyes/L0099_93.htm (last
visited Oct. 13, 2004) [hereinafter Law 991.
22 For several decades, Colombian citizens as well as the government ignored the
humanitarian tragedy of displaced countrymen. The nation grew complacent in
living with violence in rural areas, reacting with dismay to the numerous
massacres, terrorist attacks, and killings, but remaining oblivious to the massive
exodus of victims caught in the crossfire. See Daniel Pcaut, Preface to EL
DESPLAZAMIENTO POR LA VIOLENCIA EN COLOMBIA: EXPERIENCIAS, ANALISIS Y
POSIBLEs ESTRATEGIAS DE ATENCION EN ELDEPARTAMENTODEANTIOQUIA 12,12-
23 (Carlos Tassara et al. eds., 1998).
23 For example, in 1998, the Colombian President Andres Pastrana significantly
reduced the budget for the Ministry of the Environment. Maria D. Alvarez,
Forests in the Time of Violence: Conservation Implications of the Colombian
War, in WAR AND TROPICAL FORESTS: CONSERVATION IN AREAS OF ARMED
CONFLICT, supra note 2, at 64 [hereinafter Alvarez, Forests].
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In weak nations, such as Colombia, the rule of law is all but
absent in the rural territory where much of the armed conflict
occurs. In these zones of conflict, riddled with so many critical
problems, the erosion of civilian or military rule threatens conser-
vation efforts, and the lack of justice in adjudication in the
countryside renders any stewardship of the environment nearly
impotent.24 The effects of economic disparity, the absence of law,
and the abandonment of governmental presence in rural areas
exacerbate the violence, with inauspicious consequences. In addi-
tion, the flight of millions of peasants trying to escape rural vio-
lence creates additional pressures on the environment and greatly
hinders forestry conservation and restoration.25
Ironically, armed groups practice the only environmental
protection in the zones of conflict: a form of coercion called
"gunpoint conservation." 6 This coercion usually involves placing
landmines along mountainous forest access points in order to
discourage penetration and to give protective perimeters to
remote guerrilla encampments and drug labs.27
Environmental harm in wartime is unavoidable, especially
when armed groups target the environment to gain some advan-
tage over adversaries or, as in Colombia, pollute the environment
by manufacturing illegal drugs that are then trafficked interna-
tionallyto provide revenue for provisioningcombatants and foment-
ing the conflict. 2' History demonstrates that armed conflict results
in long-lasting environmental damage.29
24 See id. at 65.
2 5 Id.
2 6 Id. at 59.
27 Id.
28 For an in-depth discussion of the drug production activities of armed groups
in Colombia, see Ana Maria Diaz & Fabio Sanchez, A Geography of Illicit Crops
(Coca Leaf) and Armed Conflict in Colombia, 32-44 (2004), available at http:/!
www.wider.unu.edu/conference/conference-2004-1/conference%202004- 1-
papers/Diaz-Sanchez-1905.pdf. Diaz and Sanchez's study attempts a quanti-
tative analysis of the origins, causes, and consequences of the production of illicit
crops in Colombia.
29 Historical examples include General Sherman's "scorched earth" March to
the Sea in the United States Civil War, and the firebombing of Romania's
oilfields by the British Royal Air Force in World War II. See Jay E. Austin &
Carl E. Bruch, Introduction to THE ENVIRONMENTAL CONSEQUENCES OF WAR:
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Over the last several decades, Colombia's delicate ecosystem
has been under relentless assault by many factors. Various
governmental incentives to promote a higher yield or value of crops
encouraged significant and often unmonitored agricultural expan-
sion into delicate forest areas. This growth indirectly caused the
killing of endemic species,3" triggering a decline in environmental
quality. New economically driven activities, such as mining, cattle
ranching, and timber and perennial harvesting, as well as the
expansion of illicit crops and the escalation of the internal armed
conflict, are responsible for today's damage.3 '
Compounding the environmental deterioration caused by
economic pressures, the internal armed conflict brings a sinister
element of environmental devastation to Colombia's already
beleaguered ecosystem and biodiversity. Morethan 250,000 Colom-
bians have been killed by internal warfare and more than
1,350,000 rural poor have been forcibly displaced throughout the
entire nation.3 2 Such large-scale displacement hinders the govern-
ment's implementation of environmental policies and greatly
impedes, if not "precludes the practice of forest management,
LEGAL, ECONOMIC, AND SCIENTIFIC PERSPECTIVES 1 (Jay E. Austin & Carl E.
Bruch eds., 2000). Examples of environmental destruction in internal armed
conflicts include the conflicts in Bosnia and Kosovo. Id. at 44.
" See Kenneth Young et al., Plant Evolution and Endemism in Andean South
America: An Introduction, 68 THE BOTANICAL REVIEW, 4 Jan. 1, 2002, (noting
that Colombia may have the highest degree of endemic flora and fauna in the
Andean countries).
31 Astrid Puentes, Colombia: Cumplimiento del Convenio de Diversidad
Biol6gica en Bosques, at http://www.wrm.org.uy/paises/Amazonia/Puentes.html
(last visited Oct. 9, 2004). The primary causes of the destruction of Colombia's
environment and its unique biodiversity are: 1) the expansion of the agricultural
border and colonization into forested and jungle areas (73.3%), 2) timber
production, involving both legal and illegal harvesting (11.7%, half of which
comes from the Pacific region), 3) firewood consumption (11.0%), 4)forest
fires (2%), and 5) cultivation of illicit crops (2%) for drug production. Some
indirect causes of destruction of the environment and biodiversity include the
inadequate execution and ill planning of infrastructure projects such as
hydroelectric dams, highways and road building projects, and weak or corrupted
studies of the environmental impact in threatened regions. Id.3 2Marfa D. Alvarez, Environmental Damages from Illicit Crops and Processing
of Prohibited Drugs in Colombia, available at http://www.colombia.
edu/-mda200l/osaka.html (last visited Oct. 9, 2004) [hereinafter Alvarez,
Environmental Damages].
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restoration and conservation. '' "3 The prolonged conflict also
creates conditions that are favorable to the expansion of illicit
crops.
II. COLOMBIA'S LEGACY OF INTERNAL ARMED CONFLICT
35
During Colombia's nearly forty-year struggle, its military
actions, migrant movements, excessive natural resource exploita-
tion, and deficient management and institutional capacities have
seriously damaged the nation's environment and corroded the
welfare of its rural and indigenous populations. Colombia has lan-
guished under guerrilla conflict and societal turmoil since the
middle of the 20th century, when longstanding socio-political
tensions between the Conservative and Liberal parties, the
dominant traditional parties in Colombian politics, erupted into
widespread violence.36 In the last fifty-five years, the nation has
yielded excessive bloodshed. By the late 1940s, a defacto civil war
was underway throughout the Colombian territory. The war
became known as the Violencia and persisted well into the 1960s,
resulting in the deaths of as many as 300,000 Colombians, or two
3 lvarez, Forests, supra note 23, at 65.
34 Alvarez, Environmental Damages, supra note 32.
" Until recently, the Colombian conflict was described as an "ambiguous war,"
that did not reach the level of an internal armed conflict under Protocol II of the
Geneva Conventions of 1949. Under the Protocol, three conditions must be met:
the conflict is between the government and dissident armed forces or other
organized armed groups, the armed groups are under responsible command,
and they exercise control or possession over part of the territory. Until recently,
the internal violence and hostilities were just sporadic and isolated, and the
dissident armed forces failed to exercise control over the national territory. For
a discussion of the definition of internal armed conflict, see LINDSAY MOIR, THE
LAW OF INTERNAL ARMED CONFLICT 34-52 (2002). For a description of
Colombia's conflict as "the ambiguous war," see FRANCISCO E. THOUMI, EL
IMPERIODELADROGA: NARCO-TRAFICO, ECONOMAYSOCIEDAD EN Los ANDES 325
(2002).
36 Interpretations of the conflict in Colombia have been polarized, between
leftists and the right-wing establishment, to support the political viewpoints of
those writing about the conflict. No single text presents an accurate picture of
the complexities and motivations at the root of Colombia's international conflict.
For a comprehensive historical analysis of the Colombian insurgency in the
second half of the 20th century, see BERT RUIZ, THE COLOMBIAN CIVIL WAR
(2001). See also DAVID BUSHNELL, THE MAKING OF MODERN COLOMBIA: A
NATION IN SPITE OF ITSELF (1993); JENNY PEARCE, COLOMBIA: INSIDE THE
LABYRINTH (1990).
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percent of the population. 37 Most victims were from rural areas and
small cities. The Violencia created massive peasant migration, as
they tried to escape growing bloodshed between political factions
and between emerging guerrilla groups and government forces.38
The peasants were forced to squat on vacant lands or crowd into
urban areas that eventually became impoverished neighborhoods
called comunas.39
During the Violencia, peasant groups that aligned with the
Liberal Party took to the mountains to form guerrilla bands to
protect themselves and their homes from roving Conservative
Party marauders.4" By the mid-1960s, the two primary guerrilla
armies that persist today, FARC and ELN, were established and
conducting military operations against the Colombian govern-
ment.41
As armed groups assumed control of rural zones, Colombian
civilians not aligned with these groups were compelled to flee.42
"Many peasants were forced to sell their properties at very low
prices and others were threatened with death to abandon their
land."43 The new settlers expected the government to offer basic
services, but corruption and abuses of privilege were widespread
among local government authorities. Civilians' lack of trust of
37 THOUMI, supra note 35, at 324. For an extensive discussion of the Violencia,
see BUSHNELL, supra note 36, at 201-22.38 The police and army often supported the conservative guerrilla groups. See
THOUMI, supra note 35, at 328-29.
" This situation developed in the Departments of Caldas, Risaralda, Quindio,
Tolima and Valle-regions that had been recently settled by prior violent up-
heavals. The majority of people displaced by the Violencia fled to the middle
Magdalena River Valley (Magdalena Medio) and other unpopulated areas. Id.
at 324-28.
4 0 See Cathing Lisa Schneider, Violence, Identity, and Spaces of Contention in
Chile, Argentina, and Colombia, 67 SOcIAL RESEARCH (2000) (describing how
liberal guerrilla bands with ties to the Communist Party fled to the moutains to
organize).
41 For an extensive study of the history of Colombia's revolutionary armed
groups, see Catherine C. LeGrand, The Colombian Crisis in Historical Per-
sective, 28 CAN. J. LATIN AM. & CARIBBEAN STUD. 165 (2003).4 According to Colombian anlaysist, Alvaro Jimenez, many of these displaced
peasants settled and built their communities in Caqueta, the south of Tolima
and Huila, but the settlement lacked State presence. See LAS VERDADERAS
INTENCIONES DE LAS FARC 86 (1999) (on file with author).
43 THOUMI, supra note 35, at 328. Many settled in unpopulated areas in wes-
tern Colombia, especially in the middle Magdalena River valley. Id.
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government and increasing uncertainty with property rights"
triggered more violence. The uncertainty in land ownership aided
the guerrillas in supplanting State authority in many remote
areas.45 By the early 1950s, many violent crimes that now charac-
terize most of the activities of today's illegal armed groups were
already well established, including kidnapping for ransom,46
" Many properties lacked titles, or, due to long-established customs, had poorly
documented titles. The acclaimed Peruvian activist economist, Hernando de
Soto, writes extensively on this theme, noting that:
[tihe lack of legal property thus explains why citizens in
developing and former communist nations cannot make
profitable contracts with strangers and cannot get credit,
insurance, or utilities services: they have no property to lose.
Because they have no legal property, they are taken seriously
as contracting parties only by their immediate family and neigh-
bors. People with nothing to lose are trapped in the grubby
basement of the precapitalist world.
Hernando de Soto, The Mystery of Capital, 38 FINANCE & DEVELOPMENT,
available at http://www.imf.orglexternal/pubs/ft/fandd/2001/03/desoto.htm (last
visited Nov. 8, 2004).
45 See THOUMI, supra note 35, at 323-30.46 Recent statistics for kidnappings in Colombia between 1997 and 2003, which
vary slightly mong sources, are as follows:
Year Number of
Kidnappings
1997 1693
1998 2216
1999 2945
2000 3706
2001 3041
2002 2986
2003 2043
See Plan Colombia 3 Year Anniversary Report Card, at http://www.wola.org/
Colombia/plan-col-report-card03.pdf (last visited Oct. 9, 2004); U.S. Repre-
sentative Mark Souter Holds Hearing on Andean Counterdrug Initiative, FDCH
Political Transcripts, Mar. 2, 2004 (testimony of Robert Charles, Assistant
Secretary, Department of State, International Narcotics and Law Enforcement
Affairs); Bomba de tiempo, SEMANA, May 6, 2002, at 32 (on file with author).
According to one source, 2,201 individuals were kidnapped in 2003. Of those
individuals, "902 were released (in most cases after ransoms were paid), 587
remained detained, 400 were rescued, 204 were freed under pressure from
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extortion, terrorism against individuals and communities, and
murder for hire.4" At first the primary targets were ranchers and
plantation growers with large landholdings who were victimized
by guerrilla incursions onto their lands and forced to make
extortion payments.48
Indeed, a humanitarian crisis has existed in Colombia for
more than fifty years.49 One study found that violent deaths
occurred in areas where violent actors, such as guerrillas, para-
militaries, and narcotraffickers, operated.5" Moreover, it revealed
that "the drastic increase in violent deaths coincided with the
development of the illegal drug industry."5'
Some of the statistics from the second half of the twentieth
century highlight this coincidence. Although the number of vio-
lent deaths decreased from 51.5 violent deaths per 100,000
inhabitants in 1955 to 20 violent deaths per 100,000 inhabitants
in 1970, the number of politically motivated killings increased
consistently afterwards.52 In 1980, for example, there were close
to 40 violent deaths per 100,000 inhabitants, and after 1985 and
for the rest of the decade, there was a radical increase to 85 violent
deaths per 100,000 inhabitants. 53 From 1998 to1999, there were
60 violent deaths per 100,000 inhabitants, a ratio ten times
authorities, 71 died in captivity, and 37 managed to escape." Of those kidnapped,
only 29 were of foreign nationality. Colombia: Prosecutors Reveal Scale of
Wrongful Arrests, LATINNEWS DAILY, Feb. 24, 2004, at http://www.asiaint.
com/ln/ldb/LDB3293.asp?instance=8&mode=print. According to current esti-
mates, approximately 3,000 individuals are being held hostage as of this writing.
FARC is holding roughly 673 kidnapping victims, ELN is holding about 342, and
AUC is holding about 174. "A further 542 are held by captors unknown, and 421
kidnappings have been attributed to common criminals." Id.
47 See THOUMI, supra note 35, at 325; Leonidas G6mez 0., CARTEL, HISTORIA DE
LA DROGA 259 (1991).
' See Frank Bajak, Businesses Pay 'Tax Contributions' to Colombia's Rebels,
CHATTANOOGATIMES, Nov. 5, 1999, at C3 (describing how by the mid-1990s, the
guerrillas, after extorting money from landowners for many years, began
preying on wealthy businessmen in urban areas).
9 In a study of sixty countries, Colombia had the highest percentage of inter-
viewees (65%) that believed human rights are not respected. THOUMI,
supra note 35, at 327.
50 Id. at 324-25 (citing a study conducted by Rubio).51 Id. at 325.52 Id. at 324.
53Id.
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higher than that of the United States.54 In 2001, 5,176 of 27,841
homicides were politically motivated and there were 259 forced
disappearances.55
The internal violence over the course of so many decades
reveals that Colombia is a nation at war. "No other contempora-
neous society, no other society for which there is available
historic records, presents in times of peace such levels of vio-
lence."56 A nexus could be seen, however, heading into the last
two decades of the 20th century, between political violence and
violent deaths resulting from the development of the illegal drugs
industry, and the emergence of a right-wing paramilitary presence
intended initially to protect the interests of the conservative
landed elite.57
A. The Actors in the Conflict
This Section will focus on the primary actors that comprise
Colombia's current cast of illegal armed groups. To the outside
observer trying to get bearings with regard to the Colombian con-
flict, the illegal armed groups can be divided into the left-wing,
anti-government guerrilla armies, and the right-wing, paramili-
tary forces fighting against the guerrillas.
Colombia's guerrillas have been referred to as the "peasants'
whip."" Their traditional source of income came initially from
extorting cattle ranchers, but as the ranchers became desperate,
they began selling their lands to willing and increasingly wealthy
narcotraffickers."9 The narcotraffickers bought the land because
they worked with and lived in the same areas as the guerrillas,
and did not think they would be targeted by them." The guerrillas
were associates in the narcotrafficking business and the land
they held overlapped more than seventy percent with areas
occupied by narcotraffickers.6"
54 Id.
Bomba de tiempo, supra note 46, at 33.
THOUMI, supra note 35, at 325.
See id.
58 G6mez, supra note 47, at 259.59 Id. at 259.
60 See id. at 260.6 1 Id.
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At first, this was a fine arrangement. The drug traffickers
were able to conduct their operations in territories largely free
from government intervention and control, and the guerrillas
benefited from the bonanza of money flowing into Colombia from
a growing international drug trade.6 2 However, once the guerril-
las put pressure on the narcotraffickers to help with their cause,
the traffickers' responded by creating private armies who were
happily supported by cattle ranchers that had not yet sold their
property.63
When the narcotraffickers took over ranching lands, espe-
cially in the Magdalena Medio and Atlantic coast, they began
planting illegal crops, such as coca.' The guerrillas seized this
opportunity and imposed a tax on the narcotraffickers to secure
the coca crops and to ensure that the necessary chemicals needed
for growing and processing the coca could get through to the
traffickers.6 5
1. The FARC
The Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarios de Colombia ("FARC"),
or Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, originated in 1947,
when the central committee of the Communist party agreed to
organize a self-defense group against the conservative regime of
Ospina Prez.66 FARC was tightly linked to Colombian peasants,
their chief supporters. This self-defense group settled in the cen-
tral cordillera of the Andes, in the Serrania de la Macarena,6 7 an
area in southern Colombia so pristine as to have been designated
62 Id. at 261.
63 Id. at 260-61.
64 G6mez, supra note 47, at 298.
65 Id. at 260, 298.
66 See Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Second Report on the
Situation of Human Rights in Colombia, ch. 2 (Oct. 14, 1993), available at
http://www.cidh.oas.org/countryrep/Colombia93eng/chap.2.htm [hereinafter
Second Report].67 "Serrania de la Macarena National Park (IUCN category II), located in the
south of the region, consists of 630,000 ha. The Park has different ecosystems
including, savannas, dry forests, tropical lowland forest, and montane forests."
Apure Villavicencio Dry Forests (NT0201), WORLD WILDLIFE FEDERATION, at
http://www.worldwildlife.org/wildworld/profiles/terrestrial/nt/nt02Ol_full.html
(last visited Oct. 10, 2004).
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a Reserva de la Humanidad (literally "Reserve for the Humanity")
or Wildlife Preserve.6" The evolving guerrilla band later consoli-
dated as a guerrilla group and penetrated the jungle areas to
make it very difficult and expensive for the government to
combat.69 FARC became the state and the law in the Macarena
region, free from governmental intervention."
According to a peasant who lived in the region, the Macarena
"was a paradise. Never in another place, have I seen so many
birds, flowers and fish. It had a lot of hunting, fishing, plantain,
yucca, and land. We used to live in peace, work hard. We didn't
know a guerrilla. Only at the end of the decade [1960s], the first
ones started showing up."7
1
The narcotraffickers that were chased out by the government
from the Atlantic coast eventually settled in Macarena. At the
beginning, the narcotraffickers maintained the control, but the
guerrillas intervened to impose order on the "wild west mentality"
of stealing, violence, prostitution, and gambling that the traffickers
brought with them.72 The guerrillas demanded that for each hec-
tare of coca planted, the narcotraffickers "had to plant three
hectares of rice, corn, and plantain."73 FARC convinced peasants to
help the narcotraffickers plant marijuana and began charging a
tax on the production, requiring the peasants to present their
68 Un Robo de Gallinas o una Pelea Matrimonial son Casos que Soluciona la
Subversi6n, CAMBIO, Oct. 5, 1998, at 21. The Macarena reserve covers five
municipalities and is important because of its biodiversity.
The Macarena is the convergence point of six major ecological
and geological forces, each exerting its own unique pressure on
the local flora and fauna. The end result is a high rate of
mutation. The Sierra de la Macarena has been called a biological
hothouse. And this biological hothouse is on fire. The Sierra de
la Macarena is in danger of being burnt away. This singular
world with a huge warehouse of biodiversity waiting to be
unlocked is about to be lost forever.
Robert MykIe, Colombia's Sierra de la Macarena (Aug. 1998), at http://www.
P9aneta.com/planeta/98/0898macarena.html.
0See Second Report, supra note 66.
71 See G6mez, supra note 47, at 260, 298.
71 Plinio Apulcyo Mendoza, Pastrana nos entrego, CAMBIO, July 12, 1999, at 39
(quoting Jose, who lived in the Macarena for thirty-five years before becoming
displaced by FARC).
72 G6mez, supra note 47, at 310.73 Id. at 311-12.
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accountings on the crops they had produced.74 When the narco-
traffickers began shifting to coca crops,75 FARC began imposing a
tax on the precursors coming upriver into the area, and trying to
control the price of the coca base processed locally.76 Next, FARC
began to tax each kilo of base produced, taxing the growers at ten
percent and the buyers at fifteen percent.7 They then began
providing logistical support and protection to the drug labs and
clandestine airfields that the peasants constructed for the
narcotraffickers throughout Macarena.78 These operations caused
significant destruction to the environment. One airfield was 1,700
meters long and 40 meters wide, illuminated for night landings,
capable of handling aircraft as large as DC-6 and C-130 cargo
planes, and was surrounded by twenty-five drug labs. 9
Without the involvement of FARC, the success of the drug
operations in the region would have been impossible, ° and by
the end of the 1980s, FARC was very strong, wealthy, and in
command in the region." The peace offered to FARC by the
Betancur Administration in the mid-1980s gave them the "giant
step" they needed-the freedom of movement throughout the
region and the ability to acquire more wealth to purchase high-
quality arms and recruit many more combatants.8 2
Years later, President Andres Pastrana exacerbated Colom-
bia's problems in his peace overtures to FARC. Pastrana's mis-
take was to give FARC the Macarena as part of a demilitarized
zone. This "grant" allowed FARC to consolidate its operations and
gain territorial control over an area of Colombia roughly the size
71 Mendoza, supra note 71, at 39.
" The coca seeds, from Peru and Bolivia, were spread from the air onto the
plains of the Yiri and from there were distributed to Caquetd, Ariari, Guariare,
and part of Vichada. Id. at 40. Biodiversity in these areas was among the most
sensitive in Colombia. See generally Julio Betancur & W. John Kress,
Distribuci6n Geogrdfica y Altitudinal del Gdnero Heliconia (Helioconiaceae) en
Colombia, in BIODIVERSITY AND CONSERVATION OF NEOTROPICAL MONTANE
FORESTS 513 (Steven P. Churchill ed., 1995).
76 G6mez, supra note 47, at 260, 312.
77 Mendoza, supra note 71, at 40.7 Id. at 39.
79 G6mez, supra note 47, at 314.
0 Id. at 312.81 Mendoza, supra note 71, at 40.
82 Id. at 41.
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of Switzerland. 3 FARC's unchecked hegemony amplified the
environmental damage, degraded humanitarian conditions, and
exacerbated Colombia's national security problems. This unre-
stricted freedom allowed what had begun as a low-intensity
conflict to escalate into a full-scale internal armed conflict.8 4 A
peasant who left Macarena stated, "[w]e never imagined that
President Pastrana himself would give us to the guerrillas. One
thing was to have the guerrillas close, paying them taxes, aiding
them in what they demand, and it was something very different
to be under their exclusive authority."
8 5
From Macarena, FARC multiplied into numerous fronts
around the country. Front 53 founded its own town named Pueblo
Loco, or Crazy Town, which mobilized narcotrafficking operations
and allowed the free ingress of precursors into the region.8 6 "The
guerrillas became owners not only of the territory, but also of our
land and our lives. The peasants even had to request permission
to sell their animals."7
The humanitarian crisis of the region was also caused by
FARC and abetted by Pastrana's ill-conceived domestic policies.
First, FARC committed many assassinations and caused disap-
pearances.8 8 They also implemented a system of mandatory
service; individuals between ages eighteen and thirty-five years
had to serve in FARC ranks, while those older than thirty-five had
3 For a critical discussion of the Pastrana's failed peace process with FARC, see
Luz E. Nagle, Plan Colombia: Reality of the Colombian Crisis and Implications
for Hemispheric Security, Special Series on Shaping the Regional Security
Environment in Latin America, Strategic Studies Institute, 2002, at 10-11.
s' For an examination of several questions surrounding the concept of internal
armed conflict in Colombia, see EDUARDO POSADA CARBO, GUERRA CIVIL?: EL
LENGUAJE DEL CONFLICTO EN COLOMBIA 38 (2001). According to Posada, the
usage of the term "civil war" to describe the Colombian situation confuses more
than clarifies the nature of the conflict in Colombia. "We are not here in front of
a polarized community .... The illegal groups do not represent high percenta-
ges of the national population. Most Colombians do not identify themselves
with the illegal groups." Id.
85 Mendoza, supra note 71, at 41 (quoting Jose, a peasant who lived in the
Macarena).86 Id.87 Id.
88 Id.
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to serve in a communications system throughout the region."
FARC caused further environmental destruction by building roads
through pristine ecosystems, "with government machinery."9 ° The
roads were designed to transport drugs and provide corridors for
rapid escape.9
One commentator noted, "[wihat cannot be forgiven of the
FARC is the crime against the nation that they have committed
when allowing them to sack and destroy the Sierra Macarena
ecosystem, unique in the world."9 2 FARC has systematically de-
stroyed the "Reserves of Humanity."93
2. ELN
In 1964, FARC dissidents created the Ej6rcito de Liberaci6n
Nacional ("ELN"), or the Army of National Liberation.9 4 ELN be-
gan as a small and "very inflexible" group, most likely "as a result
of the combination of a Marxist ideology and the fanatic and
messianic elements of religious origin."95 The group later acquired
the support of some labor sectors in the Santander Department,
many university students,96 and some radical Catholic priests.9 7
89 Id.
9 0 Id.
9 Mendoza, supra note 71, at 41.
92 G6mez, supra note 47, at 315.9 3 
Id.
94 Second Report, supra note 66.95 Id.
96ELN was joined by many students and intellectuals who had broken with the
pro-Soviet Partido Comunista de Colombia ("PCC"), or Communist Party of
Colombia, and embraced the ideological sentiments and financial support of the
Castro revolution in Cuba. Haydee Marin, Terrorist Groups Inspired by Fidel
Castro and Che Guevara, La Nueva Cuba, at http://www.lanuevacuba.
comlarchivo/notic-01-10-911.htm (last visited Oct. 10, 2004).
" One of ELN's most notable early leaders was the dissident Roman Catholic
priest, Camilo Torres, who, by the mid-1960s, was a prominent figure in the
liberation theology movement sweeping through Latin America. Following
Torres' death in combat in 1966, a defrocked Spanish priest with ties to the
Basque separatist movement, Manuel Pdrez, assumed leadership of ELN.
Momentos en la vida del Comandante Manuel Pgrez, at http://www.nodo50.org/
patrialibre/identidad/semelvd.html (last visited Oct. 10, 2004) [hereinafter
Momentos]. At the beginning of 1970s, Prez was joined by two more Spanish
priests, Domingo Laino and Jose Antonio Jimenez. MARtA TERESA RONDEROS,
RETRATOS DEL PODER 75 (2002). For a description of ELN's birth by its actual
Commander, Nicolas Rodriguez Bautista, a.k.a. "Gabino," see id. at 65-72.
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Since almost the beginning, ELN has been under the leadership of
two priests, Camilo Torres and Manuel Prez.9  Some claim that
under their leadership and due to the strength of their own moral
convictions against drug use, ELN managed to stay out of drug
trafficking, and was able to concentrate its revenue-generating
activities on the kidnapping and extortion of wealthy Colombians
and foreign business entities.99
ELN struggled throughout the years due to great dissi-
dence in the ranks, intolerance by commanders, lack of money,
and crippling defeats on the battlefield.'00 By 1977, it nearly
ceased to exist. However, ELN was reconstituted when it gained
peasant support through an indoctrination process of "preaching
the communist revolution" and formed several fronts in different
regions of the country.'' By the end of the 1970s, ELN gained
control of the Consejos de Liberaci6n de Arauca wing and formed
the Frente Lain (Lain Front).12 This Front became the wealthiest
ELN front because of its ability to extort oil companies in the
area. 0 3 The $20 million extorted from the Mannesmann Company
to prevent ELN from blowing up the Cano-Limon pipeline was
the key to ELN's resurrection.0 ' This money financed the group
for a decade. 5 Currently, roughly 5,000 ELN combatants are
divided into cells throughout the country. 6
s Second Report, supra note 66. Camilo Torres was Colombian and Manuel
Perez was Spanish. Id.
" There is no consensus as to when ELN actually became involved in drug
trafficking. One explanation may be the amount of dissent that existed within
the organization. For information on ELN's exclusion from the drug business
due to the philosophical preferences of its leader priest, see Momentos, supra
note 97. For information on ELN cells' involvement in the drug business during
the 1980's in the Catatumbo region, see Colombia Objectiva, El ELNy las FARC
Intimidan a los Indigenas Motilon-Bari para Sembrar Hoja de Coca y Exportar
Cocaina, at http://www.geocities.com/CapitolHill/Lobby/6882/tres.html (last
visited Oct. 10, 2004) [hereinafter Colombia Objectiva].1oo See RONDEROS, supra note 97, at 72-82.
'
0
' Id. at 80. Seventy percent of the peasants collaborated with ELN. Id.
102 Id. at 81.
103 1d.
104 Id.
105 RONDEROS, supra note 97, at 81-82.
106 Colombia: Stoking the Fires of Conflict, at http://web.amnesty.org/web/ttt.
nsf/june2001/Colombia (last visited Oct. 10, 2004).
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In addition to kidnapping and extortion, ELN entered the
drug trafficking business to fund its terrorist operations against
the government and foreign commercial entities. Its current mili-
tary operations continue primarily in the form of acts of sabotage
and terrorism against economic targets of opportunity, such as
oil, gas, and electric power operations and facilities. 17 In an effort
to extort money from multinational and domestic oil companies,
ELN has provoked an environmental disaster by repeatedly
blowing up oil pipelines that carry oil from inland oil fields to
export facilities on the northern coast of Colombia."°8 The humani-
tarian effect of these attacks is devastating. Many civilians have
been killed and many more have been forced to leave their
homes. °9 In addition, the oil spills have contaminated thousands
of hectares and poisoned hundreds of kilometers of pristine rivers
and streams. 110
3. The Paramilitaries and the Emergence of the AUC
Paramilitarism is not a new phenomenon in Colombia. The
Colombian Communist Party created the first self-defense group,
which acted as self-defense of the masses to protect peasant
victims of army violence."'
In the mid-1960s and in response to the emergence of violent
dissident groups, Colombian President Guillermo Leon Valencia
Muhioz issued Decree 3398 during a state of emergency, which
became the doctrine of National Security. In 1968, this doctrine
became permanent with the enactment of Law 48 of 1968, which
107 G5mez, supra note 47, at 315.
108 Id. at 315-16.
109 Id. at 316.
"OId. at 315.
' The XII Congress of the Colombian Communist Party in 1975 adopted the
following accord: "Article 1: the self-defense is a popular movement of the
masses. The movement embraces all persons whose physic integrity and
interests are threatened by the reactionary repression, the greed of the land-
owners, territorial, economic, politic, ideological and cultural colonization of the
Yanqui imperialism." INTER-AMERICAN COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, THIRD
REPORT ON THE HUMAN RIGHTS SITUATION IN COLOMBIA OF 1999, ch. IV, at
http://www.cidh.oas.org/countryrep/Colom99en/chapter-4.htm (last visited Oct.
10, 2004) [hereinafter THIRD REPORT, CHAPTER IV].
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among other provisions allowed for the creation of paramilitary
self-defense forces armed and supported by the Ministry of
Defense.
112
In the late 1970s and in the 1980s the self-defense
or paramilitary groups, connected to economic and
political sectors in the different areas of Colombia,
grew stronger. These groups, which were patronized
or accepted by sectors of the State's security forces,
sought to defend the interests of certain individuals
or groups through violence. They were largely estab-
lished as a reaction against the violence taking
place in rural areas throughout the country, often in
the form of kidnappings for ransom. They sought to
combat the armed dissident groups which had
formed, because those groups were responsible for
most of these kidnappings and other violence. In
addition, the armed dissident groups had begun to
impose war taxes, known as "vacunas"
("vaccinations") in Colombia, which threatened the
economic situation of many medium and large
landowners and agro-businesses in the countryside.
The paramilitaries thus necessarily had a counter-
insurgency motivation. As a result, they formed ties
with the Colombian military."3
The self-defense groups multiplied due to the power of the
guerrilla insurgency and the strong emergence of narcotraffick-
ing. 114 During the 1980s, the first paramilitary group to gain
notoriety in Colombia's armed conflict was the group Muerte
a Secuestradores ("MAS"), or Death to Kidnappers, formed by
the notorious Medellin drug cartel" 5 to prevent kidnappings of
112 INTER-AMERICAN COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, THIRD REPORT ON THE
HUMAN RIGHTS SITUATION IN COLOMBIA OF 1999, ch. I, at http://www.cidh.
oas.org/countryrep/Colom99en/chapter-l.htm (last visited Nov. 8, 2004).
113 Id.
114 For further discussion on the different incarnations of self-defense forces in
Colombia, see Nazih Richani, The Paramilitary Connection, 34 NACLA REPORT
ON THE AMERICAS 38, 40-41 (Sept. 2000).15 The Medellin Cartel formed in the late 1970s as a joint venture among drug
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family members." 6 MAS became the narcotraffickers' private
military arm, primarily in the Magdalena Medio region of central
Colombia, a strategically vital area for major drug smuggling." '
Because the narcotraffickers were the largest landholders, FARC
had been harassing them for some time." 8 MAS set out to subdue
guerrilla activities in the region and did a rather thorough job. In
the process, MAS gained de facto territorial control of the Mag-
dalena Medio region." 9 By the late 1980s, however, the Medellin
Cartel was in an all-out war against government forces and was
soon eliminated from the scene. 2° With the downfall of the drug
lords imminent, the guerrillas and the paramilitaries seized the
opportunity to enter the illegal drug enterprise. This effort pro-
vided them with huge revenue streams, which they never could
have realized from kidnapping and extortion, prestige in the world
of organized crime, access to the well-established international
smuggling and money laundering corridors, and a high-profit
product that could be traded for the services of terrorist groups
around the world. 12 1
The paramilitaries, now under the leadership of the iconoclas-
tic anti-guerrilla zealot Carlos Castafio, assumed a new identity,
traffickers based in Medellin, Colombia's second largest city, an industrial cen-
ter, and capital of the Colombian department of Antioquia. The titular head of
the organization was Pablo Escobar Gaviria, a small time hood who rose to
dominate the organization through a combination of vision and ruthlessness.
The cartel was responsible for horrific violence against the government
throughout much of the 1980s before the leaders were either brought tojustice
or killed. By the time Escobar was hunted down and killed by national police
forces supported by the U.S. government, the cartel had been dismantled and
its place in the drug trafficking industry taken over by the cartels in Cali and
in the Caribbean coastal cities of northern Colombia. For one of the best
discussions to date regarding the cartel, see PATRICK LAWSON ET AL., THE
ANDEAN COCAINE INDUSTRY (1998). See also Public Broadcasting Service,
Frontline: Drug Wars, at http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontlme/shows/
drugs/(last visited Oct. 24, 2004) (providing an excellent documentary on the
Medellfn Cartel).
116 MAS was formed by Pablo Escobar to protect the narcotraffickers from kid-
nappers. With Escobar's money, the first generation of paramilitaries were trai-
nedby Israeli mercenaries. Las Finanzas de los Paras, CAMBIO, May 15, 2000,
at 16.
117 Id.
118 Id.
11 9 Id.120 Id. at 15-16 (discussing MAS's rise and eventual demise).
121 Id. at 15.
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forming a potent nationwide fighting force called the Auto
Defensas Unidas de Colombia ("AUC"), or the United Armed For-
ces of Colombia. 122 AUC's primary interests became confronting
and exterminating guerrilla groups, namely ELN and FARC, and
gaining absolute hegemony and control over as much of Colombia
as possible. 123 Along the way, they became involved in drug pro-
duction and trafficking, and emerged as a major player in the
international illegal drug trade.'24
In certain areas of the nation, AUC eradicated ELN and
FARC. AUC terrorized the countryside, displaced hundreds of
thousands of rural poor, and seized or purchased large tracts of
prime land at fire-sale prices. 125 They also established what have
essentially become feudal fiefdoms controlled by warlords and
their private armies throughout Colombia, especially in the
northern regions.
121
The increase in the size of AUC fighting forces has mirrored
the growth of FARC, and as of 2000, AUC claimed to have more
than 11,000 personnel, 8,000 combatants, and 2,000 urban and
rural intelligence militias, dispersed into 32 units throughout
Colombia. 127 At least seventy percent of all AUC revenues are
obtained from trafficking of illegal drugs. 12' The millions of dol-
lars realized from the drug trade gave AUC the capacity to field
a well-trained, well-provisioned, and highly disciplined fighting
force. Indeed, "the intensification of the Colombian armed conflict
has been the main cause behind the expansion of illicit crops in
Colombia. " 129
122 Las Finanzas de los Paras, supra note 116, at 16.
123 Id.
124 Id. at 16-17.
125 See Ulrich Oslender, Communities in the Cross-Fire: Afro-Colombians De-
fend Their Territorial Rights on the Pacific Coast, HEMISPHERE, Sep. 22, 2002,
at 24 (describing how AUC has terrorized Afro-Colombian popu ations and
territories along the Pacific coastal regions of Colombia).
126 AUC checked the expansion of ELN in their main operational areas in
Antioquia and Santander departments, and prevented FARC from entrenching
itself in the municipality of Urabd and the department of Cordoba. Las
Finanzas de los Paras, supra note 116, at 16.127 Id.
128 Id.12' Diaz & Sanchez, supra note 28, at 19.
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When not fighting against guerrillas, AUC has offered secu-
rity services for a new generation of drug traffickers, composed of
much smaller but far more numerous "minicartels," by protect-
ing their land and property from guerrilla incursions. 30 AUC has
also entered into regional agreements to protect legitimate busi-
nesses and executives from FARC extortion and kidnapping.' 3'
Additionally, they draw income from charging a "tax" to ranchers
for protection from FARC incursions.' 32 AUC levies the tax on a
sliding scale based on a set number of pesos per hectare 33 of land.
The taxes bring into AUC coffers of more than 6.6 billion pesos a
month.'34 In one eighteen-month span, AUC earned more than five
million dollars. 1
35
AUC also taxes the peasants who cultivate coca and the
narcotraffickers who buy coca paste in AUC-held territories. From
this tax revenue, AUC obtained two billion pesos. 13 6 FARC employs
similar tactics to fleece the growers and manufacturers in their
zones of control.3 7 In areas of southern Colombia under coca cul-
tivation, AUC wages a fierce war against FARC while charging the
highest taxes to the coca producers. In Guaviare, Meta, Caqueta,
and Putumayo, coca producers pay 1.5 million pesos. 38 In 2000,
AUC's exploitation of coca crops in Tolima, Cauca and Antioquia
generated an annual income close to 2.1 million dollars, or 4.2
billion pesos.'39 AUC has also benefited from FARC's strategy of
130 Las Finanzas de los Paras, supra note 116, at 18. AUC's main areas of
oerations are in the departments of Sind, Cesar, Cordoba, and Sucre. Id.
The paramilitaries are very wealthy and have more economic possibilities
because they are supported by the mafias and influential politicians. Pablo
Tottay, Commentario, FARCy Poblaci6n Indigena: Una Muesta de Relaci6n con
la Poblaci6n Civil, in LAS VERDADERAS INTENCIONES DE LAS FARC, supra note
42, at 198.
132 Las Finanzas de los Paras, supra note 116, at 18.
"' A hectare is the equivalent of 2.471 acres. See William Morris, ed., THE
AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (1981), at 609.
13 4 Las Finanzas de los Paras, supra note 116, at 18.
... Id. AUC presented a project with the amount of men and armament needs
and costs. According to the DEA, Carlos Castahio and the heads of the Norte del
Valle cartel were to negotiate a paramililtary group to be supported with the
money made by the trafficking of cocaine. Id. at 19.
136 Id. at 18.
137 Id.138 Id.
139 Las Finanzas de los Paras, supra note 116, at 18.
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taxing and killing the coca growers if they do not pay up because
the growers call AUC to protect them from FARC. 4 ° This began
when a drug trafficker in Caqueta was killed after being accused
by FARC of stealing 1.5 billion pesos in "taxes." The murder led
other drug traffickers to ask AUC for protection.14 1 In the Llanos
Orientales, AUC completely displaced FARC and negotiated a six
percent protection "tax" for coca growers and producers, four
percent less than FARC had imposed.1
42
AUC cultivates other lucrative sources of income by impo-
sing a protection tax on several sectors of the formal economy,
including merchants, finance houses, cattle ranchers, the timber
industry, and the commercial trucking and transportation indu-
stry.143 In 2000, for example, AUC derived 12 million dollars from
these groups. 44 Multinationals and banana exporters also pay a
protection tax to the paramilitaries. 145 For instance, in the bana-
na region of Urabd, in northwestern Colombia, AUC levies a
protection tax of fifty cents for every box of bananas valued at
eighteen dollars.'46 Considering that this banana-growing region
exports twenty-one million boxes of bananas a year, the tax
amounts to a considerable income for the paramilitaries."'7
However, the export company denies that they pay a protection
tax to AUC.14
Narcotrafficking revenues going to AUC have had a worri-
some impact on land distribution and ownership throughout the
national territory. With the paramilitary's gains and territorial
advances, the land is being redistributed as if a type of land
reform were taking place. Where paramilitary warlords and their
private armies have yet to acquire large tracts of land, they have
140Id.
141Id.
142 Id.
1
"Id. at 14.
144 Id.
145 Las Finanzas de los Paras, supra note 116, at 14. AUC revenues in 2000
from these industries and from taxes paid by narcotraffickers in Valle, Tolima
and Antioquia totaled $14.4 million. Id.146 Id. at 19.
147 Id.
148 Id.
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protected and aided narcotraffickers in purchasing land or assu-
ming control of abandoned land. In 2000, it was estimated that
under the collusion and protection of AUC paramilitary units,
narcotraffickers had purchased four million hectares of land
dispersed throughout 409 municipalities.'49
Paramilitary groups have a set strategy to acquire land that
forces peasants to sell or abandon their properties. This strategy
is comprised of four basic steps: detect an economic zone under
guerrilla control, take over and dominate it, expel its inhabitants,
and increase the value of the land with the arrival of ranchers and
investors who will form the new social and economic structure.
50
If the paramilitary warlords do not obtain direct ownership, the
peasants may receive a percentage of the increased value in the
property in exchange for relinquishing their land. In UrabA, AUC
has performed a "land reform" of 15,000 hectares of land that
produced no less than 10,000 boxes of bananas which were taken
through roads built by FARC.' 5 ' This strategy was employed in
the Magdalena Medio region of north central Colombia, where
paramilitaries assumed ownership of vast amounts of land oste-
nsibly abandoned by 800,000 individuals displaced by political
violence.'52 With regard to the overtaking of coca-growing regions,
estimates for 2000 suggest that AUC controlled twenty-five
percent of the 105,000 hectares of coca under cultivation, while
the guerrillas collectively controlled the other seventy-five
percent. 15
3
This forced takeover of Colombian land results in three illegal
armed groups systematically destroying both the environment
and the social fabric of the nation. The guerrillas are at war
against the state and the paramilitaries, and the paramilitaries
are obsessed with annihilating the guerrillas and acquiring as
much rural territory as possible, regardless of whether the Colom-
bian state approves. Each group is financed primarily by their
149 Id. at 19 (citing Camilo Echandia, El Conflicto Armado y las Manifestaciones
de Violencia en las Regions de Colombia).
10 Las Finanzas de los Paras, supra note 116, at 18.
151 Id. at 20.
15 2 Id. (citing a study conducted by Professor Fernando Cubides).
153 Id. at 21.
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respective involvement in drug trafficking and all three are
responsible for the environmental and humanitarian disasters
occurring in Colombia.
In response to the attacks against the environment and its
people, the Colombian government has entered into international
agreements and enacted domestic laws to protect the environ-
ment and its rural inhabitants. These laws and regulations will
be examined below.
III. INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND INTERNAL ARMED
CONFLICT
Environmental protection gradually entered the evolving
discipline of international human rights law to the extent that it
came to be recognized that the fundamental human right to per-
sonal growth and happiness depended upon a healthy, natural,
and undamaged environment." Some human rights treaties
recognize the protection of collective rights in addition to the
protection of individual rights.
155
One could argue that the independent right to a decent
environment has not yet become part of international law, and
that environmental law treaties do not contain human rights pro-
tections. Yet "some environmental treaties contain provisions that
expressly aim to protect the environment in order to 'safeguard
human health,' or to secure 'the health of the coastal popula-
tion. , 56
154 Antoine Bouvier, Protection of the Natural Environment in Time of Armed
Conflict, 285 INT'L REV. OF THE RED CROSS 567 (1991), available at http://www.
icrc.org/web/eng/siteengO.nsf/iwpList277/50FC45F184F067ECC 1256B660059
13A3 (last visited Oct. 12, 2004). "Generally, it has been acknowledged that
traditional human rights entitling individuals to the protection of private
goods-such as life, well-being, or property-give indirect protection against
certain environmental damage." Silja Voneky, Peacetime Environmental Law as
a Basis of State Responsibility, in THE ENVIRONMENTAL CONSEQUENCES OF WAR:
LEGAL, ECONOMIC, AND SCIENTIFIC PERSPECTIVES, supra note 29, at 200.
155 Collective rights lack the possibility of individual enforcement. See Voneky,
supra note 154, at 201.16-Id.
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Bodies of law applicable to internal armed conflict include
International Humanitarian Law ("IHL"),'57 international environ-
mental law, and human rights law. 5 ' Although IHL is explicit on
environmental impacts, enforcement is problematic during times
of internal armed conflicts.'59 It is useful at this point, however, to
briefly discuss the environmental rules applicable to international
armed conflict, the inadequacy of IHL in environmental protection,
and other rules that do not specifically protect the environment,
but provide a basis for environmental preservation and protection
during an internal armed conflict.
A. International Armed Conflict and the Environment
IHL is part of a rapidly growing and evolving corpus of
international law, treaties, customs, and practices concerned with
the impact of armed conflict on the environment. The focus of IHL
is to protect innocent victims, to afford certain rights upon the
combatants, and to establish certain protocols for redress. 160 IHL
concedes that environmental damages can be inevitable in armed
conflict and aims "not to prevent damage altogether, but rather to
157 International Humanitarian Law, also referred to as the "law of armed
conflict" or the "law of war",
is the body of laws and principles that seeks to save lives and
alleviate suffering of combatants and noncombatants during
armed conflicts. Its principal legal documents are the Geneva
Conventions of 1949, four treaties signed by almost all states
(nations) around the world. The Geneva Conventions specifically
protect members of the armed forces who are wounded, sick or
shipwrecked, prisoners of war, and civilians.
Red Cross Glossary of Terms, at http://www.redcross.org/services/intl/0,1082,0-
161_,00.html (last visited Oct. 12, 2004).
"' Jay Austin and Carl E. Bruch consider "peacetime environmental law" trea-
ties as relevant bodies of law that "require further development and some
creative thinking before [they] can be applied to wartime settings." See Jay E.
Austin & Carl E. Bruch, Legal Mechanisms for Addressing Wartime Damage to
Tropical Forests, in WAR AND TROPICAL FORESTS: CONSERVATION IN AREAS OF
ARMED CONFLICT, supra note 2, at 175.
159 Id.
1
"' See Mark Freeman, International Law and Internal Armed Conflicts: Clari-
fying the Interplay Between Human Rights and Humanitarian Protections, J.
HUMAN. L., Oct. 17, 2000, available at http://www.jha.ac/articles/a059.htm
(discussing the principle objectives and protections under international human-
itarian law).
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limit it to a level deemed tolerable."' 6 ' While there are several
norms applicable to environmental constraints in an international
armed conflict, the Convention on the Prohibition of Military or
Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Tech-
niques ("ENMOD") 6 2 and the Protocol Additional to the Geneva
Conventions of 1949 ("Protocol I",), 163 are particularly noteworthy.
ENMOD focuses on the use of the environment as a weapon
by the armed forces and not on damage to the environment per
se.16 4 ENMOD is intended to protect against threats, such as
changes in weather and climate patterns, earthquakes, and ocean
currents, and against an upset in the ecological balance of a
region.' 65 In Article I, the Convention prohibits "military or any
other hostile use of environmental modification techniques having
widespread, long lasting or severe effects as the means of destruc-
tion, damage or injury to any other State Party."166 However, the
interpretation of the terms "widespread, long-lasting or severe
effects," limits the value of the Convention.'
67
Like ENMOD, Protocol I's application to only the most severe
damages limits its effect.' 61 Protocol I applies to international
armed conflicts and includes provisions protecting the civilian
161 Bouvier, supra note 154.
16 2 G.A. Res. 31, U.N. GAOR, 31st Sess., Supp. No. 72, U.N. Doc. A/32/382 (1977).
163 U.N. Doc. A/32/144 (1977) [hereinafter Protocol I].
164
"ENMOD disallows certain modifications of [the environment] as a means of
warfare." Michael N. Schmitt, War and the Environment: Fault Lines in the
Prescriptive Landscape, in THE ENVIRONMENTAL CONSEQUENCES OF WAR:
LEGAL, ECONOMIC, AND SCIENTIFIC PERSPECTIVES, supra note 29, at 93. See also
Bouvier, supra note 154 (emphasizing ENMOD's prohibition on the
"manipulation of natural processes").
165 See Christopher D. Stone, The Environment in Wartime:An Overview, in THE
ENVIRONMENTAL CONSEQUENCES OF WAR: LEGAL, ECONOMIC, AND SCIENTIFIC
PERSPECTIVES, supra note 29, at 22.
166 Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of En-
vironmental Modification Techniques (May 18, 1977), at http://www.fas.org/
nuke/control/enmod/text/environ2.htm.
167 Adam Roberts, The Law of War and Environmental Damage, in THE
ENVIRONMENTAL CONSEQUENCES OF WAR: LEGAL, ECONOMIC, AND SCIENTIFIC
PERSPECTIVES, supra note 29, at 58.168 See Carl E. Bruch, Existing and Emerging Wartime Standards: Introduction,
in THE ENVIRONMENTAL CONSEQUENCES OF WAR: LEGAL, ECONOMIC, AND
SCIENTIFIC PERSPECTIVES, supra note 29, at 43 [hereinafter Bruch, Existing and
Emerging].
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population.169 Articles 35 and 55 specifically address issues of
damage to the environment. 7 ° Article 35(3) prohibits the use of
"methods or means of warfare which are intended, or may be ex-
pected, to cause widespread, long-term and severe damage to the
natural environment."' 7' Under Protocol I, a violation of inter-
national law occurs when all three conditions are met. 7 2 Article
55 is part of a group of provisions in the Protocol under the head-
ing "Civilian Objects" that addresses the protection of civilians in
an armed conflict:
1. Care shall be taken in warfare to protect the nat-
ural environment against widespread, long-term and
severe damage. This protection includes a prohibition
of the use of methods or means of warfare which are
intended or may be expected to cause such damage to
the natural environment and thereby to prejudice the
health or survival of the population.
2. Attacks against the natural environment by way of
reprisals are prohibited. 7 '
The environmental damage caused during the Persian Gulf
War raised the issue of tolerable damages, if acts of war against
the environment, such as the sabotaging of hundreds of oil wells,
"could wreak such large-scale destruction as to render illusory
the protection afforded civilians under M. ""' Another issue was
the application of IHL rules if disastrous environmental damage
might "seriously hamper or even prevent the implementation of
provisions to protect the victims of armed conflict (the wounded,
the sick, prisoners of war or civilians)."'75 IHL demonstrates that,
169 Id.
170 Roberts, supra note 167, at 59.
"'Protocol I, supra note 163, at 1409.172 Carl E. Bruch, All's not Fair in (Civil) War: Criminal Liability for Environ-
mental Damage in Internal Armed Conflict, 25 VT. L. REV. 695, 703 (2001)
[ereinafter Bruch, All's Not Fair].
7 Protocol I, supra note 163, at 1415.
174 Bouvier, supra note 154.1 7 5 Id.
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especially in the aftermath of the Gulf War, a link must be esta-
blished between wartime environmental damage and the pro-
tection of human rights during an armed conflict.176 Even when
humans have been the primary concern of wartime disaster, the
environmental consequences and effects on the civilian population
have illustrated that environmental calamities also tragically
affect humans. "Incidental or intentional environmental harm can
become so severe that it harms human health, especially that of
innocent civilians."'77 Peacetime environmental treaties affecting
and protecting transboundary areas and common goods remain
in effect during armed conflict when they fulfill two conditions.
Such treaties must compel parties to protect global environmental
resources as such, offering no immediate gain to the contracting
state fulfilling its obligation, and they must explicitly promote the
interest of the states as a global community. According to legal
scholar Silja Voneky, peacetime environmental treaties are suffi-
ciently similar to human rights treaties to justify their application
during wartime.' 8 These treaties include the Convention on Biolo-
gical Diversity, the Vienna Convention for the Protection of the
Ozone Layer, the Convention on Climate Change, and others.'79
International environmental law, conceived during peacetime,
contains aspects that can be adopted in response to trans-
boundary environmental damages, and can fill shortcomings of
176 Such a linkage is being established by a special rapporteur of the Kuwait
Commission on Human Rights. The Report on the Situation of Human Rights
in Kuwait under Iraqi Occupation states that
[wiarfare often affects the natural environment; such conse-
quences do not, per se constitute human rights violations.
However.... it can be concluded that not only in peacetime but
also in times of armed conflict, the deliberate causing of large-
scale environmental damage which severely affects the health
of a considerable proportion of the population concerned, or
creates risks for the health of future generations, amounts to a
serious violation of the right to the enjoyment of the highest
attainable standard of health as embodied in art. 12 of the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights.
V6neky, supra note 154, at 201:
177 Bruch, Existing and Emerging, supra note 168, at 5.
178 Voneky, supra note 154, at 213 (noting that human rights treaties apply to
belligerent states).
179 Id. at 225.
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domestic environmental legislation to address the transnational
effects of environmental injury. According to V6neky, four groups
of peacetime treaties bind state parties even during armed
conflict:
(1) treaties and customary rules protecting the
environment that expressly provide for continuance
during war;
(2) treaties and customary rules protecting the
environment that are compatible with the mainte-
nance of war;
(3) ius cogens rules and obligations erga omnes
protecting the environment;
and, in analogy to human rights treaties and treaties
providing objective regimes:
(4) treaties and customary rules that oblige the
states to protect the environment in the interest of
the state community as a whole.' 0
Customary international environmental law relies on the
notion that "each state has a duty not to allow its territory to be
used so as to injure that of another."'' Yet, during the heat of
a conflict, environmental damages are excused as the result of
military necessity, at which point the principles of proportionality
will determine the extent to which a state should be held account-
able for environmental damages and for the impact on popu-
lations." 2 A recent example is the United States Environmental
Protection Agency's decrease in efforts to make the United States
Air Force address the expulsion of ozone-depleting gases from
military aircraft.'
Generally, environmental protections are addressed solely
in legislation that specifically addresses environmental issues.
1 0 Id. at 224-25.
181 Aaron Schwabach, Ecocide and Genocide in Iraq: International Law, the
March Arabs, and Environmental Damage in Non-International Conflicts, 15
COLO. J. INT'L ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 1, 16 (2004).1 2 Id. at 17-18.
183 See Eric Painin, War Effort Pushes "Green Issues" Aside: Environmental
Groups Rethink Agenda as Nation Focuses on Anti-Terror Fight, WASH. POST,
Oct. 21, 2001, at A5.
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However, environmental protection has gradually entered the
evolving discipline of international human rights law. Environ-
mental problems prevent the effective exercise and enjoyment of
basic human rights.
Water and air pollution, accumulations of solid and
hazardous wastes, soil degradation and deforestation
prevent many people from securing the minimum
requirements for health and survival. Whether or not
a basic human 'right to the environment' exists, a
safe and ecologically balanced environment is neces-
sary for the realization of all basic human rights."4
Human rights treaties have included various protections for
individuals that are applicable during both peace and wartime. 8 '
Additionally, certain human rights provisions relate to the
protection of individuals in the context of providing a healthy
environment. For instance, Article 24 of the 1981 African Charter
on Human and People's Rights, states that "laill peoples shall have
the right to a general satisfactory environment favorable to their
development."1 6 Article 11 of the "Protocol of San Salvador", states
that "everyone shall have the right to live in a healthy environ-
ment and to have access to basic public services" and "the States
Parties shall promote the protection, preservation, and improve-
ment of the Environment."8 7
If the principles expressed in these international conventions
stress the responsibility of states to protect the environment and
populations affected, how can such principles be applicable to the
internal conflict in Colombia? The Geneva Convention provides the
foundation upon which to begin.
184 Question of the Realization of the Right to Development, U.N. ESCOR, 50th
Sess., U.N. Doc. E/CN.411994/NGO/50 (1994), available at http://www.unhchr.
ch/HuridocdalHuridoca.nsf/0/a70b7147506a807280256777005a6845?Opendoc
ument (last visited Oct. 12, 2004).
185 Voneky, supra note 154, at 201.
186 African [Banjul] Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, June 27, 1981, 21
I.L.M. 58 (entered into force Oct. 21, 1986).
... Additional Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights in the Area
of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights "Protocol of San Salvador", art. 11, at
http://www.oas.org/juridico/english/Treaties/a-52.html (last visited Oct. 12,
2004).
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B. International Humanitarian Law and the Colombian Conflict
In any non-international armed conflict, the applicable rules
are those stated in Common Article 3 of the four 1949 Geneva
Conventions,' 8 Protocol II of 1977,189 and Article 8 of the Rome
Statute of the International Criminal Court. 90 Common Article 3
sets a minimum standard of humane treatment from which the
parties to the conflict should not depart.' The application of
Protocol II is more stringent than Article 3 and applies to the
armed forces participating in the conflict and safeguarding those
no longer actively engaged in the confrontation. 192 The Rome
118 Common Article 3 is the only provision of the Geneva Conventions that
explicitly applies to internal armed conflicts. Common Article 3, section 1, states
that
[iun the case of armed conflict not of an international character
occurring in the territory of one of the High Contracting Parties,
each Party to the conflict shall be bound to apply, as a
minimum, the following provisions:
(1) Persons taking no active part in the hostilities, including
members of armed forces who had laid down their arms and
those placed hors de combat by sickness, wounds, detention, or
any other cause, shall in all circumstances be treated humanely,
without any adverse distinction founded on race, color, religion
or faith, sex, birth or wealth, or any other similar criteria.
To this end the following acts are and shall remain prohibited at
any time and in any place whatsoever with respect to the above-
mentioned persons: (a) violence to life and person, in particular
murder of all kinds, mutilation, cruel treatment and torture; (b)
taking of hostages; (c) outrages upon personal dignity, in
particular humiliating and degrading treatment; (d) the passing
of sentences and the carrying out of executions without previous
judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted court, affording
all the judicial guarantees which are recognized as
indispensable by civilized peoples.
Convention III, Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Geneva, 12 August
1949, at http://www.globalissuesgroup.com/geneva/convention3.html.
189 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and
Relating to Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts, June 8,
1977, 16 I.L.M. 1442 (entered into force Dec. 7, 1978) [hereinafter Protocol II].
'
90 U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/9 (1998) [hereinafter Rome Statute].
191 International Committee of the Red Cross, In What Situations Does Human-
itarian Law Apply? For Whom Is It Intended and Who Does It Protect?, at
http://www.icrc.org/Web/eng/siteengO.nsf/iwpListO4/29191227CF49097DC
1256CF5004EE117 (last visited Oct. 12, 2004).192 Id.
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Statute applies "when there is protracted armed conflict between
governmental authorities and organized armed groups or between
such groups."
193
Protocol II, Article 1(1), defines internal conflicts as those
taking place
in the territory of a High Contracting Party between
its armed forces and dissident armed forces or other
organized armed groups which, under responsible
command, exercise such control over a part of its
territory as to enable them to carry out sustained and
concerted military operations and to implement this
Protocol.19
In Colombia, the guerrillas and AUC have a command struc-
ture, exert control over part of the territory, and have sufficiently
intense activities that cannot be dismissed as isolated and spor-
adic acts of violence. Protocol II should therefore apply to this type
of command.
Colombia ratified the four Geneva Conventions on August 11,
1961, and acceded to Protocol II on August 14, 1995.195 The
principle of State sovereignty makes the application of the rules
of internal armed conflict difficult in Colombia. In the decades
prior to the adoption of Protocol II, the government depicted the
political crisis in Colombia as little more than an ongoing series
of internal disturbances with occasional acts of violence that did
not meet the conditions necessary for the application of Protocol
11.196
193 Rome Statute, supra note 190.
194 Protocol II, supra note 189.
195 Protocol II came into force on February 14, 1996. International Committee of
the Red Cross, Accession to Protocol II by the Republic of Colombia, at
http://www.icrc.org/Web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/iwpList148/EA9EE9968EFE8763C1
256B660059919D (last visited Oct. 12, 2004).
196 Colombia explicitly recognized the existence of its internal conflict, its
partaking in the conflict andthe applicability of common Article 3 and Protocol
I concerning the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts, as
well as other customary law rules and principles governing internal armed
conflicts. ELN expressly acknowledged to be bound by the 1949 Geneva
Conventions and Protocol II. See THIRD REPORT, CHAPTER IV, supra note 111. In
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The Colombian government also believed that Protocol II, if
embraced, would undermine the legitimacy of the State, and of
greater concern, upgrade the status of the guerrillas to that of
belligerents.'9 7 Moreover, the military and civilian allies in the
government maintained that ratification of Protocol II was
unnecessary and inappropriate because its adoption would open
the door to international intervention, including the possibility of
intervention on the side of the guerrillas. 9 ' As the crisis persisted
and intensified heading into the 1980s, however, internal pres-
sures on the government by the guerrillas and the channeling of
resources into fighting an increasingly violent campaign against
international drug traffickers forced the ratification of the Pro-
tocols.' 99
C. Law of Internal Armed Conflict and Environmental Damage
The rules protecting the environment during internal armed
conflict are less developed than those governing international
interviews with Human Rights Watch, "guerrillas" claimed to support
humanitarian standards but stated that "they do not accept Protocol II since it
was not negotiated directly with them." Human Rights Watch, War without
Quarter: Colombia and International Humanitarian Law, ch. II, at
http://www.hrw.org/reports98/colombia/Colom989-03.htm#P457-59724 (last
visited Oct. 12, 2004) [hereinafter War Without Quarter, Chapter II]. FARC
considers "Protocol II and Common Article 3 'open to interpretation.'" Human
Rights Watch, War without Quarter: Colombia and International Humanitarian
Law, ch. V, at http://www.hrw.org/reports98/colombia/Colom989 -05.htm#P1341
318397 (last visited Nov. 8, 2004) [hereinafter War Without Quarter, Chapter
V]. AUG, through its leader, Carlos Castaiio, "tated a willingness to pledge his
forces to respect the laws of war, but qualifies that support by claiming that
Colombia needs a 'creole' version of international humanitarian law, adapted to
Colombia's irregular warfare and specifically allowing the execution of
combatants hors de combat." War Without Quarter, Chapter II, supra.
197 Arturo Carrillo-Suarez, Hors de Logique: Contemporary Issues in
International Humanitarian Law As Applied to Internal Armed Conflict, 15 AM.
U. INT'L L. REV. 1, 48 (1999).
198 See Jorge L. Esquirol, Can International Law Help? An Analysis of the
Colombian Peace Process, 16 CONN. J. INT'L L. 23, 40 (2000).199 Carrillo-Suarez, supra note 197, at 48.
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armed conflict.2°° According to Bouvier, "[n]one of the rules of IHL
applicable to [internal armed conflicts] provide specifically for
protection of the environment."2 '
While the legal framework applicable to internal armed
conflict does not explicitly address the environment, some provi-
sions offer ways for sanctioning environmental damage. Common
Article 3 does not specifically address environmental damage,
but "certain instances of environmental warfare-for example,
poison gas, landmines, and scorched earth practices-may cause
'violence to life and person.' This arguably would violate Article
3(1)(a), but only to the extent that the anthropomorphic stan-
dards applied .... 202
Protocol II also lacks specific environmental protections.
However, its intent is not to protect the environment for the
environment's sake, but rather to reinforce the anthropocentric
view that the environment must be protected in order to prevent
loss of livelihood and natural resources essential to sustaining a
population subjected to the vagaries of internal armed conflict.
In this context, some provisions can be invoked to address
intentional environmental damages caused by internal armed
groups, such as tactics employed to force rural and indigenous
population displacements. Articles 14, 15, and 17 of Protocol II
arguably afford indirect protection to the environment.20 3 Article
14 states that
[sItarvation of civilians as a method of combat is
prohibited. It is therefore prohibited to attack,
destroy, remove or render useless, for that purpose,
objects indispensable to the survival of the civilian
population, such as foodstuffs, agricultural areas for
200 For a concise overview of the laws pertaining to international armed conflict
and protection of the environment, see R. A. Malviya, Laws of Armed Conflict
and International Protection: An Analysis of Their Inter-Relationship, available
at http://www.worldlii.orgint/journals/ISILYBIHRL/2001/5.html (last visited
Oct. 12, 2004).
201 Bouvier, supra note 154.
202 Bruch, All's not Fair, supra note 172, at 709-10.
203 Id. at 714.
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the production of foodstuffs, crops, livestock, drinking
water installations and supplies and. irrigation
works.204
Article 15 on the "[p]rotection ofworks and installations containing
dangerous forces," states that "works or installations containing
dangerous forces, namely dams, dykes and nuclear electrical
generating stations, shall not be made the object of attack, even
where these objects are military objectives, if such attack may
cause the release of dangerous forces and consequent severe
losses among the civilian population.""' Prohibitions against the
forced movement of civilians are covered in Article 17.206
The Rome Statute offers another possible method of sanc-
tioning environmental damage due to internal armed conflicts.
Article 8(2)(c) bans "serious violations" of Common Article 3 of the
Geneva Convention. °7 Under this provision, commanders and
troops can be held criminally liable for the use of weapons and
practices with environmental impacts that cause "[violence to
life and persons.""' Under Article 8(2)(e), war crimes are "serious
violations of the laws and customs applicable in armed conflicts
not of an international character,"20 9 such as intentional attacks
on noncombatants, destruction of historic monuments and buil-
dings of cultural significance, 21° and intentional pillaging.2 1'
Other crimes include "[o]rdering the displacement of the civilian
population for reasons related to the conflict, unless the security
of the civilians involved or imperative military reasons so de-
mand, ,212 and "[d] estroying or seizing the property of an adversary
unless such destruction or seizure be imperatively demanded by
the necessities of the conflict."213
204 Protocol II, supra note 189.
20 5 Id.
206 Id.
207 Rome Statute, supra note 190, art. 8(2)(c).
208 Id., art. 8(2)(c)(i).
209Id., art. 8(2)(e).
210 Id., art. 8(2)(e)(iv).
211 Id., art. 8(2)(e)(v).
212 Id., art. 8(2)(e)(viii).213 Rome Statute, supra note 190, art. 8(2)(e)(xii).
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IV. COLOMBIA'S IMPLEMENTATION OF ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTIONS
Laws and regulations governing access to and the use of nat-
ural resources during peacetime may be weakened or suspended
when armed conflict is present.214 Were environmental legislation
coherent, clear and comprehensive, with solid conservation prog-
rams in place and consistent enforcement during peacetime,
essential activities to protect the environment would not be so
difficult to formulate and maintain during a conflict. It is during
such periods of internal commotion that the armed groups advance
their illegal enterprises and engage in the pillage of valuable
natural resources.215
To combat the lack of environmental protection, the Colombian
government has enacted legislation, implemented conservation
programs, and begun to address sustainable usage of biological
diversity.216 The challenge to the government, however, is that
the activities of the illegal armed groups put pressure on the
214 Steven V. Price, Preface to WAR AND TROPICAL FORESTS: CONSERVATION IN
AREAS OF ARMED CONFLICT, supra note 2, at xv.
215 During the Peace process in Colombia, FARC increased its stake in the drug
trade and used the demilitarized, distention zone to set up not only illegal drug
laboratories but airfields and roads to move combatants and drug shipments
quickly in and out of the zone. Alvarez, Forests, supra note 23, at 51 (discussing
in detail the construction of a road from the distention zone through various
national parks and the intent "to facilitate the entry of hostages and re-agents
for drug processing into the DMZ"). See also EDGAR T9LLEZ ET AL., DIARIO INTIMO
DE UN FRACASO: HISTORIA NO CONTADA DEL PROCESO DE PAZ CON LAS FARC 50
(2002) (discussing the strategic significance of the distention zone to FARC
gerrillas).
6 Colombia has enacted a series of legislation on protected areas. See Ley 2 de
1959 [Law 2 of 1959] (1959) (Colom.), available at http://bases.colnodo.org.co/
reloc/docs/colombia/cendoccolombiall.htm (addressing forestry economy and
conservation of natural renewable resources); Decreto 2811 de 1974 [Decree
2811 of 19741 (1974) (Colom.), available at http://www.cdmb.gov.co/normas/
decreto28111974.htm [hereinafter Decree 2811] (preserving renewable natural
resources); Decreto 622 de 1977 [Decree 622 of 1977] (1977) (Colom.), available
at http://www.ideam.gov.co/legal]decretos/1970/d0622-1977.htm (regulating the
Code of Natural Resources); Decreto 1608 de 1978 [Decree 1608 of 1978] (1978)
(Colom.), available at http://www.sinchi.org.co/pdf/decretol608del78.pdf
(regulating the National Code of Renewable Resources and Law 23 of 1973
regarding wild fauna).
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environment and the State is unable to respond with a cohesive,
consistent plan of action or conservation because environmental
legislation has been implemented over a period of years in a
haphazard manner and without systematic codification.
When new legislation is enacted, it often fails to reference
antecedents. For example, the Code of Natural Resources deals
with the protection of the environment and natural resources, but
fails to incorporate important regulations such as those dealing
with environmental impact assessment and licensing, which are
found in separate, prior legislation.2 17 In addition, protection of
biodiversity often focuses more on protecting species rather than
their natural habitats,218 and provisions too often call for plan of
completion at a later time, thereby deferring implementation.2 19
The amount of legislation sprinkled throughout the organic
law of Colombia and the lack of cross-referencing for much of the
law creates conflict and uncertainty over legal requirements and
the applicability of norms.22 ° Moreover, in spite of Colombia's
Constitution, 22 1 which recognizes that the nation is a multi-ethnic
society, and of legislation protecting the rights of Afro-Colombian
217 See Decree 2811, supra note 216.
218 The Minister of Environment and the Humboldt Institute, along with a
number of scientists, issued a series of red books assessing the status of
threatened species in Colombia. See, e.g., LIBRO ROJO DE AVES DE COLOMBIA
(Luis M. Renjifo et al. eds., 2002) (providing detailed and updated information
on 162 threatened bird species, a map of the geographic distribution, and the
gade of threat).
For instance, Book Three, Section VI, Title I of the Code of Natural Resources,
calls for a plan of completion at a later time. Decree 2811, supra note 216.
220 In 1996, under Law 261 of January 23, the Colombian government mandated
compilation of environmental laws, but this compilation has yet to occur. Ley
261 de 1996 [Law 261 of 19961 (1996) (Colom.), available at http://www.
secretariasenado.gov.co/leyes/L0261-96.htm (last visited Oct. 12, 2004). Areas
such as commercial law, foreign investment law, mining law, and others have
been consolidated into their own codes, yet it seems that environmental law
lacks the stature that these other areas of law possess.
221 CONSTITUCI6N POLITICA DE COLOMBIA DE 1991, available at http://www.
georgetown.edu/pdba/Constitutions/Colombia/col91.html (last visited Oct. 12,
2004).
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and indigenous populations, such legal rights and protections
have been inadequate to deal effectively and fairly with environ-
mental and social issues raised by these groups.222 The Govern-
ment is slow to issue property titles, and access to such lands is
often inhibited by the presence of armed groups. 223 The rights of
these minority or underrepresented communities are imperiled
because the government either does not care or is unable to enforce
protections and constitutional guarantees, such as the prevention
of illegal timber harvests, agricultural colonization, and cultivation
of crops for the illegal drug trade in remote areas.224
On May 23, 1996, President Ernesto Samper called for bidding
on the Atrato-Truand6 Inter-Oceanic canal to begin in 1997.225 The
estimated cost of the project was 2.33 billion dollars.226 On Decem-
ber 13, 1996, under Law 70 of 1993, 1200 people belonging to 217
families in six communities were granted collective title to 61,000
hectares of land within the Truand6 River.227 At the same time,
however, the first paramilitary incursion into the Truand6 area
occurred at Riosucio. 228 "Ajoint paramilitary-army operation, using
helicopter gunships, bombarded the Afro-Colombian civilian popu-
lation, with the pretext that they were guerillas."229 Nearly 500
222 For an analysis of the multicultural aspects of the Colombian legislation
and biological diversity, see DIVERSIDAD BIOLOGICA Y CULTURAL: RETOS Y
PROPUESTAS DEAMERICA LATINA 65 (1999) [hereinafter DIVERSIDAD BIOLOGICA
Y CULTURAL].
223 See Ricardo Rocha Garcia, Drug Trafficking and its Impact on Colombia: An
Economic Overview, 28 CAN. J. LATIN AM. & CARIBBEAN STUD. 277-304 (2003)
("In Colombia, rural properties tend to have outdated titles that have never
been properly registered. This, together with the fact that guerrilla groups often
indulge in the extortion of traditional property owners, makes it easy for
mafia bosses to acquire large tracts of land.").
224 See Tighe, supra note 17 (stating that ninety percent of indigenous
homelands were put under indigenous control while the black population
"received less of a fair deal").
225 Marino C. Berrio, The Untold Truth About the Genocide Against Afro-
Colombians!, available at http://www.chicagoans.net/afroresources/untold.pdf
(May 8, 2002).
226 Panama Canal Alternative Study Invited in Colombia, THE XINHUA NEWS
AGENCY, Apr. 16, 1997.
227 Berrio, supra note 225.
228Id.
229
Id.
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people were massacred and another 20,000 people fled the area.23 °
In hindsight, it seems likely that this operation was motivated by
the need to clear the area for the exploitation of regional environ-
mental resources. "Coincidentally, three months prior to this
attack, the Maderas del Darien company had invited leaders of the
Peasant Association of the Lower Atrato to Bogotd to discuss a
proposal to exploit forests covered under the collective land
title. 23 '
Even during relatively calm periods, government negligence
toward its responsibilities can contribute to environmental pro-
tection problems.232 Frequently, the administrative procedures for
environmental control are defective; enforcement resources in
government agencies are meager and impotent; administrative
regulation, such as the issuance of environmental licenses, is lax;
local and central government environmental funds are misman-
aged; and there is a lack of inter-institutional coordination. 233 As
if these problems did not stress the system enough, the presence
of insidious and pervasive institutional and administrative corr-
uption also casts an ominous shadow over all efforts to enforce and
protect the environment and biodiversity 4
Much of Colombia's current environmental legislation is
rooted in Constitutional provisions that obligate both the state
230
Id.
231 id.
232 See Government Report Finds Serious Negligence in Protection of Colombia's
Atlantic Coast, 18 INT'L ENV'T REP. 68 (1995).233 1995 Semiannual Survey: Chronological Summary, Environmental Events in
Latin America, 6 COLO. J. INT'L ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 367, 374 (1995) [hereinafter
1995 Semiannual Survey]. (noting that "faulty administrative procedures for
environmental control and the lack of enforcement resources in government
agencies also have contributed to the problems").2 1In 1995, the Controller General issued a report blaming the government for
the deterioration of natural resources in several areas. According to the report,
a coastal highway project resulted in blocking the flow of fresh water into the
nation's largest system of inland water because of the careless manner in which
the environmental licenses were issued. Also, the Sierra Nevada de Santa
Marta's erosion process is due in part to the government's negligent manage-
ment of this unique mountain range. Failure to control settlers and hunting
also causes deforestation and endangers many species. Id. at 374.
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and individuals to abide by the law. The Constitution has been
called the "Green Constitution"2 35 because of the attention devo-
ted to the environment,2 36 and the recognition of environmental
protection obligations as a collective right to a safe, healthy, and
sustainable environment. 7 From these constitutional obligations,
along with two important legislative acts, Law 99 of 1993238 and
Law 165 of 1994,239 a National Biodiversity Policy began to
emerge.240
A. Colombia's International Environmental Commitments
On June 5, 1992, Colombia signed the Convention on Biolo-
gical Diversity ("CBD")24 1 in Rio de Janeiro, and ratified it in
1994.242 The three primary objectives of the CBD include bio-
diversity conservation, sustainable use of biological resources,
and fair sharing of the benefits of such uses.243 These goals are
critical to the internal armed conflict in Colombia because the
illegal armed groups have completely disregarded the spirit of the
Convention and prevented any governmental effort to enforce
the CBD in zones of internal commotion and conflict.
235 German Sarmiento, Role of Public Participation in Enforcement, in FOURTH
INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON ENVIRONMENTAL ENFORCEMENT 1 (1995),
available at http://www.inece.org/4thvoll/sarmient.pdf (last visited Oct. 12,
2004) [hereinafter Sarmiento, Role of Public Participation].
23 The Colombian Constitution includes more than forty articles pertaining to
the environment. See Colombia: First National Report, 19 at http://www.
biodiv.org/doc/world/co/co-nr-O1-en.pdf (last visited Oct. 12, 2004).
237 CONSTITUCION POLTICA DE COLOMBIA DE 1991, supra note 221, art. 79.
238 Law 99, supra note 21.
239 Ley 165 de 1994 [Law 165 of 1994] (1994) (Colom.) at http://www.secre
tariasenado.gov.co/leyes/LO165_94.htm (last visited Oct. 13, 2004) [hereinafter
Law 165].
240 See Colombia: First National Report, supra note 236.
24 Convention on Biological Diversity, June 5, 1992, available at http://www.
biodiv.org/doc/lega]/cbd-en.pdf (last visited Oct. 13, 2004).242 Law 165, supra note 239; See also, D1VERSIDAD BIOLOGICA Y CULTURAL, supra
note 222, at 225-26 (discussing Law 165 of 1994).
243 Convention on Biological Diversity, Sustaining Life on Earth, How the
Convention on Biological Diversity Promotes Nature and Human Well-Being,
8, at http://www.biodiv.org/doc/publications/cbd-sustain-en.pdf (last visited Oct.
13, 2004).
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The CBD asserts that conservation ofbiodiversity and marine
and terrestrial environments are "a common concern of human-
kind," and States have sovereign rights over their own biological
resources. 2" Under Article 6, which requires parties to the Con-
vention to develop programs and national strategies for the
conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity, Colombia
implemented a Politica Nacional sobre Biodiversidad, or National
Policy on Biodiversity245 and its respective National Strategy on
Biodiversity and a Plan of Action. Within this legal structure, one
of Colombia's priorities is to analyze and adjust policy instru-
ments that will incite conservation and the sustainable use of the
biological diversity.24
6
Under Article 11 of the CBD, Colombia adopted measures that
act as incentives for the conservation of biological diversity.
247
Chief among these are the Certificado de Incentivo Forestal
("CIF"), or Certificate of Forest Incentive,248 intended to preserve
the natural environment from exploitation or development, and
create tax exemptions for environmental investment in areas
244 !d.
245 Politica National de Biodiversidad [National Policy on Biodiversityl, at
http://web.minambiente.gov.co/biogeo/menu/legislacion/legisnacional/polbiodi
versidad.htm (last visited Oct. 13, 2004).
246 See Informacion Sobre Incentivos a la Conservacion y Uso Sostenible de la
Biodiversidad en Colombia, at http://web.minambiente.gov.co/biogeo/menu/
legislacion/legisnacional/polbiodiversidad.htm (last visited Oct. 13, 2004)
[hereinafter Incentivos].47 Article 11 states that "[e]ach Contracting Party shall, as far as possible and
as appropriate, adopt economically and socially sound measures that act as
incentives for the conservation and sustainable use of components of biological
diversity." Convention on Biological Diversity, supra note 241.
248 Created by Law 139 of 1994, the certificate acknowledges those who establish
new plantations of protective-productive character in forest soils that have not
had natural forest in the last five years. The incentive acknowledges seventy-
five percent of the cost of establishment for the native species and fifty percent
for the introduced species. This incentive was expanded by Article 253 of the
Tributary Code, to compensate the direct or indirect economic costs that an
owner can incur due to the maintenance of natural forest within his or her
property as an acknowledgment of the environmental and social benefits derived
y maintaining them. See Ley 139 de 1994 [Law 139 of 1994] (1994) (Colom.), at
http://www.accionambiental.org/centro_documentacion/LEY%20139
%20DE%201994.doc (last visited Oct. 13, 2004). For an example of a Certificate
for Tolima department, see Certificado de Incentivo Forestal [Certificate of
Forest Incentive], at http://www.cortolima.gov.co/servicio/certince.htm (last
visited Oct. 13, 2004).
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such as adoption of clean technology, conservation of strate-
gicecosystems, reforestation, and control and improvement of the
environment. 249
Unfortunately, the results of the conservation incentives
cannot be adequately assessed. This is primarily because the
criteria for evaluating and controlling the CIF are unformed,
reliable scientific and ecological data for the indigenous forests of
Colombia's diverse geographic regions are lacking, and there is
little, if any, follow-up regulation or monitoring with respect to
awards made under CIF.25 °
Most disturbing of all is that a landholder of targeted lands
must provide a valid property title before a CIF can be awar-
ded.251 The problem-and it must be emphasized that it is not an
unknown factor in the reality of Colombian land ownership and
possession-is that the majority of landholders in the most sen-
sitive areas lack property title.252 Many landholders are barely
249 For example, Colombia's Tributary Statutes contain several incentive provi-
sions. Article 83 stipulates that, in reforestation projects there is a presumption
that eighty percent of the sales value conforms with the costs and deductions
inherent to their exploitation. Article 157 provides deductions for investment in
new plantations, irrigation and silos. The Article specifically refers to
reforestation, coconut, oil palms, rubber, olive, cacao, and fruit trees. Article 253
states that those who establish reforestation or planted trees in the reforestation
areas can deduct up to twenty percent of their income. Convention on Biological
Diversity, supra note 241.
250 For an extensive analysis of how CIFs have negatively impacted the
Colombian forest environments and a discussion as to how small landholders are
unable to qualify for CIFs, see John Wann, et al., Report on the Activities of
Jefferson Smurfit Group in Colombia, Section 1.2, May 1999, available at
http://latinamericasolidarity.freeservers.com/smurfit2.htm#PRODUCTION1
(last visited Nov. 8, 2004).
251 Incentivos, supra note 246.
22 The problem of poor landholders being unable to prove title leads to
insurmountable economic challenges. Farmers who cannot prove ownership of
land cannot receive credit to invest in the property and make it more productive.
Unable to draw capital from the land, farmers who cannot prove title tend to
degrade the property rather than practice stewardship. In addition, the inability
to prove land title renders it difficult for displaced rural landowners to reclaim
property upon return to their lands.
Although Law 387 of 1997 provides a system to freeze property
transactions of displaced persons whether they hold formal title
or not, the problem of enforcement remains. Of displaced
landowners, 68 percent were owners, 12 percent resided on
collectively owned land and only 11 percent claimed colono
status with no formal title to their properties. A colono settles
unclaimed lands and lives by exploiting natural resources
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literate and have lived on or controlled properties for generations,
even though no records exist in the files of municipal authori-
ties.253 Without documentation, CIF benefits to such areas are not
available.
There is also a lack of continuity throughout the national terri-
tory, and there appears to be no mechanism in place to guarantee
the continuity of conservation when land changes ownership.
Moreover, the incentives do not include ownership of farms less
usually through agriculture and thus incorporates these lands
into the national economy. By definition these lands are usually
on the agricultural frontier.
D. M. Grusczynski & C. Felipe Jaramillo, Integrating Land Issues into the
Broader Development Agenda: Colombia, in LAND REFORM: LAND SETTLEMENT
AND COOPERATIVES 73 (2003), available at http://www.fao.org/documents/
showcdr.asp?urlfile=/docrep/OO6/y526e/y5026eO 7.htm (last visited Nov. 3,
2004). See also GEOFFREY DEMAREST, MAPPING COLOMBIA: THE CORRELATION
BETWEEN LAND DATA AND STRATEGY 29 (2003) (noting that the Colombian
government was not doing enough to "make land ownership precise and
transparent, and therefore not enough to control corruption and reduce dis-
illusionment. The problem may owe to an underestimate of the importance of
formalized land ownership as a fundamental mechanism for social peace and
honest government"), available at http://fmso.leavenworth.army.mil/FMSO
PUBS/ISSUES/mapping/mapping.pdf (last visited Nov. 8, 2004).
213 This is just part of a larger problem with the rural poor being unable to obtain
proper identification of self or land, especially in zones of conflict.
In Colombia, lack of documentation has become an acute
problem for hundreds of thousands of people. To receive
emergency help from the government, "certification" is
necessary but to be certified the displaced must present
personal identity documents. Since many do not have these
documents, they are put in the position of having to return to
unsafe home areas to obtain them. Many as a result do not
apply. Others do not apply for fear of being targeted or having
to provide witnesses whom they fear could put their friends or
families in jeopardy. Very few municipalities in Colombia have
made efforts to resolve the problem with the result that only a
minority of the displaced receives emergency assistance.
Without the basic documents they need-the cedula de
ciudadania (citizenship card), the registro civil (civil registration
card), and the certificacion de desplazado (certification of
displacement card)-displaced persons in Colombia have no
proof of land or property ownership, are unable to vote, drive,
work in the formal sector, move from region to region, leave the
country, or in many cases send their children to public schools.
Many are also turned away from health clinics and hospitals.
Brookings-CUNY Project on Internal Displacement, The Documentation Gap,
in INTERNAL DISPLACEMENT IN THE AMERICAS: SOME DISTINCTIVE FEATURES
(2001), available at httpJ/www.disaster-info.net/desplazados/informes/brooking/
informe2001julio.htm#gap (last visited Nov. 8, 2004).
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than five hectares." 4 This is a particularly significant shortcoming
because many of Colombia's farms are less than five hectares in
size."' For example, in the area of V6lez in the Magdalena River
valley, "[s]eventy percent of the farms are less than 5 hectares
with the average size of these 51,198 farms being 1.28 hec-
tares."256
Colombia is also a participant in the United Nations Forum
on Forests ("UNFF), 5 7 which led to the creation of the Plan
Nacional de Desarrollo Forestal ("PNDF"), or National Plan for
Forestry Development.2 51 PNDF attempts to articulate strategies
and programs related to zonification, conservation, restoration of
the ecosystem, and the management and exploitation of the forest
ecosystem. 9
Notwithstanding efforts to initiate, develop, and support con-
servation and environmental enforcement mechanisms, the
government asserts that illegal agriculture, encroachment into
virgin forests, and the armed conflict, are factors impeding success
in its conservation programs. One must wonder, however, to what
extent these impediments also serve as convenient excuses for the
government's inaction. The Humboldt Institute260 compiled a list
254 For twelve years, Cornare implemented incentives to promote regeneration
of natural forest. See Incentivos, supra note 246.
25 United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization Census, at http://www.
fao.org/es/ess/census/wcares/Colombia_2000.pdf(last visited Apr. 14,2004) (indi-
cating that of 2,021,895 farm holdings recorded, 1,067,902 or 52.8% were less
than 5 hectares in size).
256 Centro Educativo de Nuevas Ideas y Tecnologias, Global Access for Peasant
Farmers in Vglez, Colombia, at http'//www.sat-virtual.innoved.org/CENIT/
areadesc.htm (last visited Oct. 13, 2004).217 See United Nations Forum on Forests, at http://www.un.orglesa/forests/ (last
visited Oct. 13, 2004).258 Estrategia para la Consolidacion del Plan Nacional de Desarrollo Forestal,
at http://www.dnp.gov.co/ArchivosWeb/Conpes/3125.pdf (last visited Oct. 13,
2004).259 Id. at 4.
260 According to the Institute's webpage, the Alexander von Humboldt Biological
Resources Research Institute was created by Law 99 of 1993 to provide scientific
and technical support to the Environment Ministry. The Institute is a non-profit
organization ruled by the norms of science and technology. It has various
members including the Environment Ministry, the Colombian Institute for the
Development of Science and Technology, public and private universities, local
governments, and non-governmental organizations. The mission of the Institute
is to promote, coordinate and realize research "which contributes to the
conservation and sustainable use of biodiversity in Colombia. To achieve this
objective the Institute operates with six strategic programs: Biodiversity
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of 105 significant international environmental instruments to
which Colombia is a party.26 ' A perusal of the list provides a
stark contrast between noble intentions and the realities of the
unchecked environmental degradation occurring in Colombia as
a result of many factors, including a weak state, institutional corr-
uption and incompetence, internal conflict, economic instability
(particularly in the agricultural sector), and malaise.
B. Colombia's Constitution
According to Article 79 of the Constitution, every person has
a constitutional right to enjoy a healthy environment 26 2 and
Inventory, Conservation Biology, Use and Valuation, Policies and Legislation,
Communication and Information, and Training." Alexander von Humboldt
Biological Resources Research Institute, at http://araneus.humboldt.org.co/
ingles/en-instituto.htm (last visited Oct. 14, 2004).
261 These instruments include the Convention for the Protection of the World,
Cultural and Natural Heritage, the Convention on International Trade in
Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora, the Convention on Wetlands of
International Importance Especially as Waterfowl Habitat, the Agreement for
the Creation of the Inter-American Institute for Research on Global Change, the
Constituent Treaty on the Development Fund for Indigenous Communities in
Latin America and the Caribbean, the United Nations Framework Convention
on Climate Change, the Paris Treaty for the Protection of Industrial Property,
the 1978 Protocol to the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution
from Ships, the Protocol Concerning Specially Protected Areas and Wild Life to
the Convention for the Protection and Development of the Marine Environment
of the Wider Caribbean Region, and its Annexes, the International Convention
on the Protection of New Varieties of Plant (UPOV), the Additional Protocol on
the American Convention on Human Rights Relating to Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights-San Salvador Protocol, the Basel Convention on the Control
of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and their Disposal, the
International Tropical Timber Agreement, the Treaty for Amazonian
Cooperation between the Republic of Colombia and the Republic of Peru, the
Treaty for Amazonian Cooperation, the Agreement for the Conservation of Flora
and Fauna of the Amazonian Territories between the Republic of Colombia and
the Federal Republic of Brazil, the Vienna Convention for the Protection of the
Ozone Layer, the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer
and its Amendments, and the Agreement for the Conservation of Flora and
Fauna of the Amazonian Territories of The Republic of Colombia and the
Republic of Peru. For the complete list of conventions and instruments, see
Humboldt Institute, Summary of the Main International Conventions Ratified
by Colombia, at http://www. humboldt.org.co/ingles/en-pol-reco-tratados.htm
(last visited Oct. 13, 2004).
262 CONSTITUCION POLITICA DE COLOMBIA DE 1991, supra note 221, art. 79. This
right had been a mere legislative right in Article 7 of the National Code of
Natural Resources and later became a constitutional right. See Decree 2811,
supra note 216.
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Colombia's jurisprudence has treated this right just as impor-
tantly as other fundamental rights.263 The Constitutional Court
asserted that
It]he right to a healthy environment cannot be
separated from the right to life and health of human
beings. In fact, factors that are deleterious to the
environment cause irreparable harm to human
beings. If this is so, we can state that the right to the
environment is a right fundamental to the existence
of humanity.264
In other words, the State of Colombia and its citizens are
constitutionally obligated, as set forth in Article 8, to protect the
diversity and integrity of the environment, preserve areas of spe-
cial ecological importance, and protect the cultural and natural
wealth of the nation.265 Duties such as environmental clean-up are
therefore public services demanded of the State.266 In addition, the
State is obligated to prevent and control environmental deteriora-
tion and to impose sanctions when appropriate.26 7
In fulfilling its constitutional mandate, Colombia has estab-
lished several administrative procedures for environmental
protection and control. 26 Most of these procedures are flawed,
however, and the government agencies tasked with enforcement
fail to carry out their responsibilities. For example, the Western
Caribbean island of San Andres, with large-scale resorts and
263 The argument of the application of environmental right as a fundamental
right for connectivity is based on Articles 88 and 94 of the Constitution. See the
following Constitutional Court of Colombia Sentences: T-415/92, T-126/94, T-
219/94, T-262/94, T-361/94, T-469/94, T-536/92, T-194/99; T-095/97, available at
http://www.ideam.gov.co:8080/legal/sentencias.shtml (last visited Nov. 9,2004).26 Adriana Fabra & Eva Arnal, Background Paper No. 6, Review of Juris-
prudence on Human Rights and Environment in Latin America (2002), at
http://www.unhchr.ch/environment/bp6.html#-ftnref4.265 CONSTITUCIONPOLITICADE COLOMBIADE 1991, supra note 221, art. 8. See also
Decree 2811, supra note 216.
266 CONSTITUCION POLITICA DE COLOMBIA DE 1991, supra note 221, art. 9
267 Id., art. 80.
268 One such entity arising from constitutional mandates is ECOFONDO, a
corporation comprised of governmental and non-governmental organizations
devoted to protecting the environment. For information on ECOFONDO, see
http://www.ecofondo.org.co/english.htm (last visited Nov. 8, 2004).
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facilities expanding throughout the small island, has become a
very popular vacation destination for Colombia's affluent citizens.
The growth of the tourism industry has placed pressure on the
fragile environment and ecosystem, from poorly planned and
regulated garbage dumps, ocean pollution from sewage, and
hydrocarbon dumping, to unplanned, indiscriminate deforestation
and urbanization, and coral reef and sandbar destruction.269
Colombia's national parks system is another example of the
government's inability to enforce its obligations under Article 8 to
protect the cultural and natural wealth of the nation. Article 63
states that natural parks, communal land of ethnic groups, and
the archeological patrimony of the nation, are inviolable, and
cannot be encumbered."' These natural parks, inhabited by
ancient ethnic groups and fragile biodiversity, are extremely rare.
Yet the Colombian government did nothing to prevent 80% of the
original 15,000 hectares of the Tayrona National Park from being
transferred to private interests through illegal invasions or
questionable land titles that were largely the result of blatant
administrative corruption.27'
The "Green" Constitution mandates that a percentage of the
historical homelands of indigenous and Afro-Colombian popula-
tions be placed under autonomous control. However, Colombia has
failed to fulfill this requirement because such areas are under
some of the strongest pressures from illegal logging, agricultural
colonization, and drug cultivation. 2
Lack of governmental control and inter-institutional coordina-
tion, corruption, and the presence of armed groups are major
causes of environmental devastation of the Sierra Nevada de
Santa Marta ("Sierra Nevada").273 As the highest coastal moun-
tain range in the world, with an area of more than 17,000 square
kilometers, the Sierra Nevada contains every ecosystem and
climate range found in Colombia, including tropical beaches
269 1995 Semiannual Survey, supra note 233, at 374.
270 CONSTITUCION POLITICA DE COLOMBIA DE 1991, supra note 221, art. 63.
271 1995 Semiannual Survey, supra note 233, at 374.
272 Tighe, supra note 17.
273 1995 Semiannual Survey, supra note 233, at 374.
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mangrove swamps, alpine regions set among 17,000-foot peaks,
and nearly impenetrable ancient jungle wilderness.274
The Sierra Nevada is the homeland of the Kogi, an indigenous
tribe descended directly from the pre-Colombian Tayrona civiliza-
tion. The Kogi and other indigenous communities of the Sierra
Nevada consider this mountainous region their sacred land and to
many Colombians, the Sierra Nevada is one of the country's most
valued natural treasures.7 5 Yet, for the first time in Colombia's
history, indigenous communities, caught amid the conflict raging
inthe Sierra Nevada, are fleeing the area.7 6 These ancient moun-
tains are rapidly debilitating due to deforestation, an irreversible
erosion process caused by timber harvesting of virgin forests,
agricultural colonization, narcotics cultivation, and the contamina-
tion of once pristine watercourses and soils by agri-chemicals and
farming wastes. The inhabitants, whose right to a healthy environ-
ment is supposed to be protected by the Constitution, are under
immense pressure from the environmental invasion of lands due
to excessive, unregulated hunting and poorly orchestrated govern-
mental anti-drug fumigation campaigns.277
Indigenous populations and concerned citizens have few
constitutional defenses with which to fight the environmental
degradations occurring throughout so many regions of the nation.
The civil remedies available for environmental issues include the
Popular Action, which authorizes individuals to bring civil suits to
force the protection of collective rights,27 ' and the Tutela Action,
274 Louis Mejia, Kogi: Lost Tribe of Pre-Colombian America, at http://www.
abyrinthina.com/kogi.htm (last visited Oct. 13, 2004).275 Juan M. Maldonado, Ethical Considerations for Sustainable Development, 20
PACE ENvTL L. REV. 663 (2003).276 Paraiso Sitiado, SEMANA, Nov. 25, 2002, at 50 (on file with author). The
indigenous communities suffer genocide in the hands of the illegal groups not
because of their race or class, "but because of the place where they live." Id.277 1995 Semiannual Survey, supra note 233, at 374.
278 CONSTITUCION POLTICA DE COLOMBIA DE 1991, supra note 221, art. 88. See
also Sarmiento, Role of Public Participation, supra note 235 (arguing that this
action is similar to the citizen action authorized in the United States). For an
analysis of the Popular Action in the defense of Colombia's environment, see
German Sarmiento, Popular Actions and the Defense of the Environment in
Colombia, PROC. OF THE THIRD INT'L CONF. ON ENVT'L ENFORCEMENT 261
(1994), at http//www.inece.org/3rdvollJpdf/sarm.pdf [hereinafter Sarmiento,
Popular Actions].
2004]
WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POLY REV.
which protects fundamental constitutional rights.279 Under the
Constitutional Court's interpretation, a tutela action is a means
to protect the environment when a violation also affects other
fundamental rights, such as life and health.2 0 However, because
the Constitutional Court must review all tutelas, processing such
actions is very slow.
C. Internal Laws
1. The Code of Natural Resources
The Codigo Nacional de Recursos Naturales, or Code of
Natural Resources ("Code"), sets forth principles guiding the use
of tropical forests and other renewable natural resources.2"' The
Code includes a series of statutes regarding protective measures
in national forestry strategy and the protection of renewable natu-
ral resources. The Code implements an environmental and forestry
policy by establishing mechanisms such as economic incentives,
educational activities, levies for forestry services, environmental
impact assessments, and environmental emergency measures.2"2
Yet critics argue that there is a "generalized failure to comply with
the Natural Resources Code,"2"3 and the government lacks the
political will to give the Code teeth.2"4
279 Sarmiento, Role of Public Participation, supra note 235, at 1. An Accion de
Tutela, or Action of Tutela, is derived from Article 86 of the Colombian Consti-
tution and establishes that any person can bring an action before an ordinary
judge seeking the immediate protection of his or her fundamental constitutional
rights whenever they are threatened or endangered by acts or omissions of a
public authority. Such a proceeding is preferential and summary. The judge,
through an order to be immediately implemented, may enjoin others to act or
refrain from acting. The order may be challenged and, if so, the judge then
sends the order for review to the Constitutional Court for the final decision.
This action may be comparable to a judicial injunction being leveled against
actions or omissions of a public authority effecting individual fundamental
constitutional rights in the United States. See Luz E. Nagle, Evolution of the
Colombian Judiciary and the Constitutional Court, 6 IND. INT'L & COMP. L. REV.
59, 84 (1995).280 1d.
2' Decree 2811, supra note 216.2 82 
id.
283 Sarmiento, Popular Actions, supra note 278.
284 The contaminators have failed to adhere to the Code's regulations and the
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2. Law 99 of 1993
Law 99 of 1993 created the Ministry of the Environment as
a national, cabinet-level governmental authority, reorganized
the public sector in charge of environmental management,
conservation and renewable natural resources, and established the
Sistema Nacional Ambiental ("SINA"), or the National Environ-
mental System.2"5 Under Law 99, the country's process of economic
and social development will follow the 1992 Declaration of Rio de
Janeiro's Principles on the Environment and Development. 286 The
Law establishes that the protection of biodiversity must be a
priority because it is of interest to the national patrimony and to
humanity.28 7 In addition, the Law asserts that, while Legislators
formulating environmental policies will consider scientific inves-
tigation, the lack of scientific certainty and investigation will not
excuse legislators from enacting effective measures to prevent
environmental degradation.2 8
3. Enforcement
a. Law 599 of 2000 of the Colombian Penal Code
The penal code criminalizes the invasion of sensitive
ecological areas. Those who invade indigenous re-
serves, regional parks, areas or ecosystems of strate-
gic interest, or protected areas as defined by law or
regulations will incur prison terms ranging from two
to eight years and fines between 200 and 50,000
times the minimum wage salary for one month.28 9
government has failed to sanction them. In 1982, the companies and agents were
given four years to prepare and implement a plan against contamination. As of
1994, they had yet to fulfill their duties. Id.
285 Law 99, supra note 21, tit. I, art. 1(13).
286 Id., tit. I, art. 1(1).
287 Id., tit. I, art. 1(2).
288 Id., tit. I, art. 1(6).
289 CODIGO PENAL [PENAL CODE], art. 337, (Colom.), available at http://www.
andresospina.8m.net/custom.html (last visited Oct. 21,2004) [hereinafter PENAL
CODE, art. 3371.
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Law 599 of 2000 of the Colombian Penal Code2" establishes
that damaging natural resources and the environment is a crime,
and punishable by prison terms and fines. Those who destroy or
damage natural resources or protected areas will incur prison
terms ranging from two to six years and fines between 100 and
10,000 times the minimum wage salary for one month.29 ' Those
who contaminate the air, atmosphere, soil, water or any other
natural resource in a way that endangers the health and re-
sources of the ecosystem, will incur a prison term ranging from
three to six years and fines between 100 and 25,000 times the
minimum wage salary for one month.292 While the fine will not
exceed fifty times the minimum wage for one month, the penalty
will be increased from one-third to one-half of that amount if the
act is done with terrorist purposes.29 The penalties are basically
unenforceable, especially since many of the perpetrators are
illegally armed groups operating in areas with no rule of law to
enforce regulations or monitor activities.9 4 While "Colombia's
criminal laws have proved ineffective in the enforcement of col-
lective environmental rights," the Constitutional Court has
strived, in several cases, to protect the environment by balancing
private and collective rights.295 The action of tutela has been util-
ized in the Constitutional Court by some NGOs to defend collective
rights, including economic, social, cultural, and environmental
rights. 296
290 DIARIo OFIcIAL No. 44.097, July 24, 2000, available at http://www.
secretariasenado.gov.co/leyes/L0599000.htm (last visited Sept. 10, 2004).
291 PENAL CODE, art. 337, supra note 289.
292 Id.
293 Id.
294 See Ambassador Luis Alberto Moreno, Plan Colombia and Humans Rights,
8 HUM. RTS. BRIEF 9, 12 (2000) (noting that "[tihe reality is that Colombia's
justice system is often overwhelmed by the volume of criminal activity, and it
does its best under the circumstances to punish both the guerilla and illegal
defense groups that have committed crimes against citizens and the
Rovernment").
Roger W. Findley, Foreword to Symposium, Sustainable Development in Latin
American Rainforests and the Role of Law, 32 TEX. INT'L L.J. 1, 8 (1997).296 Id.
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b. Government Monitoring of Environmental Crimes
Colombia has a number of institutions that are designated
with investigative and punitive authority over environmental
crimes. Under Article 250 of the Constitution, and Title XI of the
Penal Code, the Fiscalia General de la Naci6n, or Attorney Gen-
eral, is required to investigate environmental crimes.297 Yet,
according to the Contraloria Nacional, or Controller General's
Office, the Attorney General's performance in the area of environ-
mental enforcement has been lackluster. 29" This is due primarily
to a lack of structural organization dedicated to environmental
protection, as well as the rarity of the prosecution of environmen-
tal crimes.299 For example, in 2002, only 1,667 crimes against the
environment and natural resources were reported. °°
The Ministry of the Environment regulates the sanitation
and conservation of the environment, including the recuperation
of natural resources in order to eliminate or mitigate the impact
ofharmful environmental activities.30 ' The Ministry is also charged
with managing territories that comprise the National Parks
system, protecting the natural patrimony and biological diversity,
and implementing the conservation of special areas of importance
to the ecosystem.3 2
Furthermore, the Procuraduria Delegada para Asuntos Ambi-
entales y Agrarios', or Deputy Attorney General for Environmental
and Agrarian Affairs, task is to fulfill the State's obligations to
protect the environment.0 3 One might argue, however, that the
agency cannot live up to this mandate because it concentrates
297 CONSTITUCION POLTICA DE COLOMBIA DE 1991, supra note 221, art. 250. See
also CODIGO PENAL [PENAL CODE], tit. XI, available at http://www.justicia
criminal.cl/cp/pen colombia.pdf (last visited Sept. 15, 2004) (discussing crimes
ajainst natural resources and the environment).
See ESTADO DE LOS RECURSOS NATURALES Y DEL AMBIENTE, 2002-2003, ch. V,
at 135, available at http://www.contraloriagen.gov.co:8081/internet/central
doc/Archivos/15/Medio_ambienteCapV.pdf [hereinafter ESTADO DE LOS RE-
CURSOS].299 Id.
300 Id.
3o'Law 99, supra note 21, tit. II, art. 5(2).
302 Id.
'o3 See CONSTITUCION POLITICA DE COLOMBIA DE 1991, supra note 221, art. 277.
See also ESTADO DE LOS RECURSOS, supra note 298.
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primarily on controlling and investigating only select projects
instead of the environmental degradation throughout the national
territory.
The Departamento Administrativo de Seguridad ("DAS"),
or Department of Administrative Security, is responsible for
gathering intelligence, undertaking specialized investigations, and
preventing damages to the natural resource of the nation. This
authority is assigned to the special Unit of Crimes against the
Existence and Security of the State. However, DAS does not assign
any significant resources toward its environmental duties, °4 and
given the level of responsibility for the protection of the environ-
ment assigned to the agency, this situation is quite alarming. For
example, DAS is responsible for the management, transportation
and final disposition of the seized chemicals used as precursors in
the manufacturing of cocaine and heroin. 05 Yet, the manner in
which the agency handles and stores these substances, most of
which are quite volatile, caustic, and toxic, has not been well
planned or implemented by DAS authorities and environmental
experts working with the agency.0 6
Another agency, the National Environmental Police ("NEP"),
is a special unit of the National Police responsible for providing
tactical and strategic support, such as control and vigilance, to the
environmental authorities in the defense and protection of nat-
ural resources.0 7 Unfortunately, NEP receives little or no special
training to address the myriad of environmental affairs.0 8
V. ARMED CONFLICT DEGRADES COLOMBIA'S ENVIRONMENT:
INEFFECTIVE GOVERNMENT
A. Unique Biodiversity and Fragile Environment
Colombia is the crossroads between two continents, making
it one of the most biologically diverse countries on the planet.
304 See ESTADO DE LOS RECURSOS, supra note 298.
305 Id.
306 id.
307 The Environmental and Ecological Police was created by Article 101 of Law
99 of 1993. See Law 99, supra note 21.308 See ESTADO DE LOS RECURSOS, supra note 298.
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Nearly all of the topographical features in the world are present
in Colombia, including dense tropical jungles, extreme alpine
regions, lush Andean valleys, bleak savannas, and arid deserts. °9
Colombia is one of only twelve "mega-diversity" countries.3 10
Ranking second only to Brazil in species diversity, Colombia
accounts for about 10% of the world's biological diversity, even
though the country occupies a mere 0.77% of the earth's surface.3 1'
Colombia contains the third highest number of vertebrate
species in the world (at least 2,890),312 and twenty-seven species
of neotropical primates, over one-third of those present in the
world.313 Colombia contains 7% of the world's mammals (358
species), 6% of the world's reptiles, and 10% of the world's
amphibians. 4 Colombia is also home to about 20% of the world's
birds (1,721 species), 31 5 more than any other country in the
world.3 16 It is estimated that Colombia also has 1,900 species
of fish, 970 species of crustaceans, 2,200 types of mollusks, 150
types of coral, and 290 types of starfish (echinoderms).317
More than 55,000 plant species grow in Colombian's soil and
jungle canopies, with at least fifteen percent of the world's orchids
coloring the Colombian landscape in approximately 3,500 vari-
eties.318 Many of the world's pharmaceuticals are derived from
plants found in the Colombian territory.3 19
309 JEFFREY A. MCNEELY ET AL., CONSERVING THE WORLD'S BIOLOGICAL
DIVERSITY 93 (1990). The Choco department received more than thirteen
meters annual precipitation-the highest in the world. Id.310 Global Exchange, Free Trade, The Environment And Biotech, at http://www.
globalexchange.org/campaigns/wto/FTAAWTOEnvironment.pdf (last visited
Sept. 23, 2004). Countries classified as "mega-diversity" possess "the majority
of the world's biodiversity and surviving Indigenous peoples, the true guardians
and developers of biodiversity." Id.
311 McNEELY ET AL., supra note 309, at 93.
31 Clearing-House Mechanism Colombia, Humboldt Institute, Biodiversity in
Colombia, at http://www.humboldt.org.co/chmcolombia/ingles/en-biodiversidad.
htm (last visited Sept. 27, 2004) [hereinafter Biodiversity in Colombia].
313 McNEELY ET AL., supra note 309, at 93.
314 Biodiversity in Colombia, supra note 312.315 Id.
316 Alvarez, Forests, supra note 23, at 51.
317 Introduction to LIBRO ROJO DE AVES DE COLOMBIA, supra note 218, at 28.
318 McNEELY ET AL., supra note 309, at 93.
319 Id.
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Many animal and plant species found in Colombia, especially
Colombia's 45,000 species of angiosperms, are completely depend-
ent on the forests in certain regions of Colombia: the three Andean
cordilleras that divide Colombia into distinct climate zones; the
dense jungles of Choco, located along the Pacific coast; the wes-
tern Amazonian basin that extends well into Colombia's southern
territories;32 ° the unique forest regions in the areas of Putumayo
and Caquetd; the mountain ranges of the Sierra Nevada de Santa
Marta and Sierra de la Macarena; and the department of Meta.32'
These regions, largely due to their unique topographic charac-
teristics, provide logistical opportunities for exploitation and cover
for drug traffickers, drug manufacturers, and illegally armed
groups, such as guerrillas and paramilitaries.
Colombia's biological diversity has also performed a vital role
in the sustenance and survival of various indigenous cultures.
Colombia is home to some eighty-one ethnic tribal groups, mostly
in the Amazon basin and Andean forest and mountain regions.32 2
Their cultures resisted invasion and encroachment for thousands
of years; their religious beliefs, value systems, group identities,
and livelihoods are largely dependent on their habitat.32 3 Yet many
of the indigenous communities have degraded their own natural
landscapes, partially because of the introduction and domestica-
tion of foreign plants and animals to the region. 4 As a result,
remote sensing surveys show that "as much as 97% of the tropical
dry forests of the Caribbean and 70% of the Andean cloud forests
have disappeared."32 5 Colombia's diversity is under rapidly increa-
sing pressure due to deforestation, pollution, and many other
factors that contribute to the destruction and possible extinction
20 Alvarez, Forests, supra note 23, at 51.
321 See Conflicto y Medio Ambiente en Colombia, at http://www.cgfm.mil.co/
cgfm.nsf]0/2eld69b3b lfa615385256cef0074d4b5?OpenDocument(last visited Oct.
21, 2004) (web page of the ComandoGeneral of the Colombian Armed Forces).322 Samper K. Cristi6.n, Biodiversity of Colombia: Can Science and Politics Share
the Same Habitat?, Third Darwin Initiative Lecture, London (Dec. 13, 2000), at
http://www.defra.gov.uk/environment/darwin/lecture/03.htm.
323 Id.
324Id.
325 id.
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of fragile habitats.326 Vast amounts of vegetable and animal
species are on the verge of extinction.327 Studies also indicate that
more than 1,000 plant species are threatened, including orchids,
which are considered a Colombian national treasure.328
According to data published by the International Union for the
Conservation of Nature, several animals are also endangered,
including "89 species of mammals, 133 bird species, 20 species of
reptiles and 8 species of fish."3 29 The study illustrates the effects
of deforestation from the cultivation of illegal crops on several
bird species.33 °
Among these species is the black tinamu (Tinamus Osgoodi),
which lives in humid sub-Andean forests. 331 This species has
already lost eighty percent of its habitat to deforestation, particu-
larly in the eastern Andean cordillera.332 Vast woodlands have
been cut down for agricultural purposes, many times in order to
grow coca and heroin poppy.333 The tinamu also is threatened by
the ravages of the internal armed conflict in many of the bird's
habitats: along the Magdalena river system, in the departments
of Huila and Caqueta, and running north to south through the
department of Antioquiain, the extreme north of the central
cordillera.334
The crested eagle (Oroaetus Isidori) is found throughout
Colombia's mountain ranges-the Andes, the Serrania de Perija
and Sierra Nevada de Santa Marta-but has lost sixty-three
percent of its habitat.335 A dramatic loss of habitat occurred
32 6Biodiversity in Colombia, supra note 312.
3271 d. According to the Alexander von Humboldt Biological Resources Research
Institute, Colombia should be "considered a country in which the environment
is a high priority, in which conservation, recovery and sustainability programs
must be developed that prevent the harmful effects of human activities on the
biological ecosystems and their biological resources." Id.328 Id.
329 Id.
330 Id.331 See Andr6s M. Cuervo & Juan L. Toro, Tinamus Osgoodi, in LIBRO ROJO DE
AVES DE COLOMBIA, supra note 218, at 59.3 32 Id.333 Id.334 Id.335 See C6sar M6rquez & Luis M. Renjifo, Oroaestus Isidori, in LIBRO ROJO DE
AVES DE COLOMBIA, supra note 218, at 112-14.
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between 1996 and 1998,336 mostly due to deforestation for coca
and poppy cultivation.
3 1
The Colombian pavon (Crax Alberti) is endemic to the
Magdalena River's middle valley in northern Colombia, San
Lucas, Cauca, Sierra Nevada de Santa Marta, and part of the
San Jorge and Sinu rivers. 3 The pavon has lost eighty percent
of its natural habitat due to the accelerated expansion of illicit
crops in these areas of distribution. 339 The habitat in the lower
Paramillo province of the Qundio department has been disturbed
by illegal timber harvesting, construction of the Urra dam, and
illegal coca cultivation. 4 ° In the area of Sierra Nevada de Santa
Marta in northern Colombia, the pavon's habitat has been
strained by the cultivation and subsequent fumigation of mari-
juana.34 ' The pavon's habitat along the Sinu and San Jorge rivers
has been deforested in large scale because of coca production.342
The dismaying list continues: the Santa Marta parakeet
(Pyrrhura Viridicata), from the jungles of the Sierra Nevada de
Santa Marta, has lost twenty-six percent of its habitat due to
marijuana cultivation and the fumigation programs initiated
under the so-called "Wars on Drugs."343 During the 1970s, the
greatest deforestation took place because of planting marijuana
crops.3" The golden-plumed parakeet (Leptosittaca Branickii),
native to the Andean and sub-Andean forests, has lost sixty-two
percent of its habitat as a result of deforestation for illegal crop
cultivation.3 45 The military parrot (Ara Militaris), of the Sierra
Nevada de Santa Marta and the Eastern and Central Cordilleras,
has also lost eighty-one percent of its habitat due to deforestation
3m Id. at 113. Affected areas were the department of Narino in the South of
Colombia and the forests of the Miraflores zone. Id.
337 Id. at 116.
338 See Andr6s M. Cuervo, Crax Alberti, in LIBRO ROJO DE AVES DE COLOMBIA,
supra note 218, at 135-38.339-Id. at 141.
340 Id. at 139.
341 Id.
342 Id. at 140.343 Jos6 V. Rodriguez-Mahecha & Luis M. Renjifo, Pyrrhura Viridicata, in LIBRO
RoJO DE AVES DE COLOMBIA, supra note 218, at 185.3" Id.
34 Luis M. Renjifo et al., Leptosittaca Branickii, in LIBRO ROJO DE AVES DE
COLOMBIA, supra note 218, at 196-97.
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for marijuana cultivation.3 46 Deforestation for the expansion of
illegal crops in the department of Nariflo has also resulted in the
loss of twenty-five percent of the long-wattled umbrellabird's
(Cephalopterus Penduliger) habitat.347
Ironically, efforts to substitute illicit crops with legal crops
have also caused collateral damage to some species. The brown
wood-rail (Aramides Wolfi), living along the Pacific coast of Colo-
mbia, is threatened both by deforestation from coca production
and by the substitution of African palm trees for commercial
harvest.3' This substitution project has caused the destruction of
seventy-six percent of the wood-rail's habitat.349
The cultivation of illegal crops severely affects water re-
sources in Colombia. At one time, Colombia ranked fourth in the
world, after Russia, Canada, and Brazil, in hydro resources.35 ° But
Colombia is currently experiencing a water crisis and the World
Report on the Development of the Hydro Resources ranked
Colombia as 24th in water wealth and 35th in water quality in
2004.35'
According to a report by the Colombian Defense Ministry,
water resources in Colombia are threatened by the lack of public
awareness about water conservation and the widely-held belief
that Colombia's water resources are infinite.352 They are also
threatened by a lack of understanding about the impact the
internal conflict and collateral damages of narcotrafficking have
on water resources. "Even though the totality of the environmen-
tal impact by narcotrafficking cannot be evaluated, it is clear that
there is a severe deforestation of the tropical forest and river
basin contamination."353
3 46 Jos6 Rodrfguez-Mahecha, Ara Militaris, in LIBRO ROJO DEAVES DE COLOMBIA,
supra note 218, at 205.4TRalfe Strewe & Luis M. Renjifo, Cephalopterus Penduliger, in LIBRO ROJO
DE AVES DE COLOMBIA, supra note 218, at 362.34 8 Felipe A. Estela & Isadora Angarita, Aramides Wolfi, in LIBRO ROJO DE AVEs
DE COLOMBIA, supra note 218, at 171-72.
349 Id.
350 See Alto Riesgo de Escasez de Agua en Colombia si no Cuida Sus Recursos
Hidricos, EL TIEMPO (Bogota), Mar. 24, 2003, available at http://www.rolac.
unep.mx/centinf.esp/noticias/25marO3e.doc (last visited Nov. 8, 2004).
351 Id.
352 Id.
353 Id.
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According to the National Antinarcotics Police, seventy-
three percent of the 102.071 hectares of illicit crops in the country
are located close to vital water resources, such as the Putumayo
and Caquet. rivers.354 Moreover, the increased cultivation of the
African palm is decreasing water supplies, particularly in zones
covered by natural forestry.355 Rather, it constitutes an ill-
conceived policy of substituting an agribusiness commodity for the
restoration of the original ecosystem and its diversity.356
Colombia's National Parks System also experiences the effects
of deforestation resulting from illegal crop cultivation and the ille-
gal harvesting of hardwoods. Tayrona National Park, located in
the Sierra Nevada of Santa Marta in northern Colombia, has the
"greatest biological diversity of the American littoral,"357 with an
environment ranging from marine areas to alpine regions. There
is a great diversity of species within the Park, including 108 spe-
cies of mammals, 765 types of terrestrial flora, 471 crustaceans,
300 species of birds, 700 mollusks, and 401 varieties of fish.358
B. Environmental Effects of Armed Conflict
The armed conflict persists in several municipalities that pos-
sess great biodiversity and forest resources. The most direct
114 See Incentivos Econ6micos Perversos Para la Conservaci6n de la Bio-
diversidad, Boletin No. 21 BIOSNTESIS (2001), at http://www.humboldt.
org.co/download/bol2l.pdf (last visited Oct. 8, 2004). African Palm trees have
been highly encouraged as an alternative to illicit crops and have been lauded
as an important weapon in the fight against rural poverty. This crop is financed
with resources from Plan Colombia, FINARGO and the Agrarian Bank.
Unfortunately, African Palm producers have failed to consider the negative
effects of large African Palm crops on a forest's biodiversity. These crops have
been planted in zones covered by natural forestry. However, when the African
Palm is cultivated in the middle of the humid forestry, it destroys the
ecosystem. This contributes to the disappearance of fauna and flora. Planting
palm is not planting forestry; an African Palm crop creates a homogeneous
ecosystem and is a poor substitute for a diverse natural forest. This also
negatively impacts the environment because it decreases water production,
modifies soil composition, and alters the harmony between fauna and flora. Id.3 5 5 id.
356 Id.
31' BIODIVERSITY AND ToURIsM IN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE CONVENTION ON
BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY: THE CASE OF THE TAYRONA NATIONAL PARK, COLOMBIA 8
(Jens BrUggemann et al. eds., 2002), available at http://www.biodiv.org/dod/case-
studies/tour/cs-tour-tayrona-co.pdf (last visited Oct. 8, 2004).358 Id.
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environmental damages caused by Colombia's illegally armed
groups and criminal organizations are: the increased clearing of
land in order to grow illicit crops,359 in which illegally armed
groups have used narcotrafficking as the most important vehicle
for territorial control;3 60 the impact of displacing campesinos,
responsible for clearing virgin land to grow sustenance crops;361 the
contamination of soil and water resources resulting from the
activities of drug labs and armed encampments; 362 and deliberate
terrorist attacks against environmental resources as well as oil
and gas facilities.363
Many of the affected lands are located in the temperate or
tropical zones most amenable to the cultivation and processing of
illegal coca, heroin poppies, and marijuana.3 64 These lands include
the Sierra Nevada of Santa Marta, the Andean Choc6 region, the
middle Magdalena River Valley, and the Colombian Amazonian
forests ranges.365 Armed groups occupy 6.63 million hectares (70%)
of the Andean region, 7.48 million hectares (21%) of the Amazon
359 See MINISTERIO DE INTERIOR, PLAN NACIONAL DE LUCHA CONTRA LAS
DROGAS: COLOMBIA 1998- 2002 14 (2002), available at http://www.dnecolombia.
gv.co/doc/Publicaciones/estrategica/plan-drogas.pdf (last visited Oct. 8, 2004)
ereinafter PLAN NACIONAL]. During the 1980s, illegal money was used to buy
land in the middle Magdalena River Valley. In this area, a strong presence of
illegal groups exists and paramilitary groups have been promoted strongly. See
id.
360 See James Wilson, Brutal Battle For Territory As Colombia Prepares Offen-
sive Against Rebels, Financial Times (London), Sept. 13, 2000, at 5 (reporting
that the Putumayo region of Colombia has been hotly contested by illegal armed
groups vying for control of a region where coca and opium cultivation, with
FARC exerting hegemony over the region, and that similar violent land grabs
by illegal armed groups is ongoing throughout Colombia).3 See Yadera Ferrer, Drugs-Colombia: Coca Production Grew Alongside Peace
Talks, Inter Press Service, Apr. 1, 2002 (noting how coca farmers moved into San
Vicente del Caguan, occupied by FARC, to escape the fighting between illegal
armed groups for control of coca growing areas).
362 See Martin Arostegui, Colombia Rebels Enter Drug Trade, United Press
International, July 7, 2001 (reporting on how aerial photos of the Amazon basin
showed contaminates from drug labs spreading throughout the river system).
363 See Lauren E. Godshall, Making Space For Indigenous Intellectual Property
Rights Under Current International Environmental Law, 15 GEO. INT'L ENVTL.
L.REV. 497, 503 (2003) (describing the environmental havoc caused by guer-
rillas bombing oil pipelines running through the indigenous U'wa people's
lands, and noting that over the course of the eleven years, rebels have been
bombing the Cano-Limon pipeline, between 1.7 and 2.3 million barrels of oil
have seeped into the soil).
4]Avarez, Forests, supra note 23, at 57.3 6 5 Id.
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forests, and 1.9 million hectares (21%) of the Choc6. 366 The Andean
region-including the Serrania de San Lucas, Nudo de Paramillo,
Pdramo de Las Hermosas, and the largest regions of Eastern
Andean Cordillera-comprises "the largest continuous forest
remnants" and appears most negatively impacted by the presence
of armed groups.367
1. Deforestation from Coca and Poppy Cultivation
There are direct and indirect causes for the loss of biodiversity
in Colombia.36 Deforestation, despite a lack of precise statistics
regarding its extent, is one of the principal direct causes. 369 It is
estimated that "one third of Colombia's primary forest has been
lost" due to deforestation.37 °
Pollution is another cause of biodiversity loss. "Colombia has
lost 73% of its continuous montane forests," due to the ravages of
legal and illegal deforestation. In the last fifteen years, there are
indications that more than 1,000,000 acres of land have been
deforested by narcoguerrillas and narcotraffickers in order to cul-
tivate and harvest illicit crops.372
If the current rate of deforestation continues, government offi-
cials estimate that the jungles will all be farmland in approxi-
mately seventeen years.373 The figures covering the last decade
alone are daunting; 1,361,475 hectares of tropical forests were
cleared between 1990 and 2000, an area 1.52 times greater than
Yellowstone National Park.374 Unfortunately, the "relentless plant-
ing schedule destroys all vegetation, leads to massive soil erosion,
386 Id. at 55.
367 Id. at 57.
368 See Colombia: First National Report, supra note 236, at 13.
369 Id.
370 Id. Land has been cleared for the following reasons: 73.3% from the expan-
sion of agriculture and colonization; 11.7% for timber; 11% for firewood; 2% by
forest fires; and 2% for illegal crops. Id.311 Alvarez, Forests, supra note 23, at 50.
172 See Verdad Colombia, Colombia and the Environment: Colombia Has Much
to Celebrate . . . and Also Much to Fear, at http://verdadcolombia.org/docu
mentos/documentos/01.asp (last visited Oct. 8, 2004).
373 Id.
374 Id.
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which can cause flooding, which in turn ruins more land."375 As
if the damage is not enough of a problem, the proliferation of
illicit crops severely reduces the production of food crops such as
plantain and yucca root.376
Little research has been done on the environmental impact of
poppy and coca cultivation, and according to the Colombian gov-
ernment, the environmental effects from producing illicit crops
and using precursors have yet to be sufficiently evaluated. 7 Part
of the gap in empirical knowledge has to do with the risk of life in
conducting research and gathering statistical information on the
deforestation resulting from the cultivation of illegal crops.378 As
a result, the existing information is essentially based on deduc-
tions from analyzing the hectares of "illicit crops in some forested
areas.
"379
What is known, however, is the selection process of where to
cultivate illegal crops devastates the environment and biodiver-
sity. The most favorable climate zones for growing coca and opium
poppy are sensitive ecosystems of great environmental value.8 °
The Andean forests and the upper Andean elevations are most
suitable for poppy, while the plains and jungles of the Orinoco and
Amazonas areas are best for the cultivation of coca.38 '
While it has become increasingly dangerous to determine
accurate statistics of coca crop cultivation in more recent years, it
is believed that between 1985 and 1989, coca cultivation grew by
27,000 hectares, an increase of 175 percent.38 2 It is also believed
that between 1992 and 2000, the number of hectares used for coca
cultivation almost quadrupled, from 38,000 to 136,000 hectares.8 3
3 75 
Id.
3 76 
Id.
377 See PLAN NACIONA1, supra note 359, at 15.
378 See Maria D. Alvarez, Could Peace be Worse than War for Colombia's Forest?,
21 THE ENVIRONMENTALIST 305, 306 (2001).3 79 
Id.
380 See Memorias Foro: Cultivos Ilicitos en Colombia, Aug. 17-18, 2000, Bogotd
(on file with author).
381 See id. These three areas of growth characteristically have the greatest
supply of germoplasma on the planet. Id.
382 See U.S. Department of State, The Andes Under Siege: Environmental Con-
sequences of the Drug Trade (July 2001), at http:/usinfo.state.gov/products/
pubs/andesihomepage.htm [hereinafter Andes Under Siegel.
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In 2001, 1,142,000 square kilometers of the national territory
were surveyed.3" By November 2001, it was determined that
144,807 hectares of coca cultivation were observed in twenty-two
of Colombia's thirty-two departments.385 By the-end of 2001, it was
estimated that 7,235,000 hectares, five percent of the national
territory, was affected by coca cultivation.386
Due to climatic requirements, coca cultivation for narco-
trafficking remains concentrated in the Amazon basin. Within
this area, about 65,000 hectares dispersed in the neighboring
departments of Putumayo and CaquetA accounts for forty-five
percent of coca cultivation.8 7 In addition, thirty-four percent of
coca production (about 49,000 hectares) in Colombia occurs in the
neighboring departments of Meta, Guaviare, and Vaupds."8
More startling about these statistics is that the political map
of Colombia reveals these departments to be the largest in the
nation; thus, counter-narcotics efforts in these regions are daun-
ting even under the best circumstances. 3 9 This is not to say that
interdiction and eradication efforts have not yielded any results.
For example, in 2001, illicit crop cultivation dropped in Putumayo
by 18,902 hectares and in Caquetd by 12,087 hectares. 390 As one
can imagine, however, the reduction in one department led to
increased production in neighboring departments.3 9' In the same
year, coca cultivation increased in Guaviare by 7,934 hectares, in
Vichada by 4,231 hectares, and in Norte de Santander by 2,865
hectares .392
By December 2002, approximately 102,000 hectares of coca
were cultivated in twenty-one out of the thirty-two Colombian
3 4 U.N. Office of Drugs and Crime, Colombia Annual Cultivation Survey 2001
3 (Mar. 2002), at http://www.unodc.org/pdf/publications/report2002-03-31_1.
Pdf [hereinafter Colombia Annual Cultivation].85 Id. at 4. Note that Colombia has 32 departments and not 31 as stated in the
UNODC report stated. See CIA, WORLD FACTBOOK, supra note 13.
316 Colombia Annual Cultivation, supra note 384, at 4.
3 8 7 Id.
3 88 id.
311 See generally El Portal del Tolima, at www.bundenet.com/atlas (last visited
Oct. 12, 2004).390 Colombia Annual Cultivation, supra note 384, at 4. When combined, these
traditional areas of coca cultivation account for more than fifty percent of the
entire coca production in Colombia. Id.3 9 1 id.392 [d.
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departments.393 According to the United Nations Office on Drugs
and Crime, that amount indicates a small reduction, approxi-
mately 43,000 hectares, from a year earlier when coca cultivation
was estimated at about 145,000 hectares.394
The following table is based on data compiled by the United
Nations Office of Drug Control and represents the rise and fall of
coca cultivation from 1994 through 2002:
193 Press Release, U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime, Colombian Coca Cultivation
Falls by 30 Percent (Mar. 17, 2003), available at http://www.unodc.org/
unodc/en/press-release2003-03-17_1.html [hereinafter Coca Cultivation Falls].
39' UNITED NATIONS OFFICE ON DRUGS AND CRIME, COLOMBIA COCA SURVEY FOR
DECEMBER 2002 & SEMI-ANNUAL ESTIMATE FOR JULY 2003, at 3, available at
http://www.unodc.org/pdf/publications/colombia-report_2003-09-25.pdf (last
visited Oct. 8,2004). The statistics are based on a 2002 survey on the assessment
of satellite images obtained between August 2002 and January 2003. The
satellite images were verified with flights over the areas of coca production. Id.
" See Coca Cultivation Falls, supra note 394. Compare with MINISTRY OF
JUSTICE, LA LUCHA DE COLOMBIA CONTRA LAS DROGAS ILICITAS: ACCIONES Y
RESULTADOS 2001 16, at http://www.dnecolombia.gov.co/doc/Publicaciones/
estrategica/white book.pdf (last visited Nov. 8, 2004) (stating specific numbers
by region in Colombia) [hereinafter MINISTRY OF JUSTICE].
Year Coca Hectares
1994 44700
1995 50900
1996 67200
1997 79400
1998 101800
1999 160000
2000 163000
2001 145000
2002 102000195
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However, these figures and statistics must be viewed with a
degree of skepticism. The United States Office of Drug Control
Policy released figures that differ significantly: 169,800 hectares
in 2001, 144,450 hectares in 2002, and 113,850 hectares for
2003.396 The disparity in these figures demonstrates that authori-
ties do not really know how much coca grows in Colombia.
Despite interdiction and eradication campaigns throughout
the 1990s, the amount of coca under cultivation is still quite
alarming. The next table displays the Colombian departments
where coca cultivation is prevalent, resulting in the expansion of
coca productions in regions where the environment and bio-
diversity are highly stressed.
By hectares 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Guaviare Region 26700 29800 38200 56700 78500
(including
Macarena, Meta,
Vichada, Rio
Duda)
Caqueta Region 39400 33600 32200 40300 32350
(including east'
west Caqueta)
Putumayo Region 30100 45900 47400 42000 8200
(including
Putumayo East)
Other (Narifio, 5600 13200 18400 30800 25400
Norte de 397
Santander,
Arauca, San
Lucas, Antioquia,
Santander)
396 See Press Release, Office of National Drug Control Policy, 2003 Coca
Cultivation Estimates for Colombia, at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/
news/pressO4/032204.html (last visited Oct. 8, 2004).
397 U.S. Dept. of State, Bureau of Int'l. Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs,
Colombia: Net Coca Cultivation by Region 1998-2002 (Mar. 14, 2003), available
at http://www.state.gov/g/inl/rls/other/18651.htm.
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These statistics speak volumes about the pervasiveness of
illegal crop cultivation in Colombia. Another pressing concern,
however, should be the damage Colombia's illegal crop cultivation
methods inflict on the environment. The first step in cultivation
is the selection of optimum areas for planting that are slightly
sloped so that standing water will not drown young plants.39 s The
most favorable climate zones for growing coca and opium poppy
are sensitive ecosystems of great environmental value.399 Opium
poppies are not indigenous to Colombia; the crop was introduced
by drug traffickers in the mid-to-late 1980s: "[rieports of sub-
stantial opium poppy cultivation in Colombia began in 1990. By
1992, couriers from Colombia were being arrested on a regular
basis at Miami International Airport and JFK with one to two
kilograms of heroin."40 °
Poppy grows prodigiously in Andean forest regions known as
"bosques de niebla."4 ' This type of forest area contains a great
amount of water,40 2 and is well-suited for small-scale poppy grow-
ing within an already well established agricultural border.4 3 In
both the tropical jungle and the Andean region, large-scale culti-
vation occurs in peripheral agricultural zones or isolated zones
within wooded areas.40 4 Unfortunately, large natural reserves and
natural parks are premium zones for the potential expansion of
illegal crop cultivation.4 5
398 See Drug Enforcement Administration, Coca Cultivation and Cocaine
Processing: An Overview (Sept. 1993), available at http://www.druglibrary.org/
schaffer/govpubs/cocccp.htm.
... See Andes Under Siege, supra note 382 (noting that "extraordinary rich
biodiversity of Colombia is under serious threat by narcotics traffickers who are
cultivating coca and opium poppy crops in ecologically sensitive regions of the
country, according to the Colombian government").
40 International and Criminal Justice Committee on Government Reform and
Oversight, The Threat of Heroin to the United States: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on National Security (1996) (statement of Thomas A. Constantine,
Drug Enforcement Agency Administrator), available at http://www.fas.org
/irp/congress/1996_hr/h960919c.htm (last visited Oct. 8, 2004).
4 These forestries have been threatened by great agricultural expansion. See
PLAN NACIONAL, supra note 359, at 16.
402 Id.
403 Id.
404 Id.405 Id.
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Once an area of land is selected for cultivation, the second
stage is preparing the area for planting. The most common method
of planting is the "tala"-burning of thousands of hectares of forest
terrain.4"' In order to produce one hectare of coca crop, it is esti-
mated that four hectares of forest or jungle are destroyed.4 °7 For
every hectare of opium poppy harvested, the estimated loss of
Andean jungle is 2.5 hectares.4"8 The following table illustrates the
deforestation rates in Colombia from 1993 through 2000.
Year Deforestation for Deforestation for
Coca (Hectares) Poppy (Hectares)
1993 179110 57500
1994 214947 76906
1995 265473 98217
1996 325649 122294
1997 430732 150039
1998 537777 181601
1999 661568 218328
2000 800478 260422409
A number of serious effects are caused by the clearing of land
for cultivation. These include: destruction of ecological niches; des-
truction of unknown genetic potential;4 10 soil erosion; destruction
406Id.
407 See PLAN NACIONAL, supra note 359, at 16.408 Id.
409 See Nat'l. Police Antinarcotics Division, Illicit Cultivation, Dec. 2000, 6 (on file
with author).
410 See also Verdad Colombia, La Naturaleza: Otra Victima de la Guerrilla en
Colombia, at www.verdadcolombia.org/articulos/articulos/01.asp (last visited
Oct. 8, 2003). There are between 96 and 120 varieties of trees at risk of
disappearing, without counting those which have not even been studied or
discovered. Some tree species are of unknown bioenergetic potential or of high
potential pharmaceutical, nutritional or economic value. Id.
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of native vegetation; alterations in the patterns of rains and local
climate; significant carbon dioxide emissions due to the burning
of the forests and jungles; destruction of the landscape; extinction
of endemic species within the areas under cultivation;
deterioration ofwater sources;411 and fragmentation of the fauna. 12
The human impact of coca and opium cultivation is equally
stressful on the environment. Cultivation causes a swift,
abnormal settling of thousands of persons who participate in the
preparation and processing of the drug. 13 The influx causes
contamination of water and soils, resulting in unsanitary solid
and liquid wastes that cannot be treated.41" The following table
shows the production of solid waste in the areas of Colombia
where the majority of illicit cultivation occurred during 1999:
Department Number of Urban Tons of Tons of
municipalities population waste waste
per per
month year
CaquetA 16 195483 4228 50734
Putumayo 13 107112 1616 19392
Amazonas 2 26912 486.25 5835
Totals 21 329507 6330.25 75961
415
Once narcotraffickers establish the growing areas, the third
stage of cultivation occurs: the establishment of farm operations
to sustain the crops.416 At this stage, the agricultural processes
411 1d. In 1970, Colombia had approximately 18,000 rivers. The country has lost
about 200 rivers per year in the last thirty years, decreasing the number to
2,000; a loss of 12,000 rivers. Id.412 See Memorias del Foro, Cultivos Ilicitos en Colombia, supra note 380, at 110.
413 Id.
414 Id.
415 Id.
416 Id.
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inherent to crop growing occur, including sowing and planting,
tending the fields, and harvesting the crops. 17 In some
territories, coca and opium farmers compensate for the scarcity of
labor with the heavy use of pesticides, fungicides, and fertilizers.
4 1 8
Overuse is common.4 19
The primary environmental impacts of illegal crop farms
include: contamination of surface and subterranean bodies of
water; alteration of additional landscape; soil contamination by
chemical agriculture products; and air contamination caused by
the vaporization or even incineration of agri-chemicals due to
the lack of control in the handling of such chemicals. ° The
majority of the farmers do not apply the recommended dosages of
agri-chemicals, believing incorrectly that an increase in the
quantity and concentration of agri-chemicals will result in higher
and faster yields.1
21
In addition to the impacts of illicit crop farming, the
narcotraffickers and illegal armed groups have constructed many
roads through the forests and jungles to service the illegal crop
cultivation sites.4 22 These roads add additional stress to the en-
vironment and destroy biodiversity1 23 The Colombian Air Force
has detected close to twenty-five clandestine trails in the heart of
the jungle, where narcotraffickers have leveled kilometers of
jungle to open trails for the entry of arms and the exit of processed
drugs 424
The final stage of drug production involves the harvesting and
processing of coca and poppies into a finished product. 25 During
each of the steps, drug producers use a significant quantity of
chemicals which are then dumped into the surrounding region as
waste. The manufacturing process occurs in a three-phase process:
417Id.
418 See Memorias del Foro, Cultivos Ilicitos en Colombia, supra note 380, at 110.
4 19 Id.
420Id.o
421Id.
422 See Ricardo V. Meza, Colombia: Putumayo: una Crisis de Estado, 3 BOLETIN
INTL. ACCION ANDINA (Nov. 2000), available at http://www.cedib.org/cgi-bin/
wxis.exe?IsisScript=../accionandina/script/bolaaone.xis&srch=00017&txt=biaa
2000-3.putumayounacrisisdeestado.01.html (last visited Oct. 8, 2004).
423 Id.
424Id.
425Id.
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Phase 1: Raw Coca Leaf to Coca Paste
1. Leaves are placed in container or plastic-lined
pit.
2. Alkaline solution (sodium bicarbonate) is added
to the leaves.
3. Water and kerosene are added.
4. The mixture is agitated (cocaine alkaloids and
kerosene separated from water and coca leaves).
5. Water and leaves are removed. Sodium
carbonate is again added to the acid-kerosene
solution, causing a precipitate.
6. The precipitate is filtered and dried, producing
coca paste.
Phase 2: Coca Paste to Cocaine Base
1. Coca paste is dissolved by sulfuric acid or
hydrochloric acid in water.
2. Potassium permanganate is combined with
water and added to the paste and acid solution.
3. The resulting solution is filtered and the
precipitate is discarded.
4. Ammonia is added to the filtered solution to
cause the raw cocaine base to precipitate. The
liquid chemical wastes are drained into a nearby
stream or river.
Phase 3: Cocaine Base to Cocaine Hydrochloride
1. Acetone or ether is used to remove unnecessary
components.
2. Hydrochloride acid is then added, and the
cocaine crystallizes.
3. Using a hot oven or microwave, the crystallized
cocaine is dried.426
426 See Sarah Clune & Liz Harper, Colombia's Civil War, PBS Online Newsletter
(2004), at http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/latin-america/colombia/trade.html
(last visited Oct. 8, 2004).
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This process produces not only a drug concoction ready for
packaging and shipment, but also toxic areas of unusable land.427
As more sites are created for processing coca, the government is
further pressured to respond to increasing environmental
problems caused by the illegal drug production in sensitive
areas.4 28 Again, one must keep in mind that these drug-processing
sites are in areas under the control of illegally armed groups. Even
if the government has the capacity to clean up contaminated sites,
the sites remain inaccessible.
2. Precursors' Contamination of the Environment
Despite the attempt of domestic laws and international
instruments to deny traffickers the precursor chemicals needed to
manufacture illicit drugs, such commerce continues to proliferate.
The regulation of precursors is internationally accepted under the
1988 United Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic
Drugs and Psychotropic Substances.429 Article III mandates:
[e]ach Party shall adopt such measures as may be
necessary to establish as criminal offences under its
domestic law, when committed intentionally.... The
manufacture, transport or distribution of equipment,
materials or of substances listed in Table I and Table
II, knowing that they are to be used in or for the
illicit cultivation, production or manufacture of
narcotic drugs or psychotropic substances.'O
Article XII establishes the obligation on parties to the Conven-
tion to control chemical commerce in order to prevent diversion to
427 See id.
428 See id.
429 See generally United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic
Drugs and Psychotropic Substances (Dec. 20, 1988) available at http://www.
drugtext.org/ibrary/legal/treat/psy88.htm [hereinafter U.N. Convention].
Colombia signed the Agreement from the Convention on December 20,1988, and
ratified it on June 10, 1994. Id.430 Id., art. 3, §1(a)(iv).
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illicit drug manufacture: "[tihe Parties shall take the measures
they deem appropriate to prevent diversion of substances in
Table I and Table II used for the purpose of illicit manufacture of
narcotic drugs or psychotropic substances, and shall co-operate
with one another to this end."43 '
The Convention identifies the following chemicals as those
used in the manufacture of illicit drugs:
Table I Table II
N-acetylanthranilic acid Acetic anhydride
Ephedrine Acetone
Ergometrine Anthranilic acid
Ergotamine Ethyl ether
Isosafrole Hydrochloric acid
Lysergic acid Methyl ethyl ketone
3,4-methylenedioxyphenyl-2- Phenylacetic acid
propanone
1-phenyl-2-propanone Piperidine
Piperonal Potassium permanganate
Pseudoephedrine Sulphuric acid
Safrole Toluene
432
Section Nine of Article XII instructs Party States to: organize
and sustain a method to oversee the international trade of the
materials in Table I and Table II, support and allow for the
4.1 Id., art. 12, §1.
432 See International Narcotics Control Board, Annex: Revised Tables Including
the Amendments made by the Commission on Narcotic Drugs in Force as of 23
November 1992, at http://www.incb.org/e/conv/1988/annex.htm (last visited Oct.
8, 2004).
2004]
WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POLy REV.
seizure of these substances if evidence indicates that the use is
intended for illicit narcotics manufacturing, require proper
labeling of substances in the import and export process, and to
guarantee that documents on the movement of these substances
will be preserved and stored for two years in order to be
available for review by proper authorities.433
Colombia was an original participant in the Convention, sign-
ing on December 20, 1988. 4 Upon signature, Colombia designated
a reservation pertaining to its cooperation in the investigation of
domestic drug offenses under Article Nine.4 5 Colombia justified
the reservation stating,
[Ilts legislation does not permit outside co-operation
with the judiciary in investigating offences nor the
establishment of joint teams with other countries to
that end. Likewise inasmuch as samples of the
substances that have given rise to investigations
belong to the proceedings, only the judge, as
previously, can take decisions in that regard.436
Up to this point in time, Colombia did not have any significant
mutual legal assistance agreements with other states.437
Colombia's ratification of the Convention on June 10, 1994,
altered the justification to the 1988 reservation, stating that
Colombia has reservations "inasmuch as they [paragraphs 1 (b),
(c), (d) and (e) of Article Nine] conflict with the autonomy and
independence of the judicial authorities in their jurisdiction over
43 See U.N. Convention, supra note 429, art. XII, §9.
14 See United Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and
Psychotropic Substances, Multilateral Treaties Deposited with the Secretary-
General, Status as of 31 December 2003, at 426, U.N. Doc. E/CONF.82/15,
Corr.1 and Corr.2 (2003) [hereinafter Multilateral Treaties].435 Id. at 429.43 6
1d.
411 See Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters and Extradition, Multi-
lateral and Bilateral Judicial Cooperation Instruments, at http://www.oas.
org/juridico/MLAlen/col/encol-mla-gen-list.html (last visited Oct. 8, 2004)
[hereinafter Mutual Legal Assistance]. Among the bilateral conventions in place
at the time were the Agreement in Letters Rogatory with Chile, effective July
27, 1988, and the Agreement on Judicial Cooperation and Mutual Assistance
in Criminal Matters with Ecuador, effective December 18, 1986. Id.
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the investigation and judgment of offenses."438 . At that time,
Colombia was still reeling from narcoterrorism, following a costly
and bloody war against the notorious Medellin Cartel. While the
State was objecting to submitting to foreign cooperation in judi-
cial investigations of drug manufacturing, it was midway through
an unprecedented six-year thirty-six million dollar Administration
of Justice aid package from the United States Agency for
International Development.439 Moreover, Colombia, by 1994, was
party to numerous bilateral Judicial Cooperation Agreements,'"'
including an agreement, signed on February 25, 1991, with the
United States on Measures to Prevent the Diversion of Essential
Chemicals."'
At ratification in 1994, Colombia issued Declaration Two to
the Convention that states:
It is the view of Colombia that treatment under the
Convention of the cultivation of the coca leaf as a
criminal offence must be harmonized with a policy of
alternative development, taking into account the
rights of the indigenous communities involved and
the protection of the environment. In this connection
it is the view of Colombia that the discriminatory,
inequitable and restrictive treatment accorded its
agricultural export products on international
markets does nothing to contribute to the control of
illicit crops, but, rather, is a cause of social and
environmental degradation in the areas affected.
Further, Colombia reserves the right to make an
independent evaluation of the ecological impact of
drug control policies, since those that have a negative
impact on ecosystems contravene the Constitution."2
438 Multilateral Treaties, supra note 434, at 429.
431 See Luz E. Nagle, Colombia's Faceless Justice: A Necessary Evil, Blind
Impartiality, or Modern Inquisition, 61 PIr. L. REV. 881, 936-37 (2000).
440 See Mutual Legal Assistance, supra note 437.
441 See Nagle, U.S. Mutual Assistance, supra note 6, at 1249 n.67.
442 Multilateral Treaties, supra note 434, at 429.
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This passage is nothing more than a political statement made on
the world stage and does not belong in the Convention. Colombia's
objection to the criminalization of coca cultivation" 3 has nothing
to do with harmonizing alternative development, considering the
rights of indigenous communities, or protection of the
environment. While coca has always grown in small amounts in
some indigenous communities in Colombia, coca cultivation in
large amounts was not detected until 1986. 4"
Yet, Colombia cannot justify that coca growing is a right of
Colombia's indigenous peoples."5 This justification creates a slip-
pery slope; considering the way Colombia treats its own indigenous
communities, one must question if the Indian traditions are used
as a shield to hide ulterior motives.
Finally, Colombia's declaration that it reserves the right to
evaluate the ecological impact of drug control policies prompts the
question as to the extent, given the evidence in the field, Colombia
"' See U.N. Convention, supra note 429, art. 3, §1(a)(ii).
444 See THOUMI, supra note 35, at 123. Campesinos received seeds from the drug
traffickers, many of which belonged to indigenous communities. The evidence
shows that the traffickers were the distributors of the seeds, who were then the
guaranteed purchasers of the crops. The crops quickly spread throughout the
Colombian Andes. Id. at 120.
441 See Ana Maria Diaz & Fabio Sanchez, Geografa de los Cultiveos Ilicitos y
Conflicto Armado en Colombia 8, (unpublished article on file with author). See
also Multilateral Treaties Deposited with the Secretary-General, available at
http://untreaty.un.orgENGLISH/bible/englishinternetbible/partI/chapterVI/
treaty25.asp (last visited Nov. 8, 2004). Peru's reservation to the Convention
provides an interesting contrast, particularly in the light that coca growing is
very much an historical tradition among its indigenous cultures:
Peru formulates an express reservation to paragraph 1(a) (ii) of
article 3, concerning offences and sanctions; that paragraph
includes cultivation among the activities established as criminal
offences, without drawing the necessary clear distinction
between licit and illicit cultivation. Accordingly, Peru also
formulates an express reservation to the scope of the definition
of illicit traffic contained in article 1 in so far as it refers to
article 3, paragraph 1 (a) (ii).
See also Coca: Erythroxylum Coca, at www.herbs2000.com/herbs/herbs-coca.
htm (last visited Nov. 8, 2004). Coca cultivation in Peru is central to social
customs that have existed for the past millennium. The Incans considered it a
sacred leaf, and its consumption was "reserved for priests and royalty, for the
wealthy and talented, and for others of rank and privilege." Id.
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has ever considered the environmental impact of its national drug
control policies." 6
Granted, Colombia has a long and proud history of standing up
to real or imagined pressure from assumed imperialist
intentions, both by the United States and former colonial
powers.447 While Colombia's defiance from foreign intervention
may appear noble in the eyes of other developing nations, it seems
highly counterproductive to the goals set forth by international
agreements to decrease the production and distribution of illegal
drugs worldwide.
Despite Colombia's efforts to adhere to or distance itself
from the 1988 Convention, the extent and nature of Colombia's
border regions-characterized generally by thick tropical forests
accessible only through dense river corridors,4 s remote and
rugged coastline with little government oversight, and desolate
arid regions with little government infrastructure-make it
extremely difficult for Colombian authorities to exercise an
effective control over the illegal transportation of precursor
chemicals into Colombia by drug manufacturers." 9 Precursors
not smuggled into the national territory are either legally
imported for licit usages and then diverted for the processing of
illegal drugs or hijacked by illegal actors from domestic industrial
factories.450
Precursor chemicals are necessary because "[w]ith the
exception of cannabis, every illicit drug requires chemicals to be
refined to its final, consumable form (e.g. the coca plant to cocaine,
the poppy plant to heroin), or is purely the result of chemical
synthesis (e.g. methamphetamine, ecstasy, etc)."45'
446 On December 30, 1997, Colombia withdrew its reservations with regard to
Article 3 (6) and (9), and Article 6. See Multilateral Treaties, supra note 434, at
n.8.
... See generally The History of the Guerrilla Movement in Colombia, at
http://www.geocities.com/CapitolHill/7078/g.txt (last visited Nov. 8, 2004).
448 See PLAN NACIONAL, supra note 359, at 50. Colombia shares a 9,242
kilometer-long border with Brazil that is characterized as a jungle zone. See
CIA, WORLD FACTBOOK, supra note 13.
44' PLAN NACIONAL, supra note 359, at 50.450 Id. at 51.451 See International Office of National Drug Control Policy, ONDCP Fact Sheet:
Efforts to Control Precursor Chemicals, at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.
gov/publicationsinternationallfactshtlprecursor.html (last visited Oct. 10, 2004)
[hereinafter ONDCP Fact Sheet].
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As indicated by the following table, precursor chemicals for
the manufacture of cocaine and heroin are transported to
Colombia from all over the world:
Country of Origin Precursor Chemicals for Cocaine and
Heroin Manufacturing
Bulgaria Sodium carbonate
China Sodium carbonate, Potassium
permanganate
Mexico Acetic anhydride, Ethyl acetate
Netherlands Methyl-ethyl acetone, Ethyl acetate
Romania Sodium carbonate
Trinidad & Ammonia, Urea
Tobago
United States Ammonia, Acetic anydride, Butanol,
Isopropyl alcohol, Sodium carbonate
Venezuela Ammonia, Ethyl acetate, Hexane,
Isopropyl alcohol, Methanol, Sodium
carbonate 452
Unlike the transnational smuggling corridors through which
the world's supply of illegal drugs flow, the avenues by which
the precursor chemicals travel in their source countries are
relatively benign and difficult to police.453 The effort to trace and
track shipments of precursors requires significant international
452 Colombian Embassy, Source of Precursor Chemicals for Cocaine and Heroin
Production, at http://www.colombiaemb.org/repository/PLAN%20COLOMBIA
%20English%200ct%202000/tsld011.htm (last visited Oct. 8, 2004).
411 See ONDCP Fact Sheet, supra note 451.
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41
cooperation. 45 Additionally, hardship and costs are inflicted on
legitimate business and corporations dependent on industrial
chemicals for industrial, manufacturing, public health, civil
engineering, and commercial pharmaceutical applications.455
The United Nations International Narcotics Control Board
("INCB"), based in Vienna, Austria, is one of the primary
international organizations responsible for coordinating the efforts
of major manufacturing and trading countries to decrease the flow
of precursors into the illegal drug manufacturing pipeline.456
INCB efforts in the late 1990s,to facilitate interdiction and moni-
toring of the movement of precursor chemicals, resulted in two
programs-Operation Purple, designed to track illicit shipments
of potassium permanganate, 457 and Operation Topaz, intended to
track shipments of acetic anhydride.45 s
Most shipments to Colombia begin as seemingly legitimate
industrial transactions by chemical wholesalers and brokers who
are registered and licensed to import and distribute the chemi-
454 See id.
455 See id.
456 See id.
411 Id. According to claims by the DEA, Operation Purple, intended to expose
shipments of precursors bound for illegal drug labs, has been successful. "The
cornerstone of the operation is an intensive PP tracking program aimed at
identifying and intercepting diverted potassium permanganate; identifying
rogue firms and suspect individuals; gathering intelligence on diversion
methods, trafficking trends, and shipping routes; and taking administrative,
civil, and/or criminal action as appropriate." Between April 1999, the time of
the Operation's inception, and January 2002, Operation Purple has squeezed
the availability of precursor chemicals to traffickers. During that time, some
840 shipments (about 228 millions kilograms) of potassium permanganate, a
vital chemical for cocaine production, were tracked. This led to the arrest of
forty-five criminals and fifty-one shipments were either seized or prevented. The
Office of National Drug Control Policy claims that the amount of chemicals
seized during that time could have been used to manufacture twenty-nine
million kilograms of cocaine. Id.
458 See ONDCP Fact Sheet, supra note 451. Operation Topaz targets the
movement of acetic anhydride, a primary chemical used in the manufacture of
heroin. According to the Office of National Drug Control Policy, thirty-one
countries are now participating in Operation Topaz. Figures for 2001 indicated
that more than 61.8 million kilograms of the chemical had been tracked,
resulting in the interdiction or seizure of about 185,000 kilograms of acetic
anhydride from twenty shipments. Id.
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cals.459 However, once the precursors enter Colombia, the
transactions become murky and the precursors exit the formal
economy, disappearing into the narcotrafficking pipeline.46 °
Individuals responsible for "disappearing" precursor shipments
include so-called "rogue" importers or chemical wholesalers,
companies fronting for drug traffickers, or organized criminal
groups.46 ' The methods for diverting precursors include:
mislabeling shipping containers; forging or altering tracking and
shipping documentation; and coercing officials or business
employees with threats of force or bribery.462 Where tracking
protocols and law enforcement vigilance have been a significant
obstacle, drug traffickers and the illegally armed groups involved
in drug trafficking resort to simply hijacking shipments or
embarking on elaborate international smuggling operations from
source or transit companies.463 Moreover, the illegally armed
groups can utilize their military power in hijacking precursor
shipments, not only within Colombian territory, but elsewhere in
Latin America where the groups maintain a presence, such as in
Argentina, Paraguay, Brazil, Panama, and Venezuela. 46
Despite claims that protocols are in place to track and seize
shipments that fall outside the legitimate chemical supply
industry, the production of illegal drugs in Colombia continues to
soar.46 Something is lacking in the government regulation entities
because drug traffickers continue to produce a steadily escala-
ting output of cocaine and heroin that is dependent on an ample
459 Id.
460Id.
461 Id.
462Id.
463 See ONDCP Fact Sheet, supra note 451.
41 See Office of National Drug Control Policy, The National Drug Control
Strategy: 2001 Annual Report, available at http://www.ncjrs.org/ondcppubs/
publications/policy/ndcs0l/chap3-6.html#4 (last visited Nov. 8,2004) (reporting
that in 1999 about ninety-six metric tons of precursor chemicals were hijacked
or stolen after arriving in Colombia). For a comprehensive discussion on
international terrorist involvement in narcotrafficking and FARC ties with
terrorist and drug trafficking groups in Latin America, see LIBRARY OF
CONGRESS, FEDERAL RESEARCH DIVISION, A GLOBAL OVERVIEW OF NARCOTICS-
FUNDED TERRORIST AND OTHER EXTREMIST GROUPS (May 2002), available at
www.loc.gov/rr/frd/pdf-files/NarcsFundedTerrs Extrems.pdf.
41 See ONDCP Fact Sheet, supra note 451.
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supply of precursor chemicals. 66 The chemicals must be getting
through somehow. One must ask how, given the many mecha-
nisms now in place by domestic and international drug control
agencies to stop the flow of precursors.46 7 It can only be assumed
that either tracking and seizure figures are inaccurate, the
amount of precursors getting into Colombia is far greater than
reported, or that corruption is present in the agencies tasked with
tracking and seizing the precursor trade.468
Once the precursors enter the illegal pipeline and arrive at
remote labs throughout the Colombian territory, the chemicals
are stored for use in hazardous circumstances. The mishandling
of the chemicals during the "cooking" process poses present and
long-term health dangers to the processors, and expose residual
chemicals, fumes, and waste products to the environment.
In 2002, the International Narcotics Control Board released
a report on the Implementation of Article XII of the United
Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and
Psychotropic Substances of 1988. Annex II of the report provides
a sobering analysis of the amount of the precursors required to
produce 100 kilograms of cocaine hydrochloride. 6 9 First, 100 to
400 liters of sulphuric acid are needed to convert the coca leaf to
coca paste.47 ° Twenty kilograms of potassium permanganate are
then used to convert the paste into cocaine base. 471 Finally, 1,500
to 2,000 liters of acetone/ethyl ether/methyl ethyl ketone/toluene
are needed to convert the base into the finished product of cocaine
hydrochloride ("HCL). 472
466 
id.
467Id.
468 Id.
469 See U.N. DEP'T OF INT'L NARCOTICS CONTROL BOARD, PRECURSORS AND
CHEMICALS FREQUENTLYUSED IN THE ILLICIT MANUFACTURE OF NARCOTIC DRUGS
AND PSYCHOTROPIC SUBSTANCES, ANNEX II, FIGURE X, 2002, U.N. Sales No.
E.02.XI.4, available at http://www.incb.org/e/tr/pre/2001/precursors2001_
annex2.pdf [hereinafter INT'L NARCOTICS REPORT].
470
Id.
471Id.
47 2
Id.
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The following table estimates the amount of some precursors
used in 2000, according to a report by the Colombian Defense
Ministry:
Precursor/Compounds Amount per hectare Total
Acetone 38.01 liters 6,207,095
Ammonia 15 liters 2,564,069
Chloridric Acids 28.78 liters 4,698,771
Ethyl Acetate 57.02 liters 9,310,643
Gasoline 2,190 liters 357,741,451
Plaster 658 kilograms 107,522,751
Potassium Permanganate 1.90 kilograms 310,697
Sodium Bicarbonate 3.14 kilograms 513,380
Sulfuric Acid 10 liters 1,709,3794
73
To give one a sense of how much these resources are utilized
by narcotraffickers, the amount of gasoline used to process base
in 2000 alone "is equal to 3.12 days of gasoline consumption in the
state of California or to 6.8 days of current and extra gasoline
consumption in all Colombia."
474
The conversion of 100 kilograms of opium paste into heroin
requires precursors. 5 One hundred to 400 liters of acetic
anhydride are used to convert the opium paste into a heroin paste;
1,500 to 2,000 liters of acetone/ethyl ether and thirty liters of
"' See Republic of Colombia Ministry of National Defense, Environmental
Damages of Narcotrafficking: Executive Summary (Apr. 2002), at http://www.
mindefensa.gov.co/derechoshumanos/medioambiente/200204environmental
damages-narcotrafficking.htm
T4 Id.
... See INT'L NARCOTICS REPORT, supra note 469.
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hydrochloric acid are used to convert heroin paste into the fin-
ished product of heroin hydrochloride.4 v6
Continuation of the drug trade requires a reliable and
seemingly inexhaustible supply of precursor chemicals. As world-
wide demand for cocaine and heroin persists, chemical brokers,
smugglers, and hijackers will continue to find ways to provide the
chemicals necessary for drug traffickers to produce their illicit
product. The environment in which the labs are located will con-
tinue to be contaminated, and many workers who manufacture
drugs will be physically harmed.47 7 Unless and until Colombia
and its law enforcement take strong enough steps to cut the
supply of precursors, the fragile environment in which the drugs
are produced will continue to face potentially irreparable harm.
Needless to say, individuals involved in the illicit manu-
facture of controlled substances in Colombia's tropical forests have
little regard for the impact their activities have on the surrounding
environment. Because the drug labs are located in clandestine
hideaways in isolated jungle campsites and mountain enclaves,
leftover chemical residues remain when the processing camps are
abandoned. 4" The residues and unused chemicals eventually
pollute the groundwater aquifers, and get into watercourses, where
the toxins are spread over a wide area.479 The fields may be
subjected to cultivation at a later time and the toxins may be
dispersed into the food chain."0 Water dispersal brings the chemi-
cals into contact withhumans and animals dependent on the water
sources for sustenance and agriculture.4"' The chemical residues
476 Id.
477 See Press Conference, John Ashcroft, U.S. Attorney General, Indictments for
Drug Trafficking, FEDERAL NEWS SERVICE (May 6, 2004) (noting that "[d]rug
processing uses hundreds of metric tons of toxic and caustic chemicals, which
traffickers then dump in rivers and other water sources in public places, where
they constitute a serious public health and environmental hazard. Moreover,
clandestine drug labs are often situated in urban neighborhoods, bringing with
them a risk of explosion and other dangers to the people and the property in the
vicinity.").
478 Colombian Ministry of Defense, Chemical Dumping: Byproduct of the Drug
Industry, at http://www.mindefensa.gov.co/derechos humanos/medioambiente!
20020301insumosquimicos eng.html (last visited Oct. 10, 2004) [hereinafter
Chemical Dumping].
479 Id.
48 0 Id.
481 Id.
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also displace oxygen in the water and can literally suffocate
marine life, causing a drastic depletion of the aquatic biodiver-
sity in already sensitive areas."' The Colombian Ministry of
Defense notes that, "[w]ater turbidity may increase so as to block
sunlight from plants. Moreover, humans who consume plant or
animal products from this polluted food chain are at risk from
numerous possible carcinogens." 3
A significant area of the national territory suffering from drug
lab contamination is too dangerous for environmental monitoring
teams to investigate due to the presence of narcoguerrillas and
armed narcotraffickers. 4 The Colombian authorities estimate that
more than 1,000,000 tons of toxic precursors used in cocaine and
heroin processing have been dumped into the environment since
the mid-1980s.8 5 Assumptions as to what is occurring in the
Colombian tropical forests can also be drawn from studies per-
formed in neighboring countries where cocaine and heroin is
produced in similar natural surroundings.' In the late 1980s,
significant long-term damages resulted from coca processing in
the Upper Huallaga Valley of Peru. 7 More than 100,000,000
liters of gasoline, kerosene, sulfuric acid, and toluene were dumped
into the watercourses of the Huallaga River, which feeds into the
Amazon River basin. 48 The tributaries of the Huallaga suffered
mass destruction of plant and animal life that "far exceeded
pollution standards established by the World Health
Organization."4
89
A similar situation arose in Bolivia, where toxic chemicals
contaminated the sites of more than 11,000 coca paste labs that
were discovered and destroyed in the late 1980s.49 ° Colombia can
expect similar results given the impact of coca and heroin
processing on other Andean and Amazonian regions.
4 82
Yd.
483Id.
4
' Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, Environ-
mental Consequences of the Illicit Coca Trade (Mar. 17, 2003), at http://www.
state.gov/g/inl/rls/fs/3807.htm.48 5 Yd.48 See generally Chemical Dumping, supra note 478.
487Id.
488 Id.
4 8 9
Id.
4 9 0
id.
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3. Environmental Terrorism by Armed Groups
In Colombia, there is a residual impact to the environment
despite the relatively isolated and contained sites of armed
conflict. This occurs during attacks between combatants or on
civilian populations, which includes the burning of vehicles,
firebombing of buildings, disruption of the utilities infrastruc-
ture, and collateral damages due to the proliferation of land-
mines.491' Likewise, the impact on the environment, by the human
and industrial detritus attendant to the jungle encampments of
armed groups throughout the Colombian territory, cause
potentially long-term concerns.492 But the more odious attacks on
the environment by armed groups in Colombia involve the
guerrilla campaign against the nation's oil and gas industry,
including drilling sites, pipelines, and refineries. 4 3 Guerrilla
groups in Colombia have used "[dieliberate attempts to damage
the environment as a tactic of war against the formal enemy and
as a means of instilling terror in the general populace."9 4
ELN, with cooperation from FARC, has been responsible for
more than 900 sabotage attacks against the Cano-Limon-Covenas
oil pipeline since 1986.495 Of the 346 terrorist incidents listed in
the State Department's Patterns of Global Terrorism report for
2001, fifty-one percent (178 of the attacks) were carried out against
the Cano Limon pipeline by ELN and FARC.496 Operated by
491 See generally HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, "YOU'LL LEARN NOT TO CRY": CHILD
COMBATANTS IN COLOMBIA (Sept. 2003), available at http://www.hrw.orgl
reports/2003/colombia0903/colombia0903.pdf (discussing different tactics used
b combatants in Colombia).
1See Environmental Consequences of the Illicit Coca Trade, supra note 484.
See Trade Environment Database Projects, Petroleum Mining and the U'wa
Indian Community, available at http://www.american.edu/TED/colspill.htm#r3
(last visited Nov. 8, 2004) (explaining that in "Colombia, oil and violence are
closely tied. Colombia's left-wing guerrilla groups continuously attack the oil
industry installations because they are viewed as strategic targets.").
414 Jennifer Leaning, Tracking the Four Horsemen: The Public Health Approach
to the Impact of War and War-Induced Environmental Destruction in the
Twentieth Century, in THE ENVIRONMENTAL CONSEQUENCES OF WAR: LEGAL,
ECONOMIC, AND SCIENTIFIC PERSPECTIVES, supra note 29, at 397.
495 See Kirk Semple, Colombian Training Program Not Just for Guarding
Pipelines, 81 PLATTS OILGRAM NEWS, Feb. 18, 2003, at 2.411 Peter Kiernan, US Plays Bigger Role in Latin America As It Aims to Boost
Non-Arab Oil Supplies, OIL DAILY, July 8, 2002.
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Occidental Petroleum and based in Los Angeles, California, the
Cano Limon pipeline runs 770 kilometers, from the Cano Limon
oilfields in the Arauca Department of north-central Colombia
through a remote area of northeast Colombia; the pipeline con-
nects with oil tankers at the Colombian port of Covenas on the
Caribbean coast.497 The Cano Limon oilfield produces about twenty
percent of Colombia's crude oil.49 According to various sources, the
pipeline carries anywhere between 110,000 and 225,000 barrels
of oil per day.499 Guerrillas have attacked the pipeline more than
940 times since 1986, spilling an estimated 11,000,000 barrels of
oil into the surrounding environment °° (approximately forty-three
times the amount spilled by the 1989 Exxon Valdez disaster in
Alaska).501 These spills have resulted in an estimated revenue loss
of two billion U.S. dollars.0 2 The impact of crude oil spills into
local rivers, causing contamination of the wildlife and fish, has
extended beyond Colombia's borders into neighboringVenezuela. °3
Venezuela requested monetary compensation from Colombia, but
reached an agreement in which Colombia will instead pay the
actual cleanup costs of the crude oil spills, which does not include
compensation for environmental damages.5°4
ELN and FARC attacked the pipeline at least 150 times in
2000 and 170 to 180 times in 2001.505 In 2001, ELN and FARC
497 See U.S. Dept. of State, Report to Congress, Colombia: Cano Limon Pipeline
(Dec. 2002), available at http://www.ciponline.org/colombia/02120001.htm
[hereinafter Report to Congress]. See generally Kiernan, supra note 496; see also
Steven Dudley, War in Colombia's Oilfields: Washington's Counterinsurgency
Aid Will Be a Big Boost to Occidental Petroleum, 275 THE NATION, Aug. 5, 2002,
at 28.498 See Dudley, supra note 497, at 28.
499 See Kiernan, supra note 496; see also Semple, supra note 495, at 2.
50 Report to Congress, supra note 497.50' The Exxon Valdez tanker ran aground in 1989 and dumped approximately
257,000 barrels of oil into Prince William Sound, of which approximately 36,000
barrels were ultimately recovered. See Exxon Valdez Oil Spill Trustee Council,
Oil Spill Facts: Questions and Answers, at http://www.evostc.state.ak.us/facts/
qanda.html (last visited Oct. 10, 2004).2 Report to Congress, supra note 497.503 See Austin & Bruch, supra note 29, at 3-4.
5o" See id. See also Eric Feldman, Introduction to Part IV of THE ENVIRONMENTAL
CONSEQUENCES OF WAR: LEGAL, ECONOMIC, AND SCIENTIFIC PERSPECTIVES 469-
75, supra note 29.
505 The actual numbers of attacks seem to vary among sources. However, the
number of attacks is unprecedented. See Kiernan, supra note 496.
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attacks kept approximately 65,750 barrels of oil per day from
reaching the terminal in Covenas. °6 In 2002, attacks against the
pipeline tapered off as a result of increased security patrols by
the Colombian Army's 18th Brigade and 5th Mobile Brigade, °7
"to an average of five times a month--compared to fourteen times
a month [in 2001], according to the US Energy Information
Administration ("EIA").5 °8 Leftist rebels are also suspected to be
responsible for the November 2002 attack on Colombia's largest
export pipeline in the eastern Casanare Department.0 9
It could be argued by someone sympathetic to the guerrillas'
tactics against oil infrastructures that attacks against the oil
and gas infrastructure are no more damaging to the environment
and local inhabitants than the ecological impact of oil and gas
drilling and transportation operations. In one example, twenty-five
families in the northern Antioquia Department near the town of
Zaragoza demanded compensation of approximately £600,000
from British Petroleum ("BP"), a major partner in Colombia's oil
and gas industry, for damages arising from pipeline construction
through their lands.510 According to a report by the Colombia
Solidarity Campaign,
The pipe was laid along the higher ground of undu-
lating terrain, with the peasant plots directly below.
ODC [Oleoducto de Colombia] 11 stripped all the trees
from along the pipeline corridor, leaving it without
vegetation, exposed to water and wind erosion. The
earth moving operations caused avalanches, blocked
springs and diverted streams. Works for the pipeline
506Id.
507 See Report to Congress, supra note 497.
508 See Kiernan, supra note 496.
'09 Colombia's Chief Pipeline Bombed, OIL DAILY, Nov. 25, 2002. The Cusiana-
Cupiagua fields produce nearly half of the 600,000 barrels of oil produced each
day in Colombia and are operated by British Petroleum partners. The pipeline
is also owned by Total Fina Elf of France, holding nineteen percent, and Triton
Energy of the United States, a subsidiary of Amerada Hess, which possesses
twelve percent. Id.
o Andy Higginbottom, BP and Pipeline Damage in Colombia, Colombia Soli-
darity Campaign, at htt ://www.colombiasolidarity.org.uk/Solidarity%201
b5pipeline.html (last visite Oct. 11, 2004).
5nId. Colombia's state oil company, Ecopetrol, created ODC to run the pipeline
project. Id.
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destroyed 150 water sources along the Zaragoza
section. ODC's restoration work was carried out
badly, topsoil was not replaced, and sacks of earth
had rotted away within a few months. Farm animals
that ate the synthetic sacking were poisoned. The
peasants lost their fruit trees and other crops.512
The peasants were forced to abandon their lands and, as of
April 2001, had still not reached a compensation agreement with
British Petroleum.5 13 Oil and gas operations also cause stress to
the surrounding environment, especially in developing countries
with little oversight or control over enforcing the regulations
enacted to protect the environment and indigenous inhabitants.5 14
Environmental damage caused by oil companies are a result of
negligence or even corruption, whereas damages caused by the
guerrillas are intentional acts of war against the State and
against vital industrial sectors of the economy.5 15 Therefore,
guerrilla attacks must be treated as threats to Colombia's
national security, and in the author's opinion, the appropriate
response is military action.
The guerrillas, for example, routinely target water resources
and hydroelectric power grids nationwide. In May 2003, in less
than one week, rebels destroyed eighteen electrical towers,
disrupting power in much of northern Colombia, and sabotaged
a water aqueduct and hydroelectricity plant near Cali."6 The
attacks disrupted water supplies to Cali and cut power to the
Pacific port of Buenaventura, which handles about sixty percent
512 Id.
513 Id.
514 See Regulation and the Environment, 75 PLAT'S OILGRAM NEWS, July 28,
1997, at 3 (describing what occurred when oil companies were allowed to drill
in Ecuador's Amazon region of Oriente, where weak environmental laws and
regulations resulted in devastating consequences for the fragile jungle eco-
system).
See generally Juliette Kerr, US Advisers to Train Army to Defend Oil
Pipeline, WORLD MARKETS ANALYSIS, Oct. 21, 2002 (reporting that ELN has
long considered Colombia's oil pipelines legitimate military targets).
516 See Colombian Rebels Bomb Energy Pylons in Latest Infrastructure Attacks,
BUENOS AIRES HERALD, May 10, 2003, available at www.buenosaireherald.
com/editorialeditorialenglish note.jsp?idContents=12284 (last visited Oct. 14,
2004).
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of the coffee shipments out of Colombia.517 While such attacks do
not pose a direct threat to the environment per se, these attacks
target environmental resources and are acts of war against the
State and its economy.
The guerillas also cause significant concern by gaining control
of vital natural resources through methods such as "gunpoint
conservation," a tactic previously explained.5 1 Since the middle of
the last century, guerrillas have controlled the Sumapaz reser-
voir, located on the high plateau in the eastern Andes Mountains
and considered one of the five major components of the national
water reservoir grid.519 FARC, now in control of this region, has the
potential to keep the water from reaching Bogoti, a tactic that
could result in a disastrous water shortage by 2015 if the guer-
rillas retain control.52 °
The guerrillas have previously used such tactics. In March
2002, a FARC unit seized a pumping station on the Rio Bobo
reservoir and forced engineers to shut the flow of water to the
500,000 residents of Pasto, the provincial capital of Narifio
Department. 521 ELN occupies the Serrania de San Lucas in order
to control the vast hydrological resources critical to satiating the
thirst of the people of Bogot. 522 Control over such water resour-
ces serves as "a demonstration of authority and a manifestation of
a broader ideological program."52 3
While such attacks against the water and power infrastruc-
ture cause economic more than ecological damage, there is still
an environmental impact at the site of these attacks. Structures
must be repaired, flooding from attacks to aqueducts and dams
causes serious erosion, industrial chemicals are spilled into the
local environment, and the livelihoods of local inhabitants are
negatively impacted.
517 Reuters, 3 Killed in Bomb Attack on City's Aqueduct, THE BOSTON GLOBE,
May 10, 2003, at A6.519 See supra notes 26-27 and accompanying text.
See Maria Isabel Garcia, Environment-Colombia: Crucial Reservoir a Guer-
rilla Bastion, Inter Press Service, Oct. 18, 2003.520 See id.
521 See Andrew Selsky, Rebels Cut Off Water Supply to Colombian City in the
Andes, Associated Press, Mar. 21, 2002, available at www.ipsnews.netlafrica/
inerna.asp?idnews=20691.522 Alvarez, Forests supra note 23, at 59.
5 23 Id.
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C. Government Interdiction and the Environment
The Colombian government's policy to eradicate coca and
poppy cultivation is achieved primarily through aerial fumiga-
tion and manual eradication operations.5 24 The aerial campaign
has been harsh and justifiably criticized by environmental and
human rights groups 52 ' Between 1994 and 2001, about 368,238
hectares of coca, and about 48,549 hectares of opium poppies were
eradicated nationwide. 6 However, these figures appear overly
optimistic and misleading. Under environmental regulations
enacted in the early 1990s, 527 the Colombian National Anti-
narcotics Agency created the Environmental Management Plan for
Illicit Crop Eradication, which excludes eradication operations
"in zones of the National Natural Parks System, bodies of water,
human settlements, and areas of economic interest, including the
buffer areas for these elements, and zones with a plant layer other
than illicit crops."528 If these areas are exempt from eradication,
then it seems obvious that these will be areas of intense interest
for growers to exploit.
Data gathered by the Colombian Defense Ministry in 2000
indicated that coca and poppy growing has expanded significantly
into the national park system. According to calculations, a total
of 4,660 hectares of coca and 199 hectares of opium poppy were
being grown inside national park boundaries, resulting in the
deforestation of more than 14,500 hectares of land, an area "equi-
valent to 5.2 times the size of Washington, D.C."529 Another exam-
ple is the La Paya National Natural Park in central Putumayo,
524 See MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, supra note 395, at 21-22.
525 Id.
526 Id.
527 See DIARIO OFICIAL, supra note 290. See also Decreto 1753 de 1994, available
at http://www.cdmb.gov.co/normas/decreto17531994.htm (last visited Nov. 9,
2004) (establishing a licensing protocol for any development projects having an
impact on the environment).528 See MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, supra note 395, at 23.
529 See MISITERIO DE NACIONAL, DESTROZOS AMBIENTALES DEL NARCOTRAFICO:
RESUMEN EJECUTIVO (Apr. 2002), at 5, available at http://www.mindefensa.
gov.co/derechos-humanos/medioambiente/200204informenarcotrafico_
y-medioambienteb.htm.
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where a survey indicated that about 1267 hectares of park terri-
tory is used for coca cultivation.
530
The war against coca cultivation presents a "lose-lose"
situation for Colombia's stressed environment. Aerial fumigation
causes environmental contamination and displacements of agri-
culture settlements.5 31 Fumigation may reduce coca and poppy
production in some areas, but the effort accelerates deforestation
elsewhere. 32 As more coca crops are eradicated or fumigated,
growers move deeper into Colombia's forests to clear land for more
coca fields, and at some point, eradicated areas will have been
completely substituted for new plots of land.533 It is analogous to
constricting a filled balloon at one spot and seeing it bulge in
another.
VI. HUMANITARIAN CONSEQUENCES OF THE ARMED CONFLICT 534
The humanitarian devastation caused by the environmental
damage and the lack of enforcement of the existing legislation
have been discussed. This Section addresses the massacres and
massive displacement due to the conflict. Only a few examples
are given because the record of abuse is too long.
The power struggle over the nation's resources and profits
from the business of illegal drugs has resulted in the systematic
displacement of thousands and, in many situations, entire villages.
"Colombia has produced one of the world's largest uprooted popu-
lations, with one million people registering with the government
as displaced between 2000 and 2003, and unofficial estimates of
530 See id.
531 Id.
532 See Ricardo Vargas Meza, Strategy for Controlling the Drug Supply: Illicit
Crops and Alternative Development Policy Recommendations 18-19
(unpublished paper and seminar presentation, Uppsala University) (March 17,
2004), available at http://www.kus.uu.se/CF/sem040317/vargas040402.pdf.
133 See William Mullen, Preservation vs. Profit, CHICAGO TRIBUNE, Apr. 12,
2004, at 1 (reporting that eradication campaigns in the Huallaga Valley have
forced farmers and traffickers deeper into forested areas to avoid detection by
security and counternarcotics forces).5" For the sake of brevity, this Section will mainly address the plight of the
Afro-Colombians and Colombian Indians whose territories are the battle-
grounds of the armed conflict.
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3 million since 1985.""' 5 These Colombians are too often caught
in the crossfire of a battle between illegal actors and the govern-
ment or guerrillas and paramilitary groups.
The most affected by the conflict are the underprivileged, the
powerless, and the less protected individuals of the society who
make up the rural peasantry and indigenous population. This
includes Colombian Indian groups, Afro-Colombians, and pea-
sants of mixed race (mulattos and mestizos); most of the conflict
takes place in the poor and forgotten regions that house these
minorities.53 6
Afro-Colombian communities occupy coastal lands with
access to ports in the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans.5 37 Drug
traffickers, guerrillas, and the paramilitaries have sought access
to those lands to allow the easy transfer of arms and to control
the means by which their illicit goods are shipped.538 These
lands are in a region "rich with gold, emeralds, and oil."5 39 The
area also includes pharmaceutically rich rainforest areas, fertile
farming lands, and rivers with the potential to provide tremen-
dous hydroelectric power."54 ° Coincidentally, the highest levels of
displacement have occurred in these very zones after the lands
are earmarked for hydroelectric projects and illegal drug produc-
tion.54 '
The deforestation "had an impact on the traditional indige-
nous and black settled cultures, affecting their social relations
535 See, CHURCH WORLD SERVICE, AFRO-COLOMBIANS: PROMOTING ALTERNATIVES
TO VIOLENCE, DISPLACEMENT, AND IMPOVERISHMENT 1 (Feb. 2004), at http:l
www.reliefweb.int/library/documents/2004/cws-col-20feb.pdf(last visited Oct. 10,
2004) [hereinafter AFRO-COLOMBIANS].
... Goldman Environmental Prize, Libia Grueso: Colombia Sustainable
Development (2004), available at http://www.goldmanprize.org/recipients/
recipientProfile.cfm?recipientID=132 (last visited Oct. 10, 2004) [hereinafter
Libia Grueso]. Colombia's Pacific Coast region, home to part of Colombia's
rainforest, houses "30 percent of Colombia's 10.6 million Afro-Colombians."
Armed groups battled in that territory "in pursuit of their cut of the profit,
including the introduction of illicit crops such as coca, causing terrible and
widespread devastation." Id.
537 AFRO-COLOMBIANS, supra note 535, at 4.
538 Id.539 Id.540 Id.541 Id.
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and their links with nature."54 2 The war threatens not only
these groups' cultural and environmental values, but the forced
displacement also threatens their lives. The battle over the
resources and the profits from the illegal drug industry on the
Pacific Coast has resulted in several massacres of innocent
civilians, including children and women. Many survivors are
forced to leave, triggering the "systematic displacement of more
than one million Afro-Colombians."5 43
In the Cauca Department, paramilitaries and guerrillas
massacred approximately 120 civilians in several villages.54 In the
town of Alto Naya, 150 people were killed;545 40 of the victims,
including a 17-year-old girl, were murdered with machetes and
chain saws.546 These confrontations caused massive displace-
ments-in two years, 7,200 people were displaced in the port city
of Buenaventura alone.547
There are several reasons for the massacres and subsequent
massive displacements in Alto Naya. This town has "large local
deposits of natural resources, such as gold and precious woods,"
several coca fields, is situated in a strategic location "on a river
used by guerrillas for transporting troops and arms," and some
claim that ELN uses the dense surrounding jungle to hide kid-
napped victims.' The mineworkers union produced a series of
maps in which "there appears an almost perfect correlation be-
tween paramilitary forced displacement and the existence of
natural resources.
"549
5 42
1d.
141 See Libia Grueso, supra note 536.
544 Id.
545Id.
546 U.S. Committee for Refugees, A Year of Brutal Violence in Colombia (2002),
at http://www.org/world/articles/americas-boxwrs02.htm (last visited Oct. 10,
2004) [hereinafter Brutal Violence in Colombia].
141 See Libia Grueso, supra note 536.
511 See Liam Craig-Best & Rowan Shingler, The Alto Naya Massacre: Another
Paramilitary Outrage, COLOM. J. ONLINE (May 21, 2001), at http://www.
colombiajournal.org/colombia64.htm.5 49 Id.
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On May 2, 2002, Afro-Colombians residing in Bojay 55 ° were
victims of one of the worst massacres as a result of the fight be-
tween FARC and AUC "for control of strategic jungle smuggling
routes in the remote region bordered by the Pacific Ocean and
Panama."551 As the fighting raged, Afro-Colombians from the area
fled to a concrete church, which collapsed when struck by one of
FARC's rockets. At least 120 innocent civilians died, "including
more than 40 children."55 2 One of the victims "sought refuge in the
church with his pregnant wife and five daughters, aged from 2 to
10, in the evening on May 1. The next day he was the only one in
his family to walk out alive."553 Bojayd is located in "[t]he strategic
corridor down the Atrato River," which "is a key route for smug-
gling cocaine out of Colombia and weapons into the country."
554
Indigenous people inhabit several regions that are under
siege.555 Colombia considers indigenous people a "national patri-
mony of invaluable cultural and social wealth," and since 1991, the
government has enacted massive amounts of legislation protect-
ing their rights.556 Yet in reality, these laws are only printed pieces
of paper.
0 See Garry Leech, Turning a Blind Eye, COLOM. J. ONLINE (May 15, 2002), at
http://www.colombiajournal.org/colombiall3.htm. The Bojaya massacre is
another example of a the Colombian government's abandonment of the poor
black areas of the nation. In March 2000, after FARC attacked the local police
station, the government "withdrew all security forces stationed in the area." Id.
FARC consolidated control over the region after defeating the local para-
militaries. -n mid-April, the paramilitaries were moving back into the region:
"450 heavily armed paramilitary fighters from the United Self-Defense Forces
of Colombia (AUC) traveled down the Atrato River in eleven boats (according to
the UN report, 250 AUC fighters in seven boats). Somehow this large
conspicuous force passed unheeded through several military checkpoints along
the river." Id. The arrival of the paramilitaries triggered several pleas to Bogotd
for military protection to avoid "civilians being caught in a crossfire between the
illegal armed groups." Id.
551 Juan Forero, Massacre Marks New Stage in War, May 10, 2002, available at
http://www.smh.com.au/articles/2002/05/09/102091 4 032375.html.5 52 Id.
5 53 Id.
554 Id.
5 55 COMISION INTERAMERICANA DE LOS DERECHOS HUMANOS, SEGUNDO INFORME
SOBRE LA SITUACION DE LOS DERECHOS HuMANOS EN COLOMBIA, ch. XI (1993),
available at http'//www.cidh.oas.org/countryrep/Colombia93sp/ cap. 11.htm (last
visited Oct. 11, 2004). There are 600,000 Indians living in twenty-five percent
of the national territory. They are organized in eighty-one groups, and speak
seventy-five different languages. Id.
.
56See generally id. (explaining the rights of indigenous people in Colombia).
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One of these areas of national patrimony is the Catatumbo
territory located in northeastern Colombia in the department of
Norte de Santander.5 7 In 1989, the government declared this reg-
ion the Catatumbo-Bari Natural National Park because of its rich
forest and biodiversity."' The Motil6n-Bari indigenous community
lives in Catatumbo, 59 and comprises sixteen small communities.56 °
In 1978, the government deemed this area an indigenous
territory. 61 The indigenous communities enjoyed territorial juris-
diction and autonomy in their structural organization, culture, and
beliefs. 62 The territorial privileges enjoyed by the indigenous
community did not go unnoticed by the guerrillas.
Also in 1978, ELN settled in the Catatumbo region where it
could not only harass the Motil6n-Bari community, but also grow
coca and carries out various terrorist activities. 5 3 ELN kidnaps
anyone who tries to help the Indian community gain control of
the Catatumbo region because the region is vital to ELN's hege-
mony.564 In the Catatumbo, ELN can consolidate its economic and
military power.565 The region's geographic position allows ELN
to strengthen its power in coca production, and dominate the
117 The Catatumbo territory borders Venezuela. See, e.g., Perry-Castanoda
Library Map Collection, at http://www.libutexas.edu/maps/americas/Colombia_
pol2001.jpg (last visited Oct. 11, 2004).
58 Colombia Objectiva, supra note 99. This region has an area of 158,125
kilometers and 616 bird species are close to extinction in its humid forests. Id.559 Id. The community has 2,137 inhabitants distributed in sixteen communities
in the northeastern region of the Norte de Santander Department. Id.
56 Id. There are two reservations in the Motilona region. The first reservation,
the Convenci6n municipality, contains the following villages: Ikiakarora,
Okbadukayra, Suerena, Brovucanina, Naycadukaira, Akangbarinkaira,
Bachindikaira, Atirind, Ikaira, Trindikayra, Korronkayra, Birindikayra, Kantra
Kuigday Kaira, Kiribado Kaira, Siriko Kaira, and Soro Kayra y Shubacbarina.
The second reserve, Motilon La Gabarra, is located in the municipality of
Gabarra with the following villages: Catalaura, Caricacha, Boquira, Bocabouira
and Sagbadana. Id.
561 Id. The land was designated an indigenous territory under Resolution 102
of November 28, 1978, registered with the Minister of Government and the
Commission on Indigenous Affairs of Colombia. See Colombia Objectiva, supra
note 99.5 62 Id.
56 Id. ELN ceased terrorist activities from the area until 1982. Id.
"' Id. ELN kidnapped Bruce Olson, a Canadian citizen helping the Indian
community. The Indians considered Olson one of them because he had brought
well-being to the community with his work in health, community organization,
and education. Id.
565 See Colombia Objectiva, supra note 99.
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corridor for the traffic of guns brought from Nicaragua and
Venezuela by way of Lake Maracaibo and Catatumbo River.566
Today, the region is an important area of cultivation and
production of coca, with more than 30,000 hectares of land used for
cultivating coca.567 There are several coca laboratories in the
region, and the final product leaves the country through
Maracaibo Lake.56 Production exceeds 2,000 kilos per week, and
ELN receives 60,000 pesos per kilo.569 ELN has prohibited the
traditional activities and industries such as lumber, agriculture
and livestock, and forces the residents to work in the coca busi-
ness.
570
The Indians face not only threats against their culture and
patrimony, but also threats to their lives and stability."1 "Their
territories have been occupied by dams, pipelines, roads, illegal
crops, oil and mine explorations, big haciendas, extensive cul-
tivation of African palm, National Natural Parks and so-called
ecotourism." 72 In speeches and laws, the national government
promises to respect the human rights of the Indians.573 However,
after the enactment of the 1991 constitution, the nation has seen
an increase in the violation of their human rights; the statistics
show that more than 3,500 Indians have been displaced by the
violence.574 Many hundreds have been murdered. In 2000, there
were 1,012 homicides in the Sierra Nevada.575 In the first half of
2003 alone, 118 Indians were killed.576 There have been many
566 1d.
567 
Id.
568Id.
... Id. The wealth of the area attracts narcotraffickers from other parts of
Colombia and countries such as Venezuela. They carry as much as 400 million
Pesos to purchase the product. Id.70 See Colombia Objectiva, supra note 99. An ELN deserter said that he left
because he did not like to scrape the coca leaves. Id.
571 See Luis Evelis Andrade, Colombia: Por el Conflicto Armado, la Cultura y
Patrimonio Indigena en Via de Extinci6n, available at http://www.bio
diversidadla.orgarticle/articleview/4887/1/24/ (last visited Oct. 11, 2004).
572Id.
57
3 Id.
574
Id.
571 See Paraiso Sitiado, supra note 276, at 51.
116 See Survival International, 10-Year Old Is Latest Victim in Wave of Indian
Murders (Oct. 8, 2003), available at http://www.survival-international.org/
brazil_031008.htm.
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accusations against the criminals and government officials for rape
and abuse, both physical and verbal.577 Moreover, there is a
prohibition on free movement in their own territory and the food
supply to their communities is restricted.57 The fear generated
by the presence of the armed actors prevents the entrance of vacci-
nations, medicine, and groups of physicians.
579
The Arhuaco, Kogi, and the Arsario tribes living in the Sierra
Nevada de Santa Marta are caught in the crossfire between the
army, left-wing guerrillas and right-wing paramilitaries.
The lower slopes of the mountain have been colonised
by settlers, many of them growing coca and heroin
poppies for the drug trade. Dozens of Indians have
been killed in the quasi-civil war raging on their
land. In February this year an Arsario village was
bombarded for several days by the Colombian army,
forcing the inhabitants to flee.5"'
Because of its biodiversity and strategic location, the Sierra
Nevada is key for the actors in the internal conflict. 58 ' The water
from the Sierra Nevada supplies thirteen municipalities and all
the flat zones of the Atlantic Coast, which support the agro-
export industry.58 2 The Sierra's proximity to the ocean facilitates
... See Stephen Ferry, Keepers of the World, 206 NATIONAL GEOGRAPHIC, Oct.
2004, at 50, 53 (quoting an aman of the Kogi tribe describing the conflict raging
in the Kogi terrorities in the Santa Marta range: "All sides-guerrillas, army,
and paramilitaries-are the same .... They say they fight to defend the Indian,
only to turn around and try to destroy us.").
578 See Paraiso Sitiado, supra note 276, at 52. The military commander of the
zone requested a census of Indian families in Sierra Nevada to calculate the
maximum amount of food supply each family could purchase. Each week the
army allowed only two truckloads of food into the area to supply the Indian
population, and apparently the rationale is that the army does not want the
Indians to supply the guerrillas with food. However, the guerrillas are turning
around and stealing the only cows and sustenance crops on which the Indians
have to survive. The paramilitaries also designate those who can purchase
Indian products, charging $50 to $100 pesos per kilo of coffee leaving the Sierra
Nevada. Id.
57 9 Andrade, supra note 571.510 Survival International, Indians Beheaded in Sierra Nevada, Colombia, Dec.
23, 2003, available at http://survival-international.orglarhuaco-031223.htm.
581 See Paraiso Sitiado, supra note 276, at 52.
582 Id.
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both the smuggling of legal and illegal contraband and the pro-
visioning of arms for the guerrillas, the paramilitaries, and the
narcotraffickers. "Moreover, it is a strategic corridor that extends
from the Venezuelan border to the UrabA region, and it includes
regions of Cesar and the Ci6naga Grande of Santa Marta as
corridors toward the region of C6rdoba."" 3 In other words, the
Sierra Nevada region is key to the survival of Colombia's illegal
armed groups.
One of the most violent places in Colombia is Barranca-
bermeja, a city traditionally controlled by ELN.58 4 Its location
along the Magdalena River in northern Colombia provides a
water route to the Caribbean Ocean. "Much of the cocaine grown
in surrounding areas passes through Barrancabermeja en route
to the Caribbean coast."5 5 The city refines "80 percent of the
nation's oil and stands at the heart of the fertile cattle ranching
lands and rich coca producing areas of northern Colombia."86 In
2001, AUC battled to seize control of the city's nearby areas.
From January to April, AUC was responsible for the murder of
approximately 180 civilians in Barrancabermeja and caused more
than 4,000 residents to flee.58 7 It is important to understand that
the displacements harm the environment as displaced communi-
ties struggle to survive off the land by clearing untouched areas
for new living space and for planting crops, thereby causing
human waste and trash, soil erosion, and deforestation.
VII. CONCLUSION
Colombia's violence reflects the State's incapacity to enforce
the existing laws, and a society with weak social and individual
restrictions. Violence and drug trafficking are just symptoms of
an impotent State and its social problems. Colombia's dysfunc-
tional public order has triggered the development of a "private
5 83 id.
584 Teun Voeten, Barrancabermeja: Murder Capital of the World, available at
http://www.crimesofwar.org/colombia-mag/teun.html (last visited Oct. 11, 2004).
Barrancabermeja is known as the "murder capital of the world." Id.
585 Brutal Violence in Colombia, supra note 546.
586 See Voeten, supra note 584.
587 Id.
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order" through paramilitarism. In the absence of state presence
through police force, school systems, hospitals and courts, citizens
have sought their own ways to assure protection without relying
on the State. As demonstrated by the situation in Colombia,
"dysfunctional governance can exacerbate conflict and its en-
vironmental impact."
5 8 8
The internal armed conflict in Colombia cannot justify failing
to implement or apply environmental and humanitarian legisla-
tion. Colombia is a party to many international protocols and
conventions, and it has enacted domestic legislation to protect the
environment and its citizens. However, without effective enforce-
ment, Colombia's laws are merely token efforts that provide little
more than illusions to the world community. If Colombia had
been strong enough to enforce its own laws in times of peace, it
would not be so hard to protect the rule of law during times of
internal conflict. However, because Colombia lacks the resolve to
fight for the rule of law, little can be done to hold the illegally
armed actors and renegades within the government accountable
for their many environmental depredations.
During this time of conflict, not only do Colombian laws apply,
but also the treaties to which Colombia is a signatory. Perhaps, the
international community should compel Colombia to fulfill not
only its international human rights obligations, but also its
international environmental obligations.
The Colombian conflict has created an environmental and
humanitarian crisis. For many years, Colombia ignored the
political violence in rural areas, resulting in decades of displace-
ment, which in turn caused more violence and degradation of
the environment, because the refugees needed to replace the
shelter, food, water, and sources of income taken from them by
the conflict. The violence is perpetuated because the society sees
the displaced as unwanted leftovers-burdens to the lifestyles of
those more fortunate. "To resolve the problem of the displaced,
implies no less than to remake a nation, which means at the same
time its society and institutions."8 9
588 Price, supra note 214, at xvi.
589 Pdcaut, supra note 22, at 23.
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Resolving social and economic inadequacies, dealing decisively
with illegally armed groups, bringing the rule of law and humani-
tarian relief to rural and isolated regions, instituting equitable
land distribution and instilling certainty of property rights through
committed management, and sharing of natural resources are all
essential to slowing the destruction of Colombia's environment, its
precious environmental resources, and its indigenous communities.
